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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
• 
With the Molitar decision, the Supreme Court of Illinois ab-
rogated the I~~ity Doctrine and ruled that the Illinois School 
Districts were liable in tort for injuries to pupils resulting fro~ 
the negligent acts of the sohool employees. Since recovery can be 
obtained for injuries to pupile, an increase in tort litigation cal 
be expected in the Illinois Public Schools. Parents are becoming 
more litigation-oonsoious, and the expanding sohool program in 
Illinois will multiply the number of instanoes in whioh the studen1 
~1l1 be exposed to greater risk of harm. An increase in litigatiol 
may be evident by the great numbers of cases brought against the 
school districts in California, New York, and Washington, where the 
o 
Immunity Dootrine has been abrogated. 
There is need for sohool administrators and educators to be-
pome awnre of their legal responsibilities and the liabillt~as 
~hioh can be imposed for their negligent oonduct. Through an un-
~erstanding of liability, administrators and educators can take 
preoautionary measures to prevent injuries to pupils and avoid lit. 
igation against thG schools. \ 
, 
The Master-servant relationship between the sohool distriots 
1 
2 
and teaohers was established in Illinois in 1959, and the sohool 
distriots will respond for the negligenoe of a teaoher. There may. 
be no finanoial 10s8 to a teacher, but educators have a profession 
al duty to keep the sohool distriot out of the oourts. Moreover, 
eduoators bave a le~al and moral duty to proteot sohool pupils 1'101 
harm. In the event that aotion is brought against a teaoher, and 
the suit proves unseooessful, there is still the mental stress, 
loss of time, and the possible loss of reputation, not to mention 
the burden brought upon the distriot. 
To this effeot, Burrup statBs~ "Probab17 t~ most important 
reason why a teaoher should know something about sohool law is t~ 
ine will be more oareful of the interests of ohildren if he realize. 
the possible implioations involved in bis teaohing assignment."l 
The purpose of this study is to reveal and interpret the le~ 
liability for the injur,y of pupils in the publio sohools in Illi-
nois. A preliminary study revealed that records of court oases 
brought against the sohool distriots in Illinois are too limitedte 
effeot a signifioant study of liability. Sohool oases from other 
states are used to show the reasoning of the oourts in applying 'the 
oommon law prinoiples in litigations involving the sohool. IUino~ 
oases from out-of-sohool situations are used to reveal and inteqx9t 
the oommon law prinoiples whioh are followed by the Illinois Courts 
lperoy E. Burrup, The Teaoher and Publio Sohool System, (Hew 
York. 19601. P. 214. - -
1milarities and differenoes in the appl~at1on of these principles 
ill be revealed in the study. 
It is not the purpose of this study to speoulate preoedent. 
t most, the reader may take the presumption that the reasoning of 
he courts in school oases from other states mal affeot the deci-
ions arising from future actions in the Illinois Sohool System. 
Cases 4ecided from oourts of last resort in other jurisdiotions 
re not binding in the Supreme Court of Illinois, but they would be 
ersuasive in any oase of first impression in Illino1s.n2 
This study is intended for administrators, teaohers, and stu-
ents in the field of Education. Chapter two forms a general back-
~round for the study of liability. Ohapter three presents a case 
lnalysis of the immunity of the Illinois Sohool Districts and the 
~brogation of this principle. Chapter four inoludes a study of the 
~cent Illinois statutes which pertain to school liability. Chap-
~er five is devoted to an analysiS of the common law prinoiples as 
~hey apply to aotionable negligenoe in sohool situations. Chapter 
~ix is an analysis of the legal defenses which are employed in 
~ctions against the school districts. Conclusions and recommenda-
ions derived from this study ~re presented in chapter seven. 
A study of tort liability for the injur,y of school pupils in 
2Information from a personal interview of the writer with 
rohn C. Hayes, Dean of Law Sohool, Loyola University. 
4 
Illinois involves an analysis of legal prinoiples. The following 
are a pertinent part of the study: 
What oommon law prinoiples are followed by the courts of 
other states in rendering deoisions in tort aotions for 
negligence in the sohool? 
What oommon law prinoiples are followed by the Illinois 
Courts i~ rendering deoisions in tort actions for neg-
ligenoe? 
Whioh similarities are found in the extension and appli-
cation of these prinoiples between the Illinois Courts 
and the courts of other states? 
Some of the questions involved in this study are briefly summarise : 
Are school employees in Illinois liable for negligence? 
Are sohool offioers in Illinois liable for negligenoe? 
Are the sohools in Illinois insurers of safety? 
What l1mitations did the Illinois Legislature provide for 
aotions brought against the sohool distriots? 
What provisions did the Illinois L~gislature pass for the 
proteotion of the sohool distriot personnel as a result 
of the Molitar deoision? 
What are the elements of actior.~ble negligenoe? 
What degree of oare is required of teaohers for the pro-
teotion of pupils? 
What degree of care is required of bus drivers for the 
proteotion of students? 
What degree of care iE' required of students for their own 
proteotion? 
What oonstitutes negligenoe in the SC~lOols? 
Whioh legal defenses are available for the sohool distriots 
against aotionable negligenoe in Illinois? 
The soope of this study will be limited to oases arising from 
5 
injury to pupils through the negligent oonduot o~ school district 
employees. The study applies to teachers, school administrators, 
supervisors, school custodians, and other employees. Teaohers, by 
sheer numbers, oomprise the greatest number of employees who oome 
in oontaot with sohool pupils, so that the majority of the oases 
which are presented deal with teachers and pupils. School board 
members, while in their official oapaoity, are state offioers, not 
employees, and are exempt from liability. 
Corporal punishment will not be inoluded in this study sinoe 
it has been adequately desoribed ~rom the sooial' and the lega14 
standpoint, 
This study is not intended as a substitute for legal advioe. 
Those who need legal advioe should seek oounsel. 
1'0 study whioh bears any similarity to the study whioh the 
writer proposes has been oompleted. A reoent legal study was made 
in Illinois by Harry Smith.5 His dissertation summarized the 
legal status of teaohers in regard to oertifioation, appointment, 
'Herbert AI'nold Falk, coSorel Punishment: A Sooial Inte~ret. 
ation of its Theory in the So~ols of the ttnited-States, (New ork. 
1941).-~ -- -- ---
4Hubert Freestrom, "Court Deoisions on Corporal Punishment," 
Unpublished Master's Thesis (De Paul University, Chicago, 1957). 
5Harr,y H. Smith, "The Legal Status of Teachers in Illinois," 
Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation (Washington Ur.iversity, St. Louif. 
1954) • 
6 
tenure, and retirement. 
Studies in to I"t liability have been made in othe I' states. 
Rosenfield, in his book, presented a study of the liability of 
school board members, school administrators, and teachers for in-
juries to pupils.6 Poe made a oomparison of the legal liability 
for the in3ur,y of ohildren in out-of-school situations with the 
liability for injury of pupils in the public schools.7 Leibee des-
cribed the liability of sohool boards in the states whioh have a-
bolished the Immunity Doqtrine.8 His work dealt largely with cases 
arising out of the physical education department. These studies 
in liability inolude summaries or discussions and definitions of 
negligence and the defenses whioh are available. The proposed 
study, however, will exemplify the principles of negligenoe in 
greater detail and will not be limited to the way in whioh the 
acoidents happened or the conditions which occasioned the acoident. 
Referenoe was made to the following legal indices and hand-
~ooks in order to locate citations to the cases whioh deal with 
Illinois Common Law Prinoiples: 
Illinois Annotations to the Restatement of the Law of Torts, 
6Harr,r N. Rosenfield, Liability f2! School Aocidents, (New 
York, 1940). 
7Arthur C. Poe, Sohool Liabilitl !2! Injuries to Pupils, (New 
York, 1941). 
SHoward C. Leibee, Liability for Accidents in physical Educa-
tion, AthletiCS, and Recreation, (Ann Arbor, 195~. 
~- -
II, Ohapters 16 and 17, (§28l·§50;). 
Illinois Digest, ;rd, - XXIX - Negligenoe 
XXXIV ... Schools and F.ducat ion .• 
Illinois Law and Practioe - XXVIII - Negligenoe 
XXIV - Torts 
7 
After the csses were located, referenoe was made to the Illi-
nois Reports and to the Illinois Appellate Reports where the infor 
ma;ion pertinent to the cases was lo·oat.d. 
Referenoe was made to the following indioes in looating the 
citations to sohool oases from other states: 
American Jurisprudenoe, XXXIVII - Tort Liability, (§56-§6l). 
Corpus Juris Secundum, LXXVIII ... Schools and Sohool Distriots 
Liability for Torts, ,!2;8. ~;20-!;22). 
After the citations are located, reference was made to the 
Reports of the states and the National Reporter System to looate 
the oaSes and obtain the information. Referenoe was made to 
Shepard' 8 Oi tat ions to obtain an analysis of the bisto17 and treat 
ment of the oases. The Index to Legal Periodicals and Shepard's 
Oitations were used in looating legal artioles pertaining to oases 
and legal theories. The Amerioan Law Reports and the Amerioan 
Digest S,ystem were used as a oheok in the organizing and writing 
of the material. 
CHAPTER II 
SCHOOL DISTRICT I~dUNITY IN GENERAL 
In order to understand the reasoning of the oourts' deoisions 
in dealing with sohool cases, the reader should understand the 
basic oharaoteristios of a oorporation, sinoe the oourts, in deal-
ing with the sohool districts, recognize these as publio oorpora-
tions. 
lSohool distriots are oorporations oreated by the state to ad-
minister the eduoational programs on a looal level. Although 10-
oally administered, sohool distriots are subdivisions of t,he state 
and sohool board members ere stpte offioers while aoting in,their 
oapaoity. Sohool distriots possess limited powers or those powers 
expressed by statute, hence they are oalled quasi or inoomplete 
oorporations. In addition, sohool districts are granted the use 0 
disoretion in per.torming aotivities essential to their local needs 
Sohool boards in the exercise of disoretionary powers have oooa-
sioned muoh litigation. The plaintiff's oontention generally ques 
tions the board's authority to exercise suoh powers. 
Whenever it seems the better polioy or for the matter of oon-
venience and economy, municipalities are often dalegated authority 
to per.torm oertain duties in relation to education. Municipal 
8 
9 
authorities, when in the performanoe of eduoational aotivities, are 
aotually performing for the state beoause munioipalities have no 
vested powers in relation to eduoation. Moreover sohool distriots 
may also hold the same geographioal boundaries as a oity, but when 
this is the oase, the two oorporations retain their distinot iden-
tities. 
l,t 
,j~he dootrine of Sovereign Immunity in this oountry has been 
oritioized as being too antiquated and unjust in our modern sooie-
ty, but a majority of the states uphold the immunity of sohool dis-
triots against tort liability. The immunity of the sohool dis-
triots was born in the oommon law when the early oourts deoided 
that a sohool distriot, being a subdivision of the state, should 
share the state's immunity. The oourts, in following preoedent, 
have expressed dissatisfaotion with this ruling. Othe r oourts haVtl 
gone farther by diverting from prior deoisions and abrogating the 
ruling. In jurisdiotions where the immunity dootrine has been ab-
rogated, the sohool districts are liable for the negligent acts of 
their offioers, employees, and agents. ' 
The immunity doctrine has also been abrogated by statute, and 
seoondary sources often state that "in the absenoe of statutes to 
the oontrary," sohool distriots are not liable to pupils for inju-
ries resulting from the negligent aots of its offioers, agents, anc 
employees. This indioates that where there is no statute abrogat-
ing the immunity doctrine in a stc-ite, the school distriot in that 
10 
state is immune by common law. Because of recent court decisions, 
sources should probably state, in the absence of statutes, ~ 
court ruling, to the contrary. 
The immunity doctrine provides immunity to school districts 
while they are engaged in governmental activities. School board 
members, while acting in this capacity, are immune from liability, 
but immunity does not extend to the school district employees such 
as prinoipals, teachers, custodians, and supervisors. Employees 
are answerable tor their own negligent acts when dealing with pu-
pils in states where the distriots are immune. Employees are also 
liable instates where the districts themselves are liable, buts 
actions are usually ini t1ated against the districts beoause the 
districts become responsible for the torts of their employees. 
Actions are initiated against employees in states which have "save 
harmless" statutes because the statutes state that employees should 
be reimbursed for judgments passed against them. 
The courts and legislatures have provided exceptions to the 
immunity doctrine, and while these are not a direct abrogation of 
the doctrine, they have almost the same effect. 
Exoeptions to the doctrine are found in the "save harmless" 
statutes and in the "safe place" statutes which the courts have 
applied to school distriots. Some courts have allowed judgments 
against schooldistriots whioh have liabilIty insurance, contendi~ 
that the damages awarded to the plaintiffs would not constitute 
11 
harm to the defendant districts. Other courts have awarded damages 
to plaintiffs where school districts, in acting beyond their au-
thority, have engaged in proprietary functions, therefore being 
liable as a private corporation would be. The courts have also 
held the school districtB liable in cases where the school dis-
tricts have engaged in activities which constitute a nuisance. 
There has been much litigation on these two counts, the first bei~ 
a technical transgression beyond the district's immunity, and the 
second one being a legal prinoiple in the oomm~n law. This chapt6I 
does not include an exhaustive study of liability, bat eases are 
used in illustration of the signifioance of these points. 
The Corporate Nature of School Districts 
School districts are publio corporations created by the state 
in order to facilitate the administration of government. Their 
primary function is the execution of state policy: publio educa-
tion. 
A oorporation is defined by law as "an artificial being, in-
Visible, intangible, and existing only in the oontemplation of the 
law. nl Hemm18in pursues the definition further: "Being the mere 
crcFtion of law, it possesses only those properties v4hioh the 
113 Amerioan Jurisprudenoe 154. This definition was h;:::J1ded 
down by Justioe Marshall during the oelebrated Dartmouth College 
Case. (Dartmouth v. Woodward, 4 Wheat U. s. 518, 636 4th Ed 629, 
659) Aooording to the Amerioan Jurisprudenoe, this definition "ha~ 
frequently been approved." 
12 
oharter oonte rs upon it. • • • Among the most important are imBlor. 
tality,and. ••• individuality: properties by whioh a perpetual 
suooession of many persons are oonsidered the same, and may aot 8S 
a single individual."2 
Thus a oorporation is Lot, in the law, the individual members 
whioh comprise it, but instead it is a separate and distinot legal 
entity. The suooession of individuals in no way alters its oharao. 
ter, but insures its existenoe. A sohool distriot is likewise a 
oorporate entity, separate and distinot from the persons comprisiIij 
it: the sohool board members and the looal inhabitants. 
Private oorporations in gene~l are oreated through oharters 
granted by the state upon request or petition. In this wayan ar-
tifioial being is oreated for the legal benefit of the members. 
Citizens of a locale ordinarily exePOise the right to petitioI 
in oreating a new SOhool distriot as the need arises. This howeve 
is a matter of policy, not an inherent right. Legally the state 
can create a sohool district without the oonsent of the residents.~ 
It oan oreate any agenoy or seleot and authorize any existing sub-
division of the state to oarry out the eduoational polioy. 
Sohool distriots are publio corporations oreated for the sole 
2Madaline Kinter Remclein t The Law of Looal Puolio Sohool Administration (New York, 1953J,-P: ~--
'n~~\3N~wtgR Edwards, The Courts ~ ~ Publio Schools, (Chicago, 
13 
purpose of carrying out the eduoational polioy of the state, and 
they are granted limited powers, or only those power8 deemed nec-
essary for the aocomplishment of this purpose. The oourtc, for 
this reason, have olassified sohool districts as being quasi or 
incomplete corporatlons.4 The term quasi, according to Blaok, is 
applied to corporations which are oreated involuntarily.5 
Confusion often arises as to the true identity of sohool dis-
triots when theae are oalled munioipal cOl]?orations by the couz'ts. 
Constitutional or statutor,y provisions ordinarily make referenoe ~ 
munioipal 00 rporat ions • The question of whether these provisions 
were meant to inolude sohool distriots is left to the oourts. If 
it is found that these provisions were meant to inolude sohool di& 
triots, the sohool distriots are then defined as munioipal oorpora~ 
tiona in oourt. The variation is named for the purpose of inter-
pretation of the statutes only, and the status of sohool distriots 
as quasi oorporations is in no way ohanged. 
Edwards oites several examples from oases whioh involve the 
oourts' interpretation of a munioipality. The following is used 8!1 
4 Remmlein, Local Public School Administration. p. 7-8. Ao-
oording to Remmlein, the statutes o~ most states re~er to the 
school district merely as corporations or corporate bodies. The 
task of cla8si~ication has been left to the courts. 
5Henr,y Oampbell Black, Black's Law DictioDa5[, 4th ed. (St. 
Paul, Minn., 1951), p. 411. ~fie terii'applles to corporations 
"possessing a low order of corporate existence or the most limited 
4' range of corporate powers. 
an illustration: 
The question arose as to whether a contractor who 
was erecting a school building oould employ labo:, for 
more than etght hourS a day. t strictly speaking,' said 
the conrt, 'cities are the onl:- oorpor-ntions in this 
state. We have no doubt, ho~aver, that the lawmakers, 
by the use of the word "mun..t.cipali ty" in the oonneot ion 
in whioh it is employed in the6 eight hour law, intended to include school distriots.' 
Distinction of School Districts and Munioipalities 
14 
In establishing sohool distriots to car~r the eduoational 
funotion, the state does so without regard ~o boundaries of politi 
oal subdivisions. If the better polioy or convenienoe diotates, 
the state 7may make use of existing subdivisions suoh as oounties, 
townships, towns, or oities. It is not unoommon then to find a 
munioipality and a sohool district superimposed over the same geo-
graphical area. Confusion arises beoause of the failu.Pe to distin 
guish between a city as a municipal corporation and the sohool di 
trict as fA quasi oorporation. When the two oorporations are geo-
graphioally superimposed, it oannot be assumed that the two have 
merged, or that one is subordinate to the other. The two oorpora-
tions retain their distinct identities, eaoh with a different 
tion to perform. Edwards states that a munioipal oorporation is 
oreated primarily for the purpose of looal self government, and a 
sohool distriot is a quasi oorporation, a politioal or civil sub-
division, oreated as an instrumentality of the state for its 
........... -.... 
6 Edwa rds The Courts and the Publio Sohools • 55. 
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purpose. 7 
The main distinction between sOhool districts and other public 
corporations is the limitations plaoed on the powers granted by the 
state. Corporations generally possess oommon law and speoifio or 
-
speoial powers as authorized by charter or statute. School dis-
triots have no oommon law powers, but only those expressed by law. 
, A munioipality is restrioted to the exeroise of those powers 
whioh are authorized by oharter or statute, n'amely expressed 
powers. Munioipalities oan also exeroise powers whioh are inoiden1 
to, ,or are fairly implied by these expressed powers, and also thos~ 
powers whioh are oonsidered essential for the aooomplishment of the 
purpose of the oorporation. Sohool distriots, in the exeroise of 
their powers, are limited to those powers expressed by statute and 
those implied to be neoessary for the funotion of the expressed 
powers.8 
Where a munioipal oorporation oan exercise those pOWel'"8 which 
are fairly implied to be neoessary by statute or oharter, a sohool 
distriot oan exercise only those whioh are implied to be necessary, 
Remmlein states that a school board must be able to point to a 
statute oonferring power upon it directly or be neoessary implica-
tion when its authority to exercise a power is challenged. 
7Ibid., p. 93. 
SRemmlein, Local Public School Administration, p. 9-10. 
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statutes receive a strict interpretation, and further implication 
cannot be interpreted by a school board. Any doubt concerning the 
existence of power is resolved oy the courts against the school 
district .9 
statutes whioh oonfer power on sohool districts oannot possi-
bly cover all phases or 8Qtivities neoessary for the complete edu-
oational program. Disoretionary powers allOW for some flexibility 
in the eduoational program and enable a school board to meet the 
needs of the oommunity, 
It is usually within the disoretion of the board to deter-
mine whether or not to furnish preschool, junior college, 
adult, vocational, tr other kinds of education; to repair 
an old school build ng; to have French, Spanish, Polish, 
or any othe r language taugh1i in high schools; to require 
physically normal pupils to take physioal education, to 
offer agriculture, musio, or home economics courses; to 
acoept tuition pupilsJ to e~ploy teachers within the 
legal requirements for certification and salary pqyments; 
and to make hundreds of other decisions within the pro-
visions of la~Oand the requirements of the state board 
of eduoation.J. 
For a comprehensive study of the discretionary powers of the 
sohool boards as defined by judicial interpretation, oonsult The 
-
Discretions;r Powers of Sohool Boards.ll 
9Ibid. t 11 ... 13. 
10Char1es Edwards Reeves, Sohool Boards Their Status, ~­
tiona ~ Activities {New York, 1954}, p. 142-143 •. 
llJohn D. MeSSick, The Disoretionary Powers of School Boarus 
(Durham N. Carolina, 194m-: 
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Theories of Sohool District Immunity 
It is a conwon law ruling in this oountry that sohool distrio 
are not liable in the absenoe of statute for damages resulting fro 
the negligent acts of their offioers or employees. In order to be 
held liable, there must exist a statute expressly making the 
sohool distriot liable. The power "to sue and be sued," whioh is 
oo~~on to all oorporations does not overcome this immunity beoause 
it refers to suits arising out of oontraots. 
This ruling, whioh is deeply ingrained in our oommon law, is 
referred to as the Dootrine £! Sovereisa Immunity, and its develop 
ment oan be attributed to several theories in law to whioh courts 
often refer in their deoisions. The most prominent of these is th 
theor,y of Divine Sovereignty or the Divine Right ~ KiI$s, devel-
oped in English Common Law during the Middle Ages. The doctrine 
stated that the king, being infallible, oould do no wrong, and 
hence was immune from punishment. 
In this oountry the state replaoed the kine, but the dootrine 
persisted beoause the state was assumed to be sovereign. The doo-
trine now holds thBt no liability oan be attaohed to the state for 
negligenoe in the performanoe of governmental funotions. Sohool 
distriots are or~atures of the state, performing a governmental 
funotion, the refore they share this immunity. Some jurisdiotions 
whioh follow this ruling have stated that sohool distriots are 
capable of performing only governmental duties sinoe they are not 
18 
granted the powers to perform proprietary duties. In order that 
the oourts hold a district liable, the state must consent to it in 
"clear and express terms. n12 
Private corporatiops do not share this immunity because their 
activities are for profit or self gain rather than governmental. 
Munioipalities generally share this immunity while in the perform. 
anoe of governmental funotions. However, munioipalities are as 
liable as private oorporations are while in the performanoe of pro-
prietary funotions. l , The operation ot a buSiness, suoh as a tranE~ 
portation system, which is operated as if privately owned and 
derives an inoome, is considered a proprietary function. 14 
~ 
In this country the cese of first impression regarding govern-
mental immunity of a state involved a suit against a county in 
Massachusetts. In holding the oounty immune from liability, the 
court deolared that the county was a quasi corporation created by 
legislature for the purposes of public polioy and not voluntarily, 
like a city, and th&t as a state agency it was therefore immune.15 
A similar reasoning, whioh substantiates the doctrine of 
l2Edwards. p. 394. 
l3Warder v. City of Grafton, 128 S. E. 375. "Almost univer-
sally, the police, school, health, and fire departments are classi-
fied as governmental." 
14 Remmle in, Local Public School Administration, p. 243. 
15Mower v. Leioester, 9 Mass. 247, (1812). 
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immunity, is that the relationship of master-servant does not axis'" 
between the sohool distriot and its employees. Acoording to 
Edwards, this relationship does not exist "between a municipality 
and the agent it appoints ov employs in the execution of its gov-
ernmental powers. n16 
In private employment, the employer is usually held respon-
sible for the neglisent aots of h1a employees while in the oourse 
of their employment.17 The assumption of responsibility of an 
, 
employer 1s founded in the doctrine, Respondeat Superior: let the 
maste r answer. The dootrine wus developed in English Oommon Lew, 
where the master was held "vioariously liable for the torts oom-
m.1 tted by his servants in the oourse of their employment. n18 
The applioation of this dootrine ~~s been largely restrioted 
to private employment, but it bas been applied to sohool distriots 
in states where the immunity dootrine has been abrogated. 
The Supreme Oourt of Washington, in refusing to attaoh liabil. 
ity to a sohool district stated: 
But this presupposes that the oounty superintendent in 
this oase 1s the agent of the oounty, and that as suoh, 
the oourts must respond under t.be ma:tim of respondeat 
l6Edwnrds, p. 396. 
17:&'01' a comprehensive study of this dootrine, oonsult OUtl1neJ] 
of the Law of A~enol' by Floyd R. Me o hem , 4th ed. (Ch10ago. J.!1:>~J, 
~pterS-XI!; X II, and XIV. 
~Alaph1ll1p James. Introduction to English Law, (London, 1950), 
'n .. -'JUV. -- -
superior for the tort or negligence of the oounty super-
intendent. The relationship of prinoipal and agent does 
not exist however between a munioipali ty and the agents 
it apPoints orl1mploys in the exeoution of its govern-
mental powers. ~ 
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In upholding the immunity of sohool districts some oourts baM 
stated that sohool distriots have no funds out of whioh to pay 
damages. This reasoning stems from the Trust ~ Theo17, a doo-
trine initiallY applied by the oourts in the defense of oharitable 
institutions against liability. Funds for ohari table institutions 
like hospitals were held in trust for oharitable purposes. This 
reasoning was later applied to the sOhools by some courts whioh 
held the sohool funds were set aside to provide publio eduoation 
and oould not be used to satisfy damages. 
The following oitations will serve to illustrate the applioa-
tion of the dootrine of trust funds to hospitals: 
But it is manifest that if we uphold a rule which 
would make an institution of oharity liable to a patient 
who has been injured by an inoompetent servant, negli-
gently seleoted, we destroy the principle we have endeav-
ored to make plain, that charitable trnst funds cannot 
be direoted from the purposes of the donor. 20 
It was similarly stated by the Supreme Court of Missouri: 
The law has been fairly established by the great 
weight of authority that the funds of a charitable 
19smith v. Seattle Sohool Distriot Ho. 1 et al., 191 Pac. 858 
112 Wash. 64, (1920). 
20Adams v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S. W. 
453. (1907). 
hospital or association are trust funds devoted to the 
alleviation of human suffer'ing, and cannot be diverted 
nor absorbed by claims arising from the negligence of 
trustees or their employees in administering the trust 
or charity.21 
21 
In sustaining the immunity of a sohool district, a court jus-
tified the application of the doctrine to the district: 
If it is against public policy as ruled in the for-
gOing cases to divert char.itable' funds, so called, from 
other than the purposes for which they have been col-
lected, how much stronger is the case where the funds 
are the fruit of taxation, belong to the people, and are 
to be used for the beneficent purpose of free education. 
• •• School funds are oollected from the public to be 
held in trust by the boards of education for a specific 
purpose. This purpose is education. An attempt, there-
fore, otherwise to apply or expend these funds is without 
legislative sanction and finds no favor with the courts. 22 
Of some importance is the theory which states that sohool dis· 
tricts are involuntary corporations created for public benefit, ane 
not for gain or profit. It follows that if the functions of a 
school are purely governmental, they are then irrwune. In passing 
judgment fcr the defendant school district, Judge Brannon made 
reference to the rule stated by Illinois Municipal Corporations 
966s 
The municipal corporations are organized, not for 
gain, but for public weal, as important instrumentalities 
in government, and they are supported by the taxation of 
their people, and should not be made liable for acts of 
their officers, done in the performance of purely govern-
mental powers for the benefit of the public, and not for 
21Micholas v. Evangelical, etc. Hospital, 219 S. W. 643, (192() 
22Cochran v. Wilson, 287 Mo. 210, 229 S. W. 1050, (1921). 
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private beneflt. 23 
Exceptions to the Immunity Doctrine 
The doctrine of immunity has been attacked by legal commenta-
tors as well as by the oourts. Critical comments against this 
doctrine appeared before the turn of the century, but widespread 
criticism did not appear until 1924, when Professor Borchard of 
Yale University published a notable series of articles in which he 
challenged the foundation of sovereign immunity: 
Yet it requires but a slight appreciation of the 
faots to realize that in AnglO-American law the indi-
vidual citizen is left to bear almost all the risks of 
a defective, negligen'. perverse, or erroneous adminis-
tration of the state's functions, an unjust burden which 
is beooming graver and more diversified •••• The reason 
for this long-oontinued and growing injustioe in Anglo-
Amerioan law rests, of course, upon a Medieval English 
theory that "the King can do no wrong," which without 
sufficient understanding;was introduoed with the common 
law into this oountry and has survived mainly by reason 
of its ant1quity.24 
Attaoks and criticism against the doctrine appeared more numeA-
ous afterwards, and today many of the oourts express dissatisfao-
tion. Since the doctr1ne of immunity is in the common law, it has 
been abrogated and modified by statute and changed by judicial 
interpretations. The existing exceptions to the doctrine may be 
23Krutile v. Board of Education, 99 w. Va. 466, 129 S. E. 
486, (1925). 
24Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liabilitl in Tort, Yale Law 
Journal, Vol. 34 (New Haven, conu., 1924), p. 1:--
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olassified into two oategories: those involving legislative enaot-
ments, and those arising from court deoisions. 25 
The legislatures of the states have tried in various ways to 
provide some oompensation for those injured in the sohools. Two 
states, California and Washington, have abrogated the immunity 
dootrine by statute, and both have imposed direct liability on the 
sohool distriots. The California statutes are by far the most 
oomprehensive and make no exoeptions, but impose striot liability. 
These statutes are found in the Government Code, The Education 
Code, and The California Vehiole Code. The statute passed in 1917 
by the legislature in Washington makes exceptions to liability by 
"reviving" immunity if accidents oocur on a playground, a park, or 
a field house, or if the accident involved athletic apparatus, or 
manual training equipment owned by the district. The statute 
passed in 1917 severely limits the liability imposed by an earlier 
statute which was passed in 1869. The first statute lay dormant 
for many years until 1917 when H. judgment was passed against a 
sohool district for an accident on a gym ladder. A flood of schooJ 
cases followed, and the limiting statute was enacted in 1917. In 
1953 an amendment to the Aot of 1917 stated that counties and 
corporations were not entitled to the "priviledge of governmental 
immunity," but the Supreme Court, in testing the amendment, stood 
25E, Edmund Reutter, Jr., "Tort Liability and the Sohools," 
Amerioan School Board Journal, CXXXVI (March 1958) , 28-30. 
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by the statute of 1917.26 In these two states the statutes have \ 
brought the status of the sohool distriot to the same level as 
private oorporations. 
Another legislative approaoh whioh is used by several states 
does not abrogate the doctrine of immunity. but it provides a meanf 
of reoovery for those who are injured. The statutes are known as 
"save harmless" laws, and they provide that the employees be 
"saved" by the distriot from "finanoial ha~" resulting from a 
judgment against the employees for damages. 
Recent cases indicate t~~t these statutes do not oonstitute a 
. 
waiver of immunity27i although an earlier deoision indicated that il 
New York action must be brought against the defendant employee for 
reoovery.28 Sohool distriots maintain their status as quasi cor-
porations and in this way teaohers are protected from their negli-
gent aots while in the course of their employment. 
26Baboock v. Sohool District, 358 P. (2nd) 547, (Wash.), 1961 
27Swa inbank v. Coombs, 115 A. (2nd) 468, 19 Conn. Sup. 391. 
Coates v. Taooma Sohool Distriot No. 10, 347 P. (2nd) 1093, 55 Wasl. 
(2nd) 392. Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Distriot, 11 Cal. 
Rptr. 97, 359 P. (2nd) 465. 55 C. (2nd) 224. Harrell v. City of 
Jaokson, 92 Sp. (2nd) 240, 229 Miss. 815. Thompson v. Board of Ed· 
uoation. Ctty of Millville, 90 A. (2nd) 63, 20 N. J. Sup. 419. 
Bertols v. Board of Eduoation of City of New York, 150 N. Y. S. 
(2nd) 831, 1 A. D. (2nd) 973. 
28In an earlier decision the court in New York interpreted thE 
statute as imposing direot liability on the school distriots. 
Reeder v. Board of Eduoation, 263 App. Div. 23, 31 N. Y. S. (2nd) 
113, (1941). 
25 
The statutes in Conneotiout, New Jersey, and New York require 
the sohool boards to reimburse their employees against judgments, .. 
. / 
while those of Wyoming permit the sohool boards to do so. 
In North Carolina olaims may be filed indireotly against the 
state in oertain oases. The North Carolina Industrial Commission 
has the power to deoide upon tort olaims brought against the oountJ 
or other administrative units for injuries arising out of the oper-
ation of school bUses. Those olaims are filed against the state, 
Hnd if' damages are awarded for the plaintiff', the state board of' 
eduoation pays the damages, the maxUntm of whioh is set at ten 
thousand dollar5. 29 
"Safe place" statutes are again exoeptions to the immunity 
dootr1ne although they do not constitute a waiver or abrogation ot 
the doctrine. Under these statutes public buildings and publio 
places ot employment must be maintained in a safe oondition. 
Sohool buildings must be inoluded under this legislation sinoe 
these are publio buildings. Califomia enaoted a statute known as 
the Publio Liability Aot of' 192' and suits were successf'ully brougl~ 
against the school districts under this act prior to the state's 
abrogation of' the immunity doctrine by statute. In Wisconsin, the 
"sate plaoe" statute was inapplicable to school distriots, but 
later it was amended in order that it would be applioable. 
29Reutter, p. 28-,0. 
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A number of oourts have expressed dissatisfaotion with the 
immunity dootrine, oontending that it is illogioal and unjust. 
However the majority of the oourts have generally taken the positi( n 
that if the dootrine were to be abrogated, it would be done throug} 
legislation. A study of oourt oases has revealed that some oourts 
have taken positive steps against the dootrine. 
Some oourts have provided a judioial exoeption to the immunitJ 
dootrine in oonneotion with the purchase of liability insuranoe. 
Legislation has permitted or required the sohool distriots to pur-
ohase liability insuranoe. While most oourts have held that the 
purchase of liability insuranoe does not oonstitute a waiver of 
immunity, the Appellate Court of Illinois in a reoent deoision held 
that the oarr,ying of liability insuranoe did waive the immunity to 
the extent of the insuranoe ooverage.30 
Other oourts have deviated from preoedent and have abrogated 
the immunity rule. The oourts of New York we re the first ones to 
depart from the immunity ruling. Prior to the passage o:f the Cour1 
Claims Aot, whioh waived the immunity of the state, the oourts 
allowed suooessful judgments to be brought against the sohool dis-
triots for injuries resulting from the negligence of sohool staff.3l 
30Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consolidated Dis triot No. 201, 
348 Ill. App. 567, (1957). 
3lUerman v. Board of Eduoation, 234 N. Y. 196, 137 N. E. 24, 
(1922). Garber v. Central School Distriot, 251 App. Div. 214, 294 
N. Y. S. 850, (1937). 
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The school boards in this state are liable, through these court 
deoisions, in their own oorporate oapaoity for injuries resulting 
from their own negligence. In cases arising from the negligent 
performanoe ot nondelegable duties, tl~ oourts impute the aot of 
nellis.noe directly on the board itself rather than on the agent 04 
employees. The re are two kinds of duties imposed on the boards of 
eduoation in New York: delegable and nondelegable. Delegable dutils 
involve instruotion and no liability is attaohed for any neg11genot 
whioh ocours during the teaohing prooess. Among nondelegable 
duties are the maintenanoe of sate premises and equipment, the pro-
vision of o ompe tent personnel, and the provision of adequate super-
vision. It is only for the negligent performance of nondelegable 
duties that a board is liable in New York.32 The courts of Bew 
York have also interpreted the "save harmless" law in that state 
8S imposing on the district in oertain circumstances direot liabil-
ity to perlSons injured as well as indemnity to the school employeell 
should they suffer loss due to their negligence while disoharging 
their duties.3' 
The 8tate of Illinois is the most reoent to abrogate the doo-
trine ot immunity. In a reoent and prominent oase, the Supreme 
Oourt of Illinois deolared that the sohool distriots were liable it 
32Harry N'. Rosenfield, Liability for Sohool Aooidents (New 
York, 1940), p. 34. ---
'3Reeder v. Board of Eduoation, 263 App. Div. 23, 31 N. Y. S. 
(2nd) 113, (1941). 
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tort for the negligent acts of their agents and employees, over-
ruling all prior deoisions, I:lnd stripping the state of its immuni-
ty.'4 The legislature moved quiokly to plaoe statutory l1mitationl 
on this decision. 
Judicial exoeptions to the immunity dootrine are also made by 
the oourts in csses involving nuisanoes. The diffioulty of distin-
guishing between negligenoe and nuisance has made the nuisanoe 
exoeption a d1ffioul t one to apply. OonsequentlY the oourts do noo! 
always agree on what oonstitutes a nuisance, and are not in aooord 
with its application. 
It can be said that where actions for negligence usually orig -
nate from injuries reoeived by an individual through the careless 
actions of another, nuisanoe actions generally arise from harm don4 
to property. A oontinuing danger whereby a child has been hurt ha. 
been called a nuisance by some oourts. 
Nuisanoes have been classified into two categories by law: 
publio nuisanoes and private nuisanoes. The majority of the echooJ 
oases involving nuisances are private nuisances. A private nui~ 
sance, as defined by Prosser, is an "interference with the interes"" 
of an individual in the use or enjoyment of his land."'5 A 
'41iolitar v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. ,02, 18 III 
(2nd) 11, (1959). 
35William L. Prosser, !h! ~ of Torts (st. Paul, Minn., 1955 , 
p. 389. 
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nuisance ~quir.s substantial harm to property, as distinguished 
from t~8pa8s, which oonsists of a teohnioal invasion of one's 
property. A nuisanoe is defined as "everything that endangers 
life or health, gives offense to senses, violates the laws of 
deoenoy, or obstruots reasonable and oomfortable use of property."3E 
Some jurisdiotions have held the sohool distriots are not 
liable for personal injuries arising trom nuisanoes oreated by the 
distriot's agents or employees. It has been held by the oourts 
that a sohool distriot is not held answerable where a flagpole 
falls and injures a Ohild,37 a pedestrian is hurt where children 
hold a raoe on a sidewalk,38 or whe~ a ohild suffered a mild burn 
when seated near a radiator by the teacher.39 Ne1ther have they 
been held laible where a football player suffe~d an eye injur,y 
upon oontaot with unslsked lime used to mark the f1eld,40 or where 
a boy stepped on live ooala left from a burning tree stump on the 
playground.41 Some jurisdio~iona have held steadfast and have 
36Blaok, p. 1214. 
~7Carlo v. Sohool Distriot of Soranton, 319 Pa. 417, 179 Atl. 
561, (1935). 
3SXoDonel v. Bro~o, 285 M1oh. 38, 280 N. W. 100, (1938). 
39Mo11nari v. City of Boston, 130 N. E. (2nd) 925, (1955). 
40Mokovioh v. Independent School Distriot, 225 N. W. 292, 171 
Minn. 446, (1929). 
41Rose.v. Board of Eduoation of Abilene, 337 P. (2nd) 652, 
184 Kan. 486, (1959). 
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denied reoovery even in oases of death. A court found a school 
district not liable when a speaker, in mounting a speaker's plat-
form lost his balance, fell backwards, and diad &s a result of his 
injuries,42 and where a young boy wandered off the playground and 
drowned in a bayou adjoining the school grounds.43 
Other oourts have stated the immunity dootrine does not applY 
in cases arising from nuisances: school distriots would then be 
held liable for nuisanoe. School districts have been held liable 
in damages where a flagpole fell and fatally injured a boy, 4-4 and 
where a student was injured in a gym class when he fell off a 
"balanoe beam. n45 When a janitor contraoted a disease as a result 
of breathing ooal dust in a boiler room, a court stated that propel 
ventilation should have been provided and held the school liable. 4E 
Actions have been suocessfully initiated against the school 
district for trespass and damage to property. A home adjacent to 
a school playground was damaged by baseballs batted over the fence 
by the sohool children. A lower court deoreed against similar 
42Laren v. Independent School District of Kane Township, Coun-
cil Bluffs, 272 N. W. 632, (1937). 
4-3Whitfield v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sohool Board, 23 S. (21d) 
708, (1945). Louisiana. 
44.o0a rtan v. Ci~ of New York, 133 N. Y. S. 939, 24 R. C. L. 
606, (1912). 
45Bush v, City of Norwalk, 122 Conn. 426, 189 Atl. 608, (1937 • 
46Este1e v. Board of Eduoation of Borough of Red Bank, 26 li .... 
Sun. 9. 97 Atl. (2nd) 1. (1953>'. 
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aotivities by the sohool and made the distriot liable for damages 
The supreme oourt. later oalled this judgment "too stringent" and 
relieved the sohool on both oounts. 47 In an early deoision, Ferril 
v. Board of Education,48 the defendant sohool distriot was held 
- _ ................................... 
liable for involuntary trespass and subsequent injury to the plain. 
tiff'. In this oase the defemant owned and oooupied a house on a 
lot adjoining the sohool building. The roof of the building had 
no gutters, and during the w inter months, snow and ioe slid from 
the roof onto t~, adjoining lot and the sidewalks leading to the 
baok part of the house. The owners had not ified the board of edu-
oation about this oondition, but nothing was done~ One evening, 
returning from work, the plaintiff was told by his wife that large 
quantities of snow and ioa l had fallen On his baok yard and steps. 
While going out to investigate, the plaintiff slipped on the ioe 
and was injured. In holding the sohool distriot liable, the 
Supreme Court stated. 
the defendant, being a munioipal oorporation, oould not 
be held liable Lor negligent injuries umer the oommon 
law, and there being no liability oreated by statute, 
the plaintiff oould not reoover •••• but it is oon-
tended that, where the injury is the result of the 41. 
reot aot or trespass of the munioipality, it is liable, 
no matter whether aoting in a publio or private oapao-
ity. 
47Ness v. Independent Sohool Distriot of Sioux City, 298 N. W 
855, 230 Iowa 771, (1941). 
48~erris v. Board of Eduoation, 122 Mioh. 315, 81 N. W. 90 
(1899). 
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In this deoision, the Supreme Court stated that the immunity 
dootrine did not affeot the liability of sohool distriots involved 
in nuisanoe oases in jurisdiotions wbere the dootrine was reoog-
nized. Sohool distriots in Miohigan would be held liable for tres-
pass and subsequent harm and in this oase, nonfeasanoe oonstituted 
a nuisanoe. 
In reoent oases, sohool authorities have been held liable for 
damages to propert7. In Vermont workers, in an effort to looate a 
water supply for a sohool, exploded dynamite near the plaintiff's 
spring, diverting the flow of water and drying up his spring.49 
In a similar situation workmen blooked a waterway flowing past the 
plaintiff's property in suoh a way that mud aooumulated in the 
stream and on his propert7 and later sewage baoked up due to the 
operation of a raw sewage disposal devioe. 50 
The Supreme Court of Kansas reoently held that a softball 
game did not oonstitute a nuisanoe. When the game was played at 
night, and the publio address system and the flood lights were 
operated after ten otclook, a nuisanoe was oreated. An injunction 
was plaoed against games conducted after ten o'clock at night.5l 
49Gr1swold v. Town Sohool Distriot of Town of Weatherfield, 8f 
Atl. (2nd) 829, (1952). Vermont. 
50£11en v. Board of Eduoation, 242 N. C. 584, 89 S. E. (2nd) 
144, (1955). 
51Netman v. Common Sohool District No. 95, Butter County, 232 
P. (2nd) 422, (1951). 
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A last exoeption to the immunity rule is found in cases where 
the sohool districts allegedly have engaged in proprietary funo-
tions. The oourts again are not in accord. Some courts have 
stated that sohool districts are incapable of engaging in a pro-
prietary function. Other courts have stated that a school distric-l 
is answerable in damages if found to be engaged in a proprietary 
function. 
In a ~ority of the actions initiated, the plaintiffs have 
contended that a fee was oharged for some sohool funotion or aotiv 
i ty on the school premiaea. The sohools are engaged in a proprie-
tary funotion and therefore are l1able for damages. The majority 
of the oourts have not agreed with th1s oontent10n in the past. 
This oan be attested by the numerous oases listed in lega152 and 
seoondary53 souroes where judgments have been passed for the de-
fendant school distriots. In granting immunity for the sohool dis 
tr1cts, the courts have held that a funotion does not beoome pro-
prietary because 1t produces some revenue, or yields a peouniary 
profit. This is just one of the elementa of a proprietary funa-
tion. Some oourts have made judgments on the basis of a test in 
deoiding whether a school distriot is engaged 1n a proprietary 
funotion or a purely governmental one. The following oases illus-
trate the oourt' s reasoning. 
52corpus Juris Seoundum, Vol. LXXVIII, (Brooklyn), p. 1325. 
5'Edwards, p. 403·04. 
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The test was developed by the Supreme Court of Miohigan. whe~ 
a county, under oontraot to the state for maintenanoe and repair 01 
a trunk highway, was being sued for the negligent operation of El 
truok whioh resulted in injuries to the plaintiff. The test statef: 
"The underlyir...g test 1s wllether the aot 1s for the oommon good of 
all without the element of speoial oorporate benefit or peouniar,y 
p rofi t • ,,54 The oounty in this oase was found not lia ble beoause 
it was engaged in a purely gover.nmental funotion. 
The same test was later applied to a sohool by the Supreme 
Court of Oregon.55 Aotion was brought against a sohool distriot 
for the negligent operation of a sohool bus. The oourt, after 
applying the test, found the distriot not liable, and stated: "The 
sohool distriot, in the operation of the bus, pursuant to author-
ity vested in it by statute was aoting as an agenoy of the state." 
The SUpreme Oourt of Miohigan applied this rJle to a sohool 
distriot in the oase of Daszkiewioz y. Board ~ Eduoation 2£ Oitl 
of Det~o1t.56 The oity sohool distriot owned and operated a medi-_ ........ _ ........ -
oal oollege where a medioal student fell down an open elevator 
shaft and reoeived severe injuries. Aotion was based on the raot 
54Gunther v. Board of Road Commissioners of Oheboygan Oounty, 
225 Mioh •. 619, 196 N. W. 386, (1923). 
55i~1n. v. Sohool Distriot, 143 Ore. 449, 23 p. (2nd) 132, 
(19'3) • 
56Daszkiewioz v. Board of Eduoation of Ci~ of DetrOit, 3 N. 
W. (2nd) 71, 301 Mioh. 212, (1942). 
that tuition was paid, there£ore the board was engaged in a pro-
prietary funotion in maintaining the oollege. The oourtrefused 
this oontention and s-tated that this was a purely governmental 
funotion: the oollege was a "state agenoy.lf 
Through this rule and similar contentions, the oourts have 
agreed that an activity does not beoome a proprietary function 
because it produoes a revenue or a profit to help maintain it. 
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The courts have in reoent oases awarded damages to plaintiffs 
for injuries where it was found that the distriot was engaged in 
proprietar,y funotions. Jurisdiotions have held schools liable in 
Arizona and Pennsylvania. In the case of Sawaya ~. Tusoon ~ 
School District,57 the Tusoon sohool authorities leased the school 
stadium to another school for the purpose of holding a football 
game. In the course o~ the game, a speotator fell as a result of 
a loose railing in tm stadium. The court found the school author· 
ities, in leasing the stadium and receiving oompensation, were 
engaged in a proprietary function, and therefore liable for inju-
ries sustained by the speotator. 
In the oase of Morris v. Sohool District of Mount Lebanon 
---- -
Township,58 the school sponsored a suw~r recreation program. A 
57Sawaya v. Tusoon High School District No. 1 of Pima County, 
281 P. (2nd) 105, 78 Ariz. 389, (1955). 
58Morr1s v. Sohool District of Mount Lebanon Township, 144 A. 
(2nd) 737, 393 Pa. 633, (1958). 
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ohild, while enrolled in the reoreation program, drowned in the 
swimming pool. In reviewing the oase, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania found that a fee was payable for admission, and the pro-
gram was open to the publio. Furthe rmore t the aoti vi ties were not 
part of a regular ourrioulum as required by statute. These aotiv-
ities were "normal for a summer day oamp" beoause they inoluded 
arts and orafts, danoing, and swimming. On these faots, the oourt 
found the school to be engaged in a proprietary funotion, and held 
it liable for the ohild's death. Negligence was not mentioned in 
the opinion of the oourt, but the whole issue was decided on the 
proprietary funotion of a school district. 
CHAPTER III 
THE IMMUBITY OF THE ILLINOIS SCHOOL DISTRICTS TO 1959 
The immunity of the state of Illinois from tort liability was 
guaranteed by the State Oonstitution of 18701 "The state of Illi-
nois shall never be made defendant in any oourt of law or equity.". 
The politioal subdivisions of the state, or quasi-oorporation~, 
were not granted oonstitutional immunity, but instead aohieved the 
same immunity through judioial deoisions in the oommon law. The 
first political subdivision to reoeive immunity from the oourts wal 
the county.2 The oourts later granted immunity in their deoisions 
to a townshiP,' a drainage distriot,4 a sohool distriot,5 and a 
park distriot,6 and these have long sinoe enjoyed oomplete immunit~ 
from tort liability. 
The courts, however, made an early distinotion between these 
lConstitution of the State of Illinois, Artiole IV, Seotion 2E • 
2Hedges v. County of Madison, 6 Ill. 567, (1844). 
'Town of Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Ill. 346, (1870). 
4Elmore v. Drainage Commissioners, 135 111.269, (1890). 
5Xinnare v. Oity of Ohioago, 171 111.332, 49 N. E. 536, (189E~ 
GLove v. Glenooe Park Distriot, 270 Ill. App. 117, (1933). 
'7 
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oorporations and munioipal corporations in determin1ng their lia-
bility. Quasi-munioipal oorporations, such as counties, townships 
sohool districts, and park districts are reoognized by the courts 
a8 being oreated by the state solely for the purpose of carrying 
out the state polioies, and these have enjoyed immunity. Municipa~ 
corporations, such as cities, towns, and villages, have enjoyed 
immunity only when engaged in the exercise of governmental aotivi-
ties. While engaged in the exercise of proprietary :functions, 
municipal corporations have been held liable to the same extent as 
private oorporations. 
According to Helfand,7 the early Illinois courts placed indis 
oriminate liability for torts on municipalities. It was not until 
1883 that the Supreme Court of Illinois deolared a oity immune frol 
tort liability while in the performanoe of governmental aotivities 
as distinguished from proprietary activltiea.8 
The immunity of sohool distriots in Illinois is traoed in 
this ohapter through an analysis of the leading oourt OBses. The 
study embraoe. two d90trtn8s1 the Dootrine of Governmental Immun1tJ 
or'Sovereign Immunity of the state, and immuni~ granted to 
charitable lnsti tutlons which WBS based on the Trust Fund Theo ry. 
7Marvin Helfand, "The Status of Government Immunity Prior to 
Molitar," Northwestern University Law Review, LIV (November, 1959>, 
p. 589. 
8Wiloox v. Chioago, 107 Ill. 334, (1883). I 
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Both are closely assooiated and both played an important role in 
the development of immunity of the sohool districts and in its 
final repudiation by the Illinois Supreme Court. Governmental 
immunity originally granted to the publio sohools by the Supreme 
Court formed an impregnable wall against liability, and school 
oases whioh followed crystalized the law in forming absolute immu-
nity. Charitable immunity, initially applied in defense of a 
private school, was founded in the trust fund theory and afforded 
complete proteotion to the trust funds o~ cha.ritable institutions. 
The courts in time softened or changed their attitude, and this 
dootrine was finally modified by the oourts when it was found that 
liability insuranoe oould be used to satisfy judgments without 
impairing the trust funds of private sohools. Insurance was the 
"wedge" whioh also modified the dootrine of governmental immunity 
of the publio schools when a oourt drew an analogy between the 
proteotion of trust funds of charities through insurance and the 
same protection granted to publio funds in respeot to the publio 
sohoolsa judgments were satisfied from insuranoe. The dootrine of 
governmental immunity, thus modified, was finally abolished in tot 
- ....... "'"'+ 
in 1959 by a SUpreme Ooul"t; ruling. 
Illinois EXtends the Immunity Doctrine 
to Sohool Distriots 
Immunity was first guaranteed to the school districts of Illi~ 
noia in 1898, wilen the Illinois Supreme Court, in the case of 
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Kinner. 1_ Chicago,9 stated that a board of eduoation was a '1 quasi. 
oorporation Oharged with duties purely governmental." 
The oase had been dismissed by the appellate oourts, and suit 
was filed on appeal to the Supreme Court.10 The administrator of 
the estate alleged that Kinnare, a workman in the oonstruotion of 
the roof of a "deaf-mute sohool, 'f fell off the roof and came to bia 
death as a direot result of the defendant oorporationss negligenoe 
in failing to provide the proper safeguards suoh as railings Fmd 
soaffoldings needed for the workmen's safety. 
The appellate oourt sustained a demurrer entered by a trial 
oouI't, but upon appeal, the Supreme Court was more explioit in re-
affirming the immunity of the sohool district: 
It therefore appears that the appellee board is a 
oorporation or tuaSi-oorporation oreated nolens volens 
by the general aw of the state to aid in the adminls- -
tration of the st&te government, m::.d charged, as such, 
with duties purely governmental in charaoter. It owns 
no property, bas no private oorporate interests, and 
derives no speoial benefit from its oorporate acts. It 
is simply an agenoy of the State, having existenoe for 
t!le sole purpose of perl'om1ng oertain duties, deemed 
neoessary to the maintenanoe of an effioient system of 
free schools within the partioular looality in its juris-
diotion. The state acts in its sovereign capaoity, and 
does not submit its aotions to the judgment of oourts 
and is not liable for the torts or nelgigenoe of its 
agents, and a oorporation oreated by the state as a mere 
agenoy foz- the more ef'fioient exercise of governmental 
funotions is likewise exempted from the obligation to 
9Kinnare v. City of Chioago and Board of Eduoation of Chioago, 
70 Ill. App. 106, (1897). 
10Kinnare v_ City of Chicago, 171 Ill. 332, 49 U. E. 536, (18~~) 
respond in damages, as master, for the negligent acts 
of its servants to the same extent as in the state it-
self, unless suoh liability is expressly provided by 
the statutes oreating suoh agency. 
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Thus the Supreme Court deolared that school districts were 
quasi oorporations oreated nolens volens or involuntarily and 
oharged with duties "purely governmental in character:" tl» admin-
istration of the publio school. The oourt also asserted that the 
state, being sovereign, was not liable in tort, and school dis-
tricts, being agenCies of the state, were likewise immune from 
tort liability. 
The oourt then stated that the City, in oo-operating with the 
board of eduoation in ereoting a school building, was aotually 
working for the state anl it was therefore not liable: 
The erection of the sohool building was of no benefit 
to the oity as a municipality, and whatever conneotion 
it had with the board of eduoation in the matter of oon-
struction of the building was simply for the purpose of 
discharging a publio duty oast upon it by the law-making 
power of the state. That duty, as we have seen it, is 
governmental in oharaoter and nature. It was performed 
in obedienoe to a statute whioh was enacted beoause it 
was deemed expedient by the legislature, in the distri-
bution of the powers of government, to require the oity, 
nolens volens, to perform a publio servioe in whioh the 
oity, as a oorporation, has no interest. The intestate 
of appellant, and others engaged in the work of construot-
ing the building, must bA regarded as servants and agents 
of the State, and not of the City, and for that reason 
the dootrine of Respondeat Superior is not applicable 
against the oity. 
After passing judgment for·the oity of Chioago, the oourt 
stated that the oity, in being cleared of damages, did not indioat 
that a municipal oorporation was held in the same status as a 
quasi-munioipal corporation_ This distinotion made in a prior 
decision was upheld and oited in Cltl £! Chica~o !_ Seben:ll 
The reason for the distinotion, as given by this 
oourt in the cases above referred to, is that cities and 
ohartered towns and villages aot under charters, at their 
request, these privileges being held to be a considera-
tion for the duties imposed upon them, and for the per-
formanoe of these duties, like individuals, they must 
be responsible in an aotion. 
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The immunity granted to the sohool distriots by the oourt 
stood seoure for over fifty years. In oases involving quasi 001'-
porations, the oourts showed no intention of ohanging the law. I~ 
a late oase, a oourt stated that the question of whether the law 
respeoting tort liability of the oounties was outmoded and should 
be ohanged was one for the legislature, and not for the oourts.12 
Illinois Grants Immunity to Oharitable Institutions 
Immunity was first granted to a oharitable institution in 
Illinols in Parks y_ Northwestern Unlveraitz.l, A medical student 
sued for damages arising from a laboratory explosion whioh cost 
him the loss of an eye. The oourt dismissed the oase, stating ths~ 
tne university was a oharltable institution, and would not be 
liable. The oourt stated that although it required its students 
llcity of Chioago v. Seben, 165 Ill. '71, (1897). 
12Lake County v. Ouneo, '44 Ill. App. 242, (1950). 
13Parks v. Northwestern University. 218 Ill. 381. (1905). 
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to pay tuition and was oonsidered a private oorporation, the uni-
versitywas organized £or purely charitable purposes: the dissemi-
nation of learning. It deolared no dividends and had no power to 
do so. It depended for its maintenanoe upon the inoome from its 
property and the endowment~ and gifts whioh were held in trust 
"for the objeot of its organization." 
The Supreme Court granted absolute immunity to these institu-
tions based on the Trust ~ Theorl: 
The funds and property thus aoquired are held in 
trust, and cannot be directed to a purpose of paying 
damages for injuries oaused by the negligent or wrong-
ful aots of its servants and employees to persons who 
are enjoying the benefit of the charity. An institution 
of this oharaoter, doing oharitable work of great bene-
fit to the publio withou,t profit, depending upon gifts, 
donations, and legacies, and bequests made by charitable 
persons for the suooessful aocomplishment of its benefi-
cial purposes, is not to be hampered in the acquisition 
of property and funds from those wishing to oontribute 
and assist in the charitable work, by any doubt that 
might arise in the minds of such intending donors as to 
whether the fund& whioh are supplied by them will be 
applied to the purpose for which they were intended to 
devote them, or diverted to the entirely different pu.;&:'-
pose of satisfying judgments reoovered against the donee 
beoause of the negligent aots of those employed to oarr.y 
the benefiolent purpose into exeoution. 
The dootrine expressed by the Supreme Cou~t to preserve the 
trast funds of charitable institutions was later reaffirmed in 
Hogan y. Chicago !JiDj:l-,!! Hospital, 14, and the lower courts a180 
14Hogan v. Chioago Lying-in Hospital, 335 Ill. 42, 166 N. E. 
461, (1929). 
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stood by this decision.1S These were cases in whioh the plaintiff~ 
sought relief on the basis of this insurance, the courts .differed 
in their decisions. Two cases are shown in illustration. The 
first oase involves a hospital where the oourt stood by Stal~ 
Decisis. The seoond case involves a private institution, and the 
courts rendered this corporation liab~ This decision was not a 
repudiation of preoedent, but an extension through a different 
interpretation of former Su.preme Court deoision~. 
An appellate cou~ in Pi~et ~. Epstein16 followed tne Supreme 
Court ruling. In this case, suit was brought ae8inst a hospital 
by a plaintiff for the death of his wife. The surgeon, the super-
vising nurse, and a student nurse were named co-defendants, and it 
was alleged that death had resulted from infection oaused by their 
leaving a laparolomy sponge in her abdomen following a Caesarean 
seotion. 
The appellate oourt dismissed the suit stating that the rule 
of non-liability for negligenoe was absolute in Illinois. It was 
pointod out during the oase that the hospital oarried liability in-
suranoe, and reoovery could be had without depleting the trust 
l5Lenahen v. Anoilla Domini Sisters, 331 Ill. App. 27, 72 N. 
E. (2nd) 445, (1947)·. Wattman v. st. Lukes Hospital Assooiation, 
314 Ill. APP. 244, 41 If. E. (2nd) 314, (1942). Maretiok v. South 
Chioago Oommunity HospitAl, 297 Ill. App. 488, 17 N. E. (2nd)1012, 
(1938). 
<I 
- l6piper v. Epstein, 326 Ill-. App. 400, 62 N. EoO (2nd) 139, 
(1945). 
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funds. To this the court replied that the procurement of liabilitr 
insurance did not affeot the oha:r>ities t non-liability for negli-
gent injury. "Policy of insurance indemnifying ohari table hos-
pital against liabi11ty for neg11genoe imposed by law does not 
sffect an enlargement of soope of hospital's liability beyond that 
existing without insuranoe." 
In the P1per oase, the lower oourt stood by for.mer deoisions, 
and then ruled that the cax'rying of 11ab111 ty insuranoe in no way 
affeoted the immun1ty of a charitable institution. Shortly after, 
another appellate court luled to the contrary.17 
Suit was bro~ht against the ferv~t. Fathers by Wendt for in-
juries sustained by his son after falling from a roof of a tioket 
office ~t st. Phillip Stadium. The oourt review the Parks ruling, 
and then deoided that exemptions from liabi11ty were not aosolute. 
It contended that the only basis for the Supreme Court's decision 
was that if liability were admitted, the trust fund would be di-
verted to satisfy claims. thus thwarting the donors' intent. It 
added that the case went no further, stating that t If It does not 
hold or employ any language indioating the exemption from liabilit, 
1s absolute." 
The oourt then reversed the trial oourt's judgm6nt for the 
l7Wendt v. Serv1te Fathers, 332 Ill. App. 618, 76 N. E. (2nd) 
342, (1947). 
defendant, and remanded the oase with direotions stating: 
The immunity dootrine was devised for the benefit 
of the oharitable oorporation, and if the oorporation 
wishes to waive immunity, we know of no prinoiple in 
law whioh would prevent it from doing so. To hold that 
the exemption from liability is "absolute" and that a 
hospital or charitable institution may not protect its 
benefioiaries as well as itself by insuranoe beoause it 
oreates a new liability where none existed before is to 
extend the dootrine far beyond Parks v. Northwestern 
universitf or any other decision rn tnis state. If the 
absolutemmunity rule enunoiated in the }iper oase were 
to prevail, it would seem a sheer waste 0 money for a 
ohari table corpo'ration to purchase insuranoe protection~ 
We hold that where insuranoe exists and provides a fund 
from which tort liability may be oollected so as not to 
impair the trust fund, the defense of immunity is not 
available. 
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The ruling of the appellate cou rt thus modj,fied the dootrine 
to permit recovery when insuranoe prooeeds were available for pay-
ment.of damages. 
Insuranoe Coverage Permits Court Aotion 
Against A Charitable Institution 
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in deciding the oase of Moore 
!. Moyl.18 in 1950, had its first opportunity to olear up the oon-
fliot of deoisions whioh had developed in the appellate oourts. 
Bradley University had purchased a trapeze to be used in a 
oollege oircus, and in May of 1940, While the plaintiff was prao-
ticing on the trapeze in preparation for the circus, it collapsed, 
18Moore v. Moyle et al., 405 Ill. 555, 92 N. E. (2nd) 81, 
(1950). 
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allowing ber to fall some twenty-five feet to a hardwood floor. 
Suit was brought against Bradley University, and against the indi-
. 
vidual instruotors in its department of physical eduoation. It wa 
alleged that Bradley University was fully insured and had other 
non-trust funds from whioh judgment could be satisfied. A circuit 
oourt dismissed the suit, and the appellate oourt affirmed this 
judgment. The suit was then appealed to the Illinois Supreme 
Court. 
In reviewing the previous deoisions, the oourt found that the 
immunity granted in the Parks case did not impose a "disability to 
be sued in tort upon the oharity." and the immunity oouldbe 
waived. In other words, the Parks oase provided a defense only 
against trust funds, but it did not destroy the right of aotion 
against ohari ties. Onoe right of aotion against o han ties was 
established, the Supreme Court stated that in the Parks oase immu-
nity olearly extended to all funds!!!.!! !!! _t_rtl_s_t_, but nothing was 
mentioned in oonneotion with non-trust funds. The oourt oonoludes 
by stating that it was not overruling or ohar..ging the Parks oase, 
but instead, extending the rule, reoovery would be allowed, pro-
vided.. that trllst funds or trust property are not sUQjeoted to the 
payment of any judgment obtained for tort liability: 
We are of the opinion there is no justifioation for 
absolute 1mmunity if the trust is proteoted, beoause that 
has been the reason for the rule of absolute immunity. 
Reason and justioe require an extension of the rule in 
an attempt to injeot some humanitarian prinoiples into 
the abstraot rule of absolute irnmunity. The law is not 
statio and must follow and oonform to OPllanging oondi tions 
and new trends in human relations to justify its exist-
enoe as a servant and protector of the people and, when 
necessary, new remed1es must be applied where none exist. 
From a oarefUl analysis of the many cases, we are of 
the opinion that the law of IlliLois is that the trust 
funds of charitable oorporations are immune from liab1lity 
for the torts of the corporation's employees and agents. 
Beyond that, the rule of respondeat superior is in effeot. 
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Thus the ru11ng of the Parks case was not reversed, but rathe 
1t was reaffirmed insofar as trust funds or charities were oon-
oerned. The court extended the ruling so that inst1tut10ns wh10h 
possessed insuranoe or other non-trust funds would be subject to 
- . 
the ordinary rules of negligenoe and respondeat sUR-er1'!.1'. Judgmen s 
against these institut10ns would henoeforth be satisfied from 
these funds. 
The difference between th1s ruling and the Parks decision lay 
1n the fact that the Parks oase established absolute immunity, and 
the Moore decision established that oharities were held liable for 
their torts. Judgment could be passed against the oharities, but 
they would have to be oollected from non-trust funds. This oourt 
-_ ...... -
did not define what oonstituted non-trust funds, but it regarded 
liability insuranoe as suoh. L1ab1lity insuranoe, being a non-
trust fund, would only effeot the oolleoting of judgments. 
A School Distriot Beoomes Liable to the Extent 
of Insuranoe Ooverage 
Up to this time, the trust fund theory has been developed and 
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modified by the oourts in cases involving hospitals and private 
schools only. The rule was finally applied to the publio sohools 
in Thomas v. Broadlands.19 
The plaintiff, a minor. sued the sohool distriot thrOugh his 
father for personal injuries reoeived at the school playground. I 
was alleged in this complaint that the sohool authorities were neg 
ligent. and the injury received by the plaintiff cost him the loss 
of an eye. The trial court made a motion to dismiss the complaint 
on the grounds that the school district was created nolens volens. 
Thomas elected to stand by his oomplaint and the court then enterec 
judgment against him. Appeal was brought on two questions of law, 
(1) Is the defendant school distriot immune from suit for negli-
gence in this case? and (2) If immunity exists, does the carrying 
of liability insuranoe remove this immunity either completely or 
to the extent of suoh insurance! 
The court first oited Kinnare,~n and stated that, "Absent the 
question of insurance, the law in Illinois is clear that a school 
district, as a quasi-municipal oorporation, is not liable for in-
juries resulting from tort." The appellate oourt then explained 
that immunity of quasi-municipal and municipal oorporations ex-
!sted from two theories in law. The first theory was the dootrine 
19Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consolidated Sohool Distriot 
No. 201, 348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N. E. (2nd) 636, (1952). 
20Xinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 Ill. 332, 49 N. E. 536,(189 ). 
of sovereign immunity: the state is soveI~ign and cannot be sued 
without its consent, and the second one WbS one of public policy 
which dictated that public funds and corporate moneys devoted to 
government purposes could not be diverted to any other purpose. 
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The oourt was influenced by decisions in other states and 
stated that the don trine of sovereign immunity did not apply to 
munioipal or quasi-munioipal corporations because it could not be 
justified in the present age, and society condemned it: "The whole 
doctrine of gove rnmental Immuni ty rests upon a rotten foundation.·
' 
~l 
The court's treatment of the doctrine was also influenoed by legal 
oommentaries: "It seems, however, a prostitution of the ooncept of 
sovereign immunity to extend its scope in these ways, for no one 
could seriously contend that local government units possess sover-
eign powers themselves." The court then reoognized that the only 
reason for granting immunity to school districts was publio policy 
In reviewing the reasoning of the Moore case, the court then 
found direct applioation of that ruling, and followed pI~cedentf 
The only justifiable reason for the immunity of 
quasi-munioipal oorporations from suit for tort is the 
sound and unobjeotionable one that it 1s the public pol-
icy to protect public funds and publio property, to pre-
vent the diversion of tax moneys, in this case, schocl 
funds, to the payment of damage olaims. There is no jus-
tification or reason for absolute immunity if the public 
funds are proteoted. Their proteotion has been the real 
and historical reason for the absolute immuni~, both 
21Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 47 N. M. 85, 136 P. (2nd) 480, 
(1943) • 
elsewhere and in Illinois •••• Liability insuranoe, 
to the extent that it proteots the publio funds, removes 
the reason tor, and thus the immunity to suit. The rea-
soning in the Moore case, supra, applied with equal 
foroe to the question betore us. If the publio funds 
are proteoted by liability insuranoe, the justifioation 
and reason tor the rule of' immunity are removed. 
In a final defense the defendant declared that there was no 
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statutory authorization in Illinois for the purohase of insuranoe 
by a sohool distriot, and therefore it oould not be used to waive 
the immunity of the district. The oourt did not reoognize "an 
illegal aot" as a defense and oonoluded by stating: "We need not 
deoide the question of waiver beoause immunity from tort liability 
of a quasi-munioipal oorporation is required or justified by the 
need for the proteotion of publio funds. The reason for the rule 
of immunity vanishes to the extent of available insuranoe." 
The oourt in this oase relied on the Moore deoision and drew 
an analogy between the trust funds and publio funds. In both 
oases, the funds of the institutions were protected, and in both 
oases liability was imposed from ~-trust and·~-pub110 funds. 
The Broadlands OBse was the first instance in whioh judgment was 
passed against a publio sohool distriot. The deoision of this 
oase modified the immunity dootrine, and later affeoted legisla-
tion. 
Allegations Against Sohools are Limited 
to Non-Publio Funds 
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The doctrine of limited immunity thus far developed was reoog 
nized in·Tracy !. .. Davis,22 a case whioh originated in an Illinois 
court and was settled in a circuit court of the United States. In 
this oase, a sohool district was named defendant in an automobile 
acoident. The oourt held the sohool district liable, and added 
that tort aotions against school distriots should not be dismissed 
when it was not alleged that the school distriot had any means of 
paying jUdgments. It went further to s tate that funds need not be 
available at the time judgment was entered, as they could be ao-
23 quired later. This theory was influential in this oase beoause 
it was oited in the Moore case. It held that the properties of 
oharities were tax exempt and exempt from tort liability, but pro-
perty could probably later be acquired not exempt from tort liabl1 
ity or the status of some existing property oould be ohanged to 
make it liable to taxation and tort. "No one oan say what the 
future may bring forth." 
This decision in essenoe held the school distriot striotly 
liable for torts, but it expressly limited the collection of judg-
ments passed against oharities and the sohool distriots: 
It is now clearly established that a charitable cor-
poration is n{)t immune from tort liability. However, the 
exeoution on the judgment, if obtained, is limited to 
non-trust funds. The allegations praying for a judgment 
22Traoy v. Davie, 123 F. Sup. 160, 181 N. E. (2nd) 363,(1954) 
2'Anderson v. Armstrong, 171 S. W. (2nd) 401, 180 Tenn. 56, 
(1943) • 
in a complaint against a school district should probably 
allege and be limited to funds other than publio funds. 
The Supreme Court of Illinois Abolishes 
the Immunity Dootrine in toto 
--
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The Supreme Court of Illinois in Moli tar .!. Kane land Communi t 
Distrlot24 overruled all prior deoisions, and deolared sohool dis-
triots liable in tort for pupil injuries. 
Suit was brought against the sohool distriot by the father of 
the plaintiff, a student in that distriot, who suffered injuries 
and severe burns when a sohool bus in whioh he was riding left the 
road , hit a oul ve rt, exploded, and burned. It was alleged thB. t t ru 
bue left the road as a result of the driver's negligenoe. It was 
not alleged in the oomplaints that the sohool distriot oarried in-
suranoe, but plaintiff's abstraot showed that the sohool oarried 
liability insuranoe with limits of $20,000 for eaoh person injured 
and $700,000 for eaoh ooourrenoe. The plaintiff purposely omitted 
suoh allegations. 
Both the trial oourt and the appellate oourt dismissed the 
suit on the grounds that the sohool distriot was immune from lia-
bility for tort. The suit was then appealed. The plaintiff asked 
the oourt either to abolish the rule in toto or find it did not 
--
24Molitar v. Kaneland Community Unit Distriot No. 302, 18 III 
11, 163 N. E. (2nd) 89, (1959). 
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apply to a sohool distriot such as Kaneland, whioh was organized 
through the voluntary acts of petition and election by the voters 
of the district, as oontrasted with a sohool distriot oreated 
nolens volens by the state. 
The court stated that no logical distinction oould be drawn 
between a school distriot organized by petition and election of 
voters and any other distriots all are quasi-munioipal oorporation 
oreated for the purpose of performing oertain duties necessary for 
the maintenanoe of a system of free sohools. 
The oourt then admitted that the only problem to be deoided 
was that of determining whether a school distriot should be immune 
from liability for personal injur,y to a pupil arising out of the 
operation of a sohool bus. tThe Supreme Court stated that while it 
had not re-evaluated the doctrine of immunity for over fifty years 
the dootrine has almost unanimously been oondemned by legal writer. 
and soholars. The ooul"t then reviewed the history of the dootrine ~ 
Illinois adopted the theor.y of sovereign immunity from .Rus __ s.e_l.l ~. 
Men of Devon,25 an English case whioh granted immunity to a oounty, 
--.;;;".;;...;...;,;;;; 
The deoision in this oase was based chiefly on the faot that there 
were no funds out of whioh to pay a judgment. The oase was later 
overruled. 26 Illinois adopted the immunity dootrine in relation t~ 
25Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 Term Rep. 671, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 
(1788) • 
26Crisp v. Thomas, 63 L. T. N. S. 756, (1890). 
~,-----------_--a 
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towns and counties in ~:om E! Waltham..!, .. Kemper27 from the Russell 
case.. Eight yea;;'s after the Bussell oase was overruled, Illinois 
courts extended the immunity doctrine to school distriots in 
Kinnare y_ City .2! Chicago.28 :.eha oourt for this reason found the 
dootrine unsound. 
The Gene~dl Assembly had frequently indioated dissatisfaction 
with the dootrine: governmental units, inoluding sohool districts, 
were now subjeot to liability under the Workmen's Oompensation and 
Occupational Disease Acts.29 The article dealing with bus insur-
ance of the Illin01s Sohool Code was found inapp110able because 1t 
author1zed, but d1d not require, sohool distriots to purchase in-
suranOe. It would therefore allow school districts to determine 
for themselves their financial responsibility for wrongs inflioted 
by them. 
In searahing for former deoisions, the court stated thcJt the 
issue "ould be d.eaided on the basis of the Moore dectrine J or the 
immunity rule would be abolished. The court did not find the 
Moore decision applicable because that decision had implied tha"t 1J 
1t appeared that the trust funds could be impaired, suit would be 
dismissed. The SUpreme Court reasoned that not only the oollectio) 
27Tow~ of Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Ill. 346, (1870). 
28K1nnare v. City of Chioago, 171 Ill. 332, 49 N .. E. 536,(1898 • 
29Illin01s Revised Statutes, 1957, Chapter 48, paragraph 
138.1 .. 172.36. 
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of judgment, but liability itself, would depend upon the presenoe 
o! non-trust assets. There was a oontradiotory element in the 
Moore deoision whioh the oourt found to be unsatisfactor,y in ap-
plying limited liability under that dootrine. 
The Moore deoision had found that the reasoning of the Parks 
oase was based solely on the proteotion of trust funds. The Moore 
caSe stood by the Parks deoision insofar as trust funds were oon-
cerned, but it allowed suit to be brought against a oharity, where 
Parks held that immunity was absolute. The Moore deoision held 
oharities liable for torts, the judgments to be paid out of non-
trust funds. It was argued that suoh a deoision would give rise t 
a situation whioh would oreate liability only in the ev~nt 
oharities were insured. The oourt answered that insuranoe had no 
bearing on the liability of a oharity, but only on the manner of 
oolleotion: "It is suggested that liability is predioated upon the 
absenoe or presenoe of liability insuranoe." By this statement th 
oourt implied that oharities would be held liable for tortp per !! 
and judgment would be pressed where found negligent. The oolleo-
tion of suoh judgments, however. would be another matter, and they 
would be limited to non-trust funds. The Supreme Court in review-
ing this deoision agreed with this opinion, but found the element 
of oontradiction in the last part of the opinion of the Moore oase 
In remanding the oase, the opinion of the Moore oase stated: 
It appears that the trust funds of Bradley will not 
complaint, and therefore it was error to dismiss it. 
The judgment, therefore, of the Appellate Court, in sus-
taining the motion to dismiss the complaint as to the 
appellee, Bradley Polytechnio Institute, is reversed and 
the oase remanded to the ciroui t court of Peoria County. 
The Sup~me Court in Molitar interpreted this opinion as 
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meaning that sinoe Bradley Polyteohnio was fully insured, the 
court should not have dismissed the oase, but impressed liabili V • 
This then could later be interpreted by enlargement to mean that 
a charity were not ooveredby insuranoe or possessed other than 
trust funds, suit against a oharity would be dismissed, thereby 
reveMiing to immunity. Charities oould then diotate their own 
liabllit7. 
The oourt in reviewing the Broadlands deoision found it also 
objeotionable where that deoision stated, "It 1s the publio polioy 
to protect publio funds and public property, to prevent diversion 
• 
of tax moneys, in this case sohool funds, to the payment of damage 
claims. It The SUpremeCourt interpreted this opinion as meaning tha 
school distriots would beoome bankrupt if oalled upon to compeneat 
for their torts. The oourt further reasoned that immunity oould 
not be justified on the protection-of-publio-funds theory: school 
distriots in whioh common law ~e was abandoned have not been com 
pel led to shut down. 
In diotum the oourt stated, "We are of the opinion that none 
of the reasons advanoed in support of school distriot immunity hav 
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immunity should be abolished by legislature, not by the oourt, it 
responded, "The dootrine of sohool distriot immunity was oreated 
QY this oourt alone. Having found that dootrine to be unsound and 
unjust under present oonditions, we oonsider that we bave not onlJ 
the power, but the duty, to abolish that immunity." 
The oourt finally oonoluded and established liability !a toto 
by stating, "For reasons herein expressed, We aooordingly hold t~ 
in this oase, the sohool district is liable in tort for the negli-
genoe of its employee, and all prior deoisions to the oontrar,y are 
hereby overruled." 
The Molitar deoision presented some unique problems whioh de-
.erve further consideration and olarifioation. There were e1S1te.a 
children involved in the sohool bus aooident, and only Thomas 
Molitar was allowed to recover damages. The Supreme Ooul"t, in 1ts 
final opinion, announoed that the new ruling whioh abrogated the 
doctrine of 1mmunit7 would be applied prospeotively. Schools would 
be held liable in future oocurrences only. This applioation was 
based on the reasoning that sohool distriots prior to the Molitar 
deoision had relied on the dootrine of immunity and bad not ~d 
themselves: this was the "relianoe test." If the rule were appl1e~ 
ret roaotively , the sohool distriots would suffer undue hardship. 
The oourt then announoed that the ruling would apply to the 
"instant 08se," Molitar~. Kaneland •. The oourt gave two reasons 
for this ruling. First, if the oourt were to merely announoe the 
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rule without applying it, the ruling would amount to me.re diotum. 
Seoond, and more important, to refuse to apply the new rule to the 
instant oase would deprive the appellant, Molitar, of' any benefit 
from his efforts and expenses. There would then be no inoentive 
to appeal in future oases where an appellant reoeived no benefit 
even though he had won a d&oision. 
Sinoe Thomas Molitar was the only ohild represented in that 
oase, the deoision in effeot deprived the other ohildren who were 
involved in the same aooident of any benefit.30 Parties represent 
ing all ohildren appealed, and the four appeals were oonsolidated 
into one.3l The appellate oourt stood by the Molitar ruling, and 
deprived judgment to the plaintiffs. This oourt bas9d its deoisio 
on the faot that all parties had or1ginall1 brought suit against 
the sohool distriot, and the suit was dismissed by the oourt. 
Thomas Molitar alone had eleoted to appeal to the SUpreme Court. 
"Future ooourrenoes" meant aooidents oocurring after the 
Molitar deoision. The aooidentooourred on Maroh 10, 1958, and 
the oase was heard on May 22, 1959. A rehearing was held on the 
,OMolitar v. Keneland Community Unit Distriot No. 302, 29 III 
App. 471, 173 N. E. (2nd) 599, (April, 1961). 
31Molitar v. Kaneland Community Unit Distriot Bo. 302, 29 III 
App. 471, 17' N. E. (2nd) 599, (April, 1961); Nelson v. Kaneland 
Community Unit Distriot No. 302, Id.; Meek v. Keneland Community 
Unit Distriot No. 302, Id.; Probst v. Keneland Community Unit Dis-
triot No. 302, Id., (April, 1961). 
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case and the ruling went into effect December 16, 1959. I Tlia new 
ruling excluded the children injured in the accident before the 
decision, even though their injuries were sustained in the same 
accident which gave rise to that deCision. From an info~al ap-
peal, the Supreme Court has now modified its original deoision 
again to hold that the ohildren involved in the aocident will not 
be barred by the ruling of December 16. The ruling has not been 
abrogated, but an exception to it was made in this case. The 
language of the opinion made this olear: "It should be evident 
that this holding in no way modifies or effects our holding in the 
Molitar cBse or the cut off'date relative to governmental tort 
immunity 8S previously established in ~he oas8."32 
~ome school cases have been decided subsequent to and relat-
ing to the ruling of Deoember 16. In Terzy v. Mount Zion Commun-
- -
!tl ~ ~chool Distriot,3; the appellate court dismissed the oase 
holding that the Molitar decision did not apply. In this case, a 
school boy sustained injuries from a fall while performing gymnas-
tics. The accident, however, ocourred on Maroh,3, 1959, prior to 
the .!2].itar decLsion, and it was pl°operly dismissed. The oase of 
32Molitar v. Kaneland Community Unit Distriot No. 302, 24 Ill~ 
(2nd) 467, 182 N. E. (2nd) 145, (1962). 
'3Terry v. Mount Zion Community Unit Sohool Distriot No. :5 in 
Maoon and Moultioe Counties, ;0 Ill. App. (2nd) 307, 174 N. E. 
(2nd) 701, (1961). 
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Bergman !. Board ~ Eduoation ~ Chioag034 was also dismissed be-
oause the deoision of Molitar did not apply. The plaintiff in 
this oase oontended that the accident ooourred on May 28, 1959, s~ 
days after the Supreme Court rendered its first opinion in the 
Molitar deoision. The oourt pointed out that the original Molitar 
opinion was released on May 22, 1959, and a rehearing was held on 
Deoember 16, 1959. The results of the rehearing were identioal to 
those of the original opinion. The only differenoe was that the 
Supreme Court stated that ita opinion would beoome law, effeotive 
Deoember 16, 1959. The appellate oourt oited other oases in whioh 
the Supreme Court has reasserted its stand as to the effeotive 
date of the Molitar ruling.3S 
Summary 
Governmental immunity initially granted to sohool distriots 
in Illinois was based on an extension of the dootrine of sovereign 
1mmunity.36 Deoisions whioh followed and whioh involved the sohod 
distriots and other quasi oorporations stood by stare deoisis and 
advanoed additional explanations. The most oommon was that it waa 
34Bergman v. Board of Eduoation of City of Ohio ago, 30 Ill. 
App. (2nd) 65, 173 N. E. (2nd) 565, (1961). 
35Peters v. Bellinger, 19 Ill. (2nd) 367, 166 N. E. (2nd) 58~ (1960), List v. O'Connor, 19 Ill. (2nd) 337, 167 N. E, (2nd) 188, (1960); Garrison v. Community Oonsolidated Sohool Distriot No. 65, 
34 Ill. App. (2nd) 322, '.181 N. E. (2nd) 360, (1962). 
36Xinnare v. City of Chioago, 171 Ill.332, 49 N. E. 536,(1898 
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publio polioy to proteot the publio funds and to prevent the diver 
sion of tax moneys for payment of damages. It was sometimes added 
that the sohool distriots, having limited powers, had no authority 
to spend money other than in ways speoified by the legislature. 
Immunity granted to the sohool distriots held firm for over siXty 
years, until the Supreme Court in a notable deoision severed immun 
ity and held the distriots liable !2 toto, with no exoeption.;7 
The oourt's ohange in attitude toward the dootrine was not an 
abrupt one. In the interim the Illinois courts were influenoed by 
~eoisions in other jurisd10tions and by legal oommentaries, but 
~ 
Ithey were unw1lling to abandon preoedent. 
Charitable immun1ty ran a parallel oourse to that of govern-
mental immunity. The oourt's adherenoe is illustrated in the 
Piper oase.;8 However oases involving the oharities were instru-
~ental in the oourt's abandonment of the immunity dootrine. 
The first break with tradition appears in Wendt !. Servite 
'athers,;9 when the appellate oourt used insuranoe prooeeds to' 
grant ~udgment while still adhering to the immunity of trust funds. 
;7Molitar v. Keneland Community Unit Distriot No. ;02, 18 Ill. 
~2nd) 11, 16; B. E. (2nd) 89, (1959). 
;8Piper v. Epstein, 326 Ill. App. 400, 62 N. E. (2nd) 139, 
~1945). 
;9Wendt v. Servite Fathers, 3;2 Ill. App. 618, 76 N. E. (2nd) 
~42, (1947). 
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The Parks40 oase, along with other oases from other states, was 
influential in the Moore4l deoision, whioh is oredited with the 
first breaoh in the total immunity of charities. Being a Supreme 
Court deoision, it had the authority to ohallenge the Parks deoi-
sion and establish precedent: charities were held liable, but 
their trust funds were proteoted. 
The first break from total immunity oonoerning sohool dis-
triots appears in Thomas ~. Broadlands.42 This oourt openly con-
demned the dootrine of gove~8ntal immunity, while holding that 
publio policy was the only justifiable reason for granting immun-
ity. The Moore 088e had been'deoided under similar oiroumstances 
and it was found to be whOlly applioable in this deoiston. The 
importance of the Broadlands deoision lay in the fact that it con-
l 
stitu~ed the first breaoh in the total immunity traditionally 
granted to the sohool distriots in Illin01s. It beld the sohool 
distriots liable to the extent of insuranoe ooverage. This oase 
also was instrumental in amending the Sohool Code in relation to 
iDSurance.43 This decision affecting the publio sohools was 
40Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill. 381, (1905). 
41Moore 
(1950). v. Moyle, et al., 405 Ill. 555, 92 N. E. (2nd) 81, 
42Thomas v. Broadlands Community Conso11dated School Distriot 
No. 201, 348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N. E. (2nd) 636, (1952). 
43Sohool Code of Illinois, 1959, Artiole 6, Seotion 35.1, 
Liability Insurance for Sohool Board Employees, p. 89. 
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reaffirmed in Tracl !. Davis.44 According to Franklin,45 the 
oourt in this oase interpreted the law so as to remove all to rt 
i~un1ty from the schools, and to substitute "immunity of 001180-
t10n~n 
The Illinois Supreme Oourt in tie Molitar46 deoisioD seems to 
have rea.soned that the courts in prior decisions had not asserted 
themselves strongly enough, and the law was resay for a change. 
It found the Moore decision inapplicable beoause of the oontradio-
tion found in that opinion. It also replldiate~. ';;b.,; ~cotY.'1ne u~d..~ 
the Broadlands decision because immunity ~as based on the protec-
tion of public funds, which was not justifiable in this age. It i 
probable that the Supreme Court in the Moli tar case would have 
found the Moored.eision unaooeptable even if the oontradiotions 
were absent in that opinion. The Supreme Oourt had vigorously 
attaoked immunity based on sovereignty, and also the polioy of 
proteoting publio funds. If it had attaoked immunity based on the 
proteotion of publio funds, it could not possibly have reoonciled 
immunity based on the trust fund theor.y. 
Finding no justifiable reason for holding the school distriot. 
44Traoy v. Davis, 123 F. Sup. 160, 181 N. E. (2nd) 363,(1954) 
45John L. Franklin, "Tort Liabil1ty of the Schools," Univarsi ~y 
of Illinois Fornm, (1958), 43'. 
-
46Mo11tar v. Keneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 III 
(2nd) 11, 163 N. E. (2nd) 89, (1959). 
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immune, the Supreme Court stated that school distr10ts would be 
held liable with no except1ons. The Stat e of Illinois then became 
one of the most recent states to abrogate the iIllmu.n1ty doctrine. 
CHP~ER IV 
ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS 
Prior to the time that the oourts challenged the immunity 
dootrine of the school distriots in Illinois,l the sohool dis-
triots were provided with permissive legislation oonoerning health 
and aocident insurance and liability insurance. 
The first statute to be enacted provided liability insurance 
restricted to operation of buBes, and purohased at the disoretion 
of the sohool boards. This statut& provided liability insuranoe 
ooverage to the sohool distriots, its agents, or employees in oon-
neotion with the ownership or maintenanoe of sohool buses: 
Any sohool distriot, inoluding any non-high sohool 
distriot, whioh provides transportation for pupils may 
insure against any 10s8 or liability of such district, 
its agents, or employees, resulting from or incident to 
the ownership, maintenance, or use of any sohool bus. 
• • • Every policy for suoh insurance coverage issued to 
a sohool district shall provide, or be endorsed to pro-
vide that the oompany issuing suoh policy waives any 
right to refuse payment or to deny liability thereunder 
within the limits of said policy, by reason of the non-
liability of the insured school district for the wrong-
ful or negligent aots of its agents and employees, and 
its immunity from suit. as an agenoy of the state 
Lrhomas v. Broadlands Community Consolidated District No. 201, 
348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N. E. (2nd) 636, (1952). 
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performing governmental functions. 2 
Shortly thereafter, another statute was enacted which per-
mitted the school districts to purchase medical insurance to pro-
tect pupils while partioipating in athletic activities. Thie in-
sumr..ce was not pl'Ovid.,d for by "public funds, tt but it was to be 
derived from Admissions to athletio events. 
The sohool board of any school district may, in its 
discretion, provide medical or hospital servioe, or both, 
through accident and health insuranoe on a group or in-
dividual pasis, or through ~on-profit hospital servioe 
oorporations or medioal service plan oorporations, or 
both, for pupils of the distriot injured while partici-
pating in any athletio aotivity under the jurisdiotiQn 
of or sponsored or oontrolled by the distriot or the 
authorities of any sohool thereo;t'~. The cost of suoh in-
suranoe or of stlbsoriptionB to su~h non-profit oorpora-
tions, when paid from the funds of the distriot, shall be 
paid from moneys derived from athletio aotivities.' 
The s~hool distriot was held liable in Thomas v. Broadlands 
.................... --
when it was found that the sohool distriot oarried publio liab11it r 
insuranoe. Damages paid from insuranoe prooeeds provided a means 
ot recovery for injury ot the plaintiff, while the pub1io funds 
2Sohool Code of Illinois, Article 29, Section 9, p. 363, ,(en-
aoted August 10, 1949). . 
Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 122, Artiole 29, Seotion 9 
Liability Insuranoe, p. 2015.. ' 
Smith Hurd Annotated Statutes of Illinois, Chapter 122, Artio e 
29, Seotion 9, p. 449. 
'Sohool Code of Iltinois, Artiole 22, Sect. 15, p. 270, (en-
aoted June 21, 1951). 
Illinois Revised Statutes, Chap. 122, Art. 22, Sect. 15, p. 
1985. 
Smith Hurd Annotated Statutes, Chap. 122, Art. 15, Sect. 19, 
T} .. ~ 
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remained untouohed. The Illinois sohool distriots were not then 
authorized to purohase liability insuranoe. statutes provided onl 
for the purchase of sohool bus aooident liability polioies. De-
fendant t s last plea to the court was based on this contention, add 
1ng that the school was not authorized to purchase this insuranoe, 
and therefore was not authorized to satisfy a judgment olaim. The 
oourt refused this argument, held the sohool liable, and as a di-
rect result, the legislature enacted a statute authorizing the 
-:" 
sohool distriots to purohase liability insurance to protect them-
selves in the faoe of liability, 
To insure against any loss or liability of the school 
district or of any agent, employee, teacher, offioer, 
or member of the supervisory staff thereof resulting 
from t he wrongful or negligent act of suoh agent, employee. 
teaoher, offioer, or member of the supervlsor,y staff, 
whether such wrongful or negligent aot ocourred within 
or without the sohool building, provided suoh agent, 
employee, teacher, officer, or member of the supervisory 
staff was, at the time of suoh wrongful or negligent aot, 
aoting in the dischar&e of his duties within the, soope 
of his employment and/or under the direotion of the 
Board of School Directors.. Such insuranoe shall be oar .. 
ried in a. company licensed to write suoh ooverage in this 
Stat~. Ever.y polioy for suoh insuranoe shall provide, 
or be endorsed to provide, tmt the company issuing suoh 
polioy waives any right to refuse payment or to deny lia-
bili ty thereunder within the 11m1 ts of said polioy" by 
reason of the ~on-l1ability of the insured sohool dis-
triot for the wrcngful or negligent aots of its agents 
a.nd emplOYees, and its immunity from suit, as an agenoy 
of the state engaged in governmental funot10ns. 4 . 
The legislature, fearing a broad applioation of the Molitar 
400de, Art1cle 10, Seot10n 22.3, P. 89, (enacted July 23, 195~. 
Statutes, Chapter 122, Article lOt Seotion 22.3, p. 1932. 
Smith Hurd. Obapter 122. Artiole 6. Seotion 35.1. 1). 300. 
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ruling to quasi corporations, passed a series of bills granting 
Immunity to several state agenoies two months after the first 
Molitar opinion was released. Total irrlJJlunity was granted to park 
districts,5 oaunties,6 and forest preserve districts.7 The sohool 
distriots had been declared liable, but the legislature extended 
limitations to liability with the passage of the !2!! Liability 
Act.8 
-
The Tort Liability Act expressly inoludes religious and pri-
vate ~non-profit· schools. This would seem to include schools as 
well as colleges and universities. The .olitar decision made only 
the sohoo1 districts liable, but it found the Moore dootrine inap-
plioable, and it is unlikely that oourt. in future deCisions will 
allow the3e msti tutions protection under that ruling ~ In oase 
that these institutions are found liable as were the sohoo1 dis-
triots, they are granted proteotion under the same statute. 
In regard to publio education, the Tort Liability Act include 
school districts only. This covers elementary and seoondary 
schools, and probably ino1udes junior 0011eges.9 A more speoifio 
5statutes, Chap. 105, Art. 12.1, Seot. 1, p. 1075. Seela1so 
Art. 333.2, p. 1099. 
6Statutes, Chap, ;4, Art. 301.1, p. 1498. 
7Sta~tes, Chap. 57i. Art. 'a, p. 26B. 
BStatutes, Chap. 122, Seot. 821-831, p. 2100. 
9Statutes, OhaP. 122, Art. 13, Seot. 2B t p. 1950. Code, Art. 
1'15 Seot. 25 .. 'D. 168. 
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definition oan only be provided through a oourt ruling. Publio 
institutions of higher learning are not mentioned in the statute, 
but the University of Illinois and its branches are oovered by the 
Court of Olaims Act .10 
It has been stated that the referenoe to purely govel"lmlElntal 
funotions in the statutel1 is somewhat puzzling beoause the govern 
mental-proprietary test whioh is used in determining the liability 
of municipalities has not been applied to the sohool districts in 
Illinois.12 Other jurisdiotions have used this distinotion in de-
oiding liability,l, but it is doubtfUl that tl~ legislature inten~ 
ed to introduce thisdietinct10n into the law of Illinois. The 
term 1s probably meant to be descriptive and reat'f1rm the sohool 
activities whioh the Supreme Court initially reoognizod as being 
"purely governmental" in oharaoter.14 
lOStatutes, Chap. 37, Art. 439.8, Sec. 8, part D, p. 1698. 
llCode, Art. 1, p. 457. Statutes, Chap. 122, SeC. 821, p.210). 
12f1 Governmental Immunity in Illinois, n Northwestern Un1versit r 
Law Review, ed. Edwin Misktn, (Evanston, Illrno!s, 1959} VOl. ,~, 
P:-594. , 
13Sawaya v. Tuscon High Sohool Distriot No.1 of Pima County, 
281 P. (2nd) 105, 78 Ariz. 3891 (1955). Morris v. Sohool Distriot 
393 Pe. 633, 144 A. (2nd) 72, \1958). 
14K1nnare v. City of Chioago, 171 Ill. 332, 4·9 N. E. 5'6, 
(1898). Linoke v. Moline Board of Eduoation, 245 Ill. App. 459. 
(1927). Lindstrom v. City of Chioago, '31 Ill. 144, 162 N. E. 128 
(1928). Chioa.go City Bank end Trust Co. v. Bor:rd of Education, '8 ~ 
Ill. 508, 54 N. E. (2nd) 498, (1944). Sohreiner v. City ot CMoag >, 
406 Ill. 75, 92 N. E. (2nd) 133, (1950). 
n 
A reoent (post~Molitar) lower oourt decision has stood by 
prior deCisions, and has restated that sohool distriots are oharge 
with duties whioh are purely governmental in charaoter and exist 
for the sole purpose of eduoation.1S 
Publio Polioy. Seotion 1. The General Assembly finds 
and hereSy enacts the publio polioy of the State of Illi-
nois that publio schools in the exercise of purely govern-
mental functions should be proteoted from exoessive diver-
sion of their funds for purposes not direotly oonneoted 
with their statutory funotions, if there is liability 
imposed by any court ••• from injuries inourred as a 
result of negligenoe in the oonduot of sohool distriot 
affairs; and that non-profit private sohools oonduoted 
by bona fide eleemosynary or religious institutions ahould 
be proteoted from exoessive diversions" of their tunds 
for purposes not direotly oonneoted with their eduoational 
funotions ••• toward alleviation of the burden of indi-
vidual loss arising from injuries inourred as a result 
of negligenoe in the oonduot of suoh non-profit private 
8ohools.l6 
The general s'~atute of lim1tations for personal aotion allows 
a period of two years from the time of injury to the time of oom-
menoing the suit.17 !be Sohool Distriot Tort Liability statute 
in this oase deoreases the time limit in that it requires aotion 
to be oommenoed within one year from the time the oause of aotion 
aoorued.18 It also imposes a more severe limitation. The general 
lSGarrison v. Oommunity Consolidated Sohool Distriot No. 65, 
34 Ill. App. (2nd) 322, 181 N. E. (2nd) 360, (1962). 
16Code, Art. 1, p. 457. Statutes, Seo. 821, p. 2100. 
17statutes, Ohap. 83, Art. 14, p. 692. 
l8Cod., Art. 2, P. 458. Statutes, Seo. 822, p. 2101. 
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statutes of limitations allow exceptions to the two year 11mitatioA 
in cases where the plaintiff is a minor. Limitations do no run 
against a minor until he reaches majority, eighteen for a female, 
and twenty-one for a male. A minor can then bring suit within two 
years.19 The school statute expressly places one year limitation 
on all persons, regardless of age. In effeot this means that a 
child, if hurt in any area outside the sohool, would have up to twc 
years after reaching majority to commence suit, but failure to 
commenoe suit against the schools within one year would forfeit th4 
right of aotion against the school. 
L1mitation of Aotion. Seotion 2. No civil action shall 
be oommence~in any court against any sohool district or 
non-profit private sohool by any person for any injur,r 
to his person or property unless it is commenoed wlth~ 
one year from the date that the injur,y was received or 
the oause of aotion aocrued. 20 
The school statutes require that a "olaim" or motive must be 
filed with the school distriot authorities prior to the commence-
ment of the suit, and within six months of the injury.2l Failure 
to file suoh notice would result in dismissal of the suit even if 
suit were brought withi~ the one year 11m1tation.22 Oourts in 
19statutes, Chapter 83, Article 21, p. 693. 
20C04e, Artiole 2. p. 458. 
Statutes, Seotion 822» p. 2101. 
21Code, Artiole 3, p. 458. 
Statutes, Seotion 823, p. 2101. 
22Code, Artiole 4, p. 458. 
Statut es~ Seotion 824~1". 2101. 
other jurisdiotions have affirmed a similar restriotion, and it is 
unlikely that the Illinois Supreme Oourt will go against this 
restriotion.23 
Fili, Statement of Ingurz. Section 3. Within six months 
trom he da=Ee tIiarsuo injury was reoeived or suoh oause 
of aotion aoorued, any person who is about to oommenoe 
any oivil aation in any oourt against any sohool district 
for damages on acoount of any injury to his person or pro-
perty shall file in the office of the sohool board attor-
ney ••• and also in the offioe of the olerk or seoretary 
of the sohool board, • • • a statement in writing • • • 
giving the name of the pe non to whom the oause of aotion 
has aocrued, the name and residenoe of the person injured, 
and the date and about the hour of the acoident. the plaoe 
or looation where the aocident oocurred, and the name and 
addresfJ of the attending physioian, if any •. 
II • 
With respeot to non-profit private sohools the state-
ment in writing required hereunder shall be filed in the 
offioe of the Superintendent or Principal of suoh sohool.24 
Failure to File. Seotion 4. If the notice provided by 
~eotIon ~iS-not filed as provided therein, any suoh civil 
action oommenoed against any sohool distriot or non-pro-
fit private sohool shall be dismissed and the person to 
whom any suoh oause of action aocrued for any personal 
injur,y or property damage shall forever be barred from 
further sUi!!§.25 --
Seotion five of the Statute l1m1ts the amount of recovery to 
ten thousand dollars for eaoh separate cause of aotion. 
Amount Reooverable. Seotion 5. The amount reoovered 
1J 
. 2'Grimaldi v. Board of Education of City of Utioa, 107 N. Y. 
S. (2nd) 658, (1958). 
2400de, Artiole 3, p. 458. 
statutes, Seotion 823, p. 2101. 
250ode, Artiole 4, p. 458. 
Statutes, Section 824, p.2l01. 
in eaoh separate oause of aotion against a public sohool 
shall not exceed $10,000.00, exoept as is otherwise pro-
vided by law. 
The amount reoovered in eaoh separate oause of aotion 
against a non-profit private sohool shall not exoeed 
$10,000.00.26 
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It is suggested that, the term "exoept as otherwise provided by 
law," in the statute is ambiguous, and that it oould be inter-
preted to grant the oourts the power to impose additional liabil-
ity in future oases where the sohool distriots purohase insuranoe 
in exoess of ten thousand dollars. 27 It is argued that it will 
probably have little effeot sinoe it is unlikely that sohool dis-
triots will purohase more insuranoe than is neoessary to cover the 
maximum ten thousand dollar liability. 
The ten thousand dollar limitation olearly app11esto "non-
profit" sohools, oolleges, and universi'ties. It also applies -to 
the publio sohools, but not to the University of Illinois and its 
branohes. Limitat10ns for this inst1tution are fixed at twenty-
five thousand dollars under the Oourt of Claims Aot .28 Another 
exoeption to this limitation also appears in the oase of death. 
The statute expresses recovery for injuries sustained, but it make_ 
26code , Artiole 5, p. 458. 
Statutes, Section 825, p. 2101. 
27"Governmental Immunity in Illinois," !. !!. l!. l!., p. 597. 
28Statutes, Chapter 37, Court of Claims Act, Article 439, 
part D, p. 1698. 
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no mention of injuries resulting in death. 29 If suoh would be the 
oase, the statute would be inapplioable, and reoover,y would be ob-
tained up to a maximum of thirty thousand dollars under the Wrong-
ful Death Aot.30 The prooedure for filing notioe and oommenoing 
aotion against the sohool distriot would also be inapplioable, 
thereby allowing the plaintiff two years to bring suit as provided 
by the Wrongful Death Aot, under the general statute of limita-
tiona. 
Damages awarded through the Court of Claims are final beoause . 
the Court of ClaimS is not a oourt of law and appeal is not avail-
able. The ten thousand dollar limitation on reoovery plaoed on th 
sohool distriots does not represent the full amount of reoover.y 
available to parties in future ORses. The oourts could award addi 
tional damages or deolare this artiole unconstitutional or the 
legislature could amend the artiole. Ten thousand dollars repre-
sents an amount hardly adequate in a speoific instance where a 
ohild is maimed for life. The limitation does not apply to indi-
vidual employees of a sohool distriot, and the individual suoh as 
a teaoher oan be sued for any amount. 
Artioles six through nine of the Aot st&te the same language 
as artioles one through five, but they applY onlY to oases arising 
29"Governmental Immunity in Illinois," N. U. L. R., p. 595. 
- -- -., .... 30 . Statutes J Chapte r 70, Wrong:f'ul Death Act, Artiole 2 t p. 434 ~ 
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prior to the aot, and subsequent to the first Molitar opinion. ThE 
legislature had anticipated the application of the :first Molitar 
opinion and enaoted these sections in reference to those cases. 
These articles require that parties injured prior to the llot must 
file notioe within six months of the effeotive date of the Aot.'l 
Suit must also oownenoe within one year of such date,32 and the tel 
thousand dollar limitation also applies." These articles were 
rendered void by the Molitar rehear1Ps which stated that the ruli~ 
in regard to school liability would go into effect on Deoember 16, 
1959. This e1imina"ted all suits prior to the Act, and follow ing 
the first opinion.34 
Section ten states that the statute is not to be oonstrued as 
authorizing the bringing of suit or the entry of judgment against 
a school distr1ct, indioating that liability does not fall under 
the statute, but under tba oommon law. 
Construotion. Section 10. Nothing oontained in this aot 
shall Se deemed to authorize the bringing of any action 
against any sohool distriot or non-profit private school, 
'lCoda, Seotions 7 and 8, p. 458, 459. 
Statutes, Artioles 827, and 828, p. 2101. 
32Code, Seotion 6, p. 458. 
Statutes, Article 826, p. 2101. 
33Code, Section 9, p. 459. 
Statutes, Article 829, p. 2101. 
'4Bergman v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 30 Ill. 
App. (2nd) 65, 173 N. E. (2nd) 565, (1961). 
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nor the entry of a judgment in any suoh aotion.35 
Seotion eleven allows the oourts to modify or deolare unoon-
stitutiona1 any seotion without effeoting other seotions. If the 
statute were written in one paragraph, the whole statute would be 
jeopardized if part of it were found to be unoonstitutional. 
severabi1itt. Seotion 11. If any seotion or part of any seo~ron othis aot is held unoonstitutional by a oourt of 
oompetent jurisdiotion, all other seotions or P~6ts of 
sections shall remain in full foroe and effect.'b 
The Illinois legislature has been critioized for reaoting so 
quiokly in grantink oomplete immunitt to the different quasi-oor-
porations. It be.' been suggested th$t there is need for further 
study and modification if these statutes are to appear rea1istio. 
The statute in regard to eduoation oannot be regarded as a stat-
utory frustration of judioial reforQt. The statute did not impede 
the oourt's intent, but set limitations to the sonoo1 liability, 
the most prominent of which is the ten thousand dollar 11m1t.37 
Clearly it is a job for legislature. Thus the combination·of jud~ 
cial deoision and legislative reaotion oreates a reform which en-
oourages the use of liability insuranoe as a proteotion for aooi-
dent viotims while yet proteoting the sohools against disastrously 
35Cede, Seotion 10 p. 459. 
Statutes. Article 830, p. 2101. 
36Code, Seotion 11, p. 459. 
statutes, Artiole 831, p. 2101. 
T .... ,.Q~1~~~erlTf~er~R~?~Cr~~~ive Continuity in Tort Law, n Harvard 
high judgments. The question as to whether ten thousand dollars 
is an adequate amount will have to be answered by court opinions 
in future cases. 
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CHAPTER V 
ELEMENTS OF AOTIOBABLE NEGLIGENCE IN THE SCHOOLS 
Negligenoe deals with oonduot whioh falls below or does not 
measure up to the standards of behavior established by law for the 
protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. The idea 
of risk involves a reoognizable danger based upon the eXisting 
faots at the moment; the danger must be apparent to the aotor. 
Judgment of the aotor's oonduot is likewise made from the faots 
apparent to the aotor at the time. 
Negligenoe alone does not give rise to a cauae of aotion. Al~ 
elements of aotionable negligenoe must be present and the absenoe 
of one element will bar reoovery. These elements are: 
a. A legal duty to oonform to a standard of behavior 
or oonduot for the proteotion of others against 
unreasonable risk of harm. 
b. A breaoh of duty or the fa1lure to oon:f'orm to that 
standard. 
o. SuffioientlY olose oauaal oonneotion between that 
oonduot or behaTlor and the resulting injury. 
d. Injury or damage1r8sul tills to the rights or 1nt er-ests of another. 
lWilliam L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, 2nd ed., 
(st. Paul, I,~inn., 1955), 1'. ItS? - - - -
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Duty oan be defined as an obligation on the part of one persOl 
to oonform to a partioular standard of conduct toward another. Tb! 
oourts will reoognize and enforce this obligation aris1ng out of 
the relationship of two parties 1nvolved in a law suit. In the 
prooess of a law su1t,a oourt will first establish the duty owed 
by the defendant to the plaintif'f before it oan determine whether 
the defendant has breached his duty. The conoept of duty, however. 
must be established in regard to that partioular plaintiff involv« 
in the suit. Aotion oannot be based upon the breaoh of duty owed 
to some other person. In a sense, the duty owed to a plaintiff 
must be a personal one. Prosser states that the plaintiff must 
bring himself within the soope of a definite obligation so that it 
might be regarded as personal to him.2 
Breaoh of duty is determined by comparing the defendam t soon 
duot against a standard whioh i8 set by law. This standard bears 
purely on the aotor's oonduot and upon what was apparent to him at 
the time. It does not matter if the risk seems to be greater 
afte1'?lsrds. On the other hand, it must be taken into aooount that 
the aotor has no time to refleot. Thus all aspeots are taken into 
View, and the aotor's conduot is judged aooordingly. The standard 
imposed must be an external one. It must not be based upon the 
individual t 8 own notions of what is right and what is wrong. The 
failure to do so would bring about a multiplioity of "standards." 
2Prosser~ p. 167. 
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Prosser states that an honest blunder or a mistaken belief that no 
damage will result does not absolve the aotor from the f'aot that 
the risk was still there and the harm to others was still as 
great.' 
In judging the aotorts conduct, the gravity of the risk must 
be balanced against the purpose served by that oonduot. Oertain 
risks are acoepted as oommon, everyday risks, and are justified by 
society as long as their benefit outweighs the risk of probable 
harm. In the interest of education, students are exposed to the 
apparent risks involved 1n phys1cal eduoation olasses, soience la~ 
orator" aotiv1ties, and vooational arts olasses. To eliminate 
these risks would mean curtailing these aotivities. Negligenoe is 
not absolute,but is relative aocording to the need and oocasion. 
In attempting to es"tablish a uniform standard of behavior 
against whioh to measure the oonduot of the aotor, the courts have 
oreated a fiotitious person: the reasonab!l Erudent person. 4 This 
person symbolizes the average prudent person of the oommuni ty who 
is possessed of ordinary sanse and skill, and who is always up to 
standard. 
The oonduot of the re~sonable man will vary with the situatiol 
with whioh he is oonfronted, and in judging the aotor's oonduot, 
'Prosser, p. 121. 
4Ibid ., P. 124. 
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the jury is instruoted to take the oircumstances into account; neg 
ligenoe is the failure to oonduot oneself in the same way that a 
reasonable man would "under the same or similar oircumstanoes." 
This takes into aooount the external faots which surround the aoto 
from one situation to another. 
The oharsoteristiosat the prudent person itself are allowed 
to vary to some degree sinoe persons or individuals will vary. 
Allowanoes are made as far as physioal oharaoteristios are oon-
oerned. It the aotor is blind or deaf or is an amputee, his oon-
duot must meet the standard of a reasonably prudent blind or deaf 
person or an amputee. Allowanoes are also made in the oase of the 
aged and of ohildren simply beoause they oannot meet the standard. 
The standard of oonduot applied to a child is the conduct expeoted 
of a reasonable ohild of the same age, intel11genoe, and experieno • 
The oonduot of a sohool teaoher 1s held to be the oonduct of 
a reasonable prudent teacher having the same physioal attributes, 
the same training, and experienoe. faoed with the same situation. 
The standard of oonduot of a sohool oh1ld beoomes important only 
when the faots in question bear upon oontr1butory negligenoe, as 
will be disoussed in the latter part of this paper. 
If the aotor has knowledge, skill, or intelligenoe superior 
to that of the ordinary man, the law demands a higher standard of 
conduoty whioh is oommensurate with these skills. Most of the 
oases involvi these situations have involved rofessional le 
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suoh as dootors and nurses. The same could be true, however, of 
any teaoher possessing a special skill or knowledge. 
The term proximate oause is oonfusing and diffioult to under-
stand beoause it involves more than one problem. It is better un-
derstood if it is disoussed from the viewpoint of oausation and 
legal or Prox1mat~ oause. 
Oause in faot deals direot1y with the problem and determines 
..................... _-
whether the injury or loss of the plaintiff was a oonsequenoe of 
the aotor's oonduot. This is a question of faot usually deter-
mined by a jury, and it oovers all events whioh oould have oontri-
buted to the injury_ It entails the aotorts nonfeasanoe as well 
as his misfeasanoe. 
In determining whether an aotor's nonfeasanoe has oausal re-
lation to an injury, the oourts have formulated the !!E! qua ~ 
rule, commonly known as the but for rule, which states that the 
--
defendant's oonduct is not a oause of the injury if the event 
oould have ooourred without it. This test is one of exolusion and 
is restrioted to the question of oausation alone. The test OalLnot 
be used in situations where two oauses oocur and bring about an 
event whioh either oause, operating alone, would have been suffi-
oient to bring about the same Nsul t. While oausation is s.n es-
santial element of liability, it does not determine liability 
slone, sinoe other oonsiderations may prevent liability. 
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If a oausal oonneotion is found, the oourt must determine if 
the aotor is legally responsible or not. The failure to find a 
causal oonnection ends further lit1gation and absolves the aotor, 
from tort. 
Legal cause 1s a lim1tation whioh the oourts have placed upon 
the aotor's responsibi11ty for the oonsequenoe of his conduct. 
This is done 8S a matter of P190tio.al neoessity sinoe an aotor's 
oonduot may have,far-reaching effeots. In a philosophical way, 
~rosser states that consequences could go forward to eternity: 
"The fatal trespass done by Eve was the oause of our woe. uS 
, 
In determining liability, the oou~s limit legal responsibil-
ity to those oauses whioh are olosely related with the results and 
signifioant enough so as to justify imposing liability. Prosser 
states that an attempt to impose liability without these l1mita-
~ions would result in infinite liab1lity for all wrongful aots and 
~ndless l1tigation.6 
The problems involved in determining proximate cause a~ nu-
nerous and of a oomplex variety. At times, however, the problem 
~s approaohed by determining whether the interests of the plaintiff 
ire entitled to legal proteotion from the aotions of the defendant. 
Phis, of o~urse, routes the problem to the question of duty of 
5Prosser, p. 218. 
6Ib1d., p. 219. 
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care owed by the actor to the plaintiff. 
Some courts plaoe the legal responsibility on the last wrong-
doer where the cause is traced to sevelg1 sources. The last wrong 
doer is not, however, always held responsible. An earlier actor 
may be held responsible.if he is under an obligation to protect 
the plaintiff' against the conduct of the wrongdoer. Tr..is commonly 
happens in school cases where a stud.ent is injured by the negligerli 
aot of another ~tudent. The teacher always has the obligation to 
protect the students in his care from injur.y and i8 legally bound 
to effectively control pupils conduot so as to prevent injury to 
any. 
The last element of' actionable negligenoe is the injur,y or 
damage which constitutes the actual physioal harm to the plaintiff 
This is an element upon which a law suit is baesd and without whid 
aotion oannot be initiated. 
Duty of the School District 
The Supreme Court of Washington stated that it is the legal 
duty of the sohool districts to proteot the students under their 
oustody. In defining the duty owed to the sohool child, the court 
r; 
also defined the standard of oare required of the sohool district. 
7Brisooe v. Sohool Distriot No. 123, Grays Harbor County, 32 
Wash. (2nd) 353, 20 P. (2nd) 697, (1949). 
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The oourt made speoial reference to the supervision of games 
which are inherently dangerous for an age group, or could beoome 
dangerous if allowed to continue without supervision. In the 1m-
mediate c_se a group of students were playing a game of football 
during reoess. In the game, wh10h was oalled "Keep away" footban. 
it was required that the members of one team taokle any member of 
the opposing team who had possession of the football. This game 
was forbidden at the grade sohool, but at the time there was no 
teaoher present on the playground. During the game an eleven year 
old boy was taokled and injured. 
In determining the duty owed to the ohild, the oourt stated: 
a duty is imposed by law on the sohool distriot to take 
oertain preoautions to proteot pupils in its oustody 
from danger reasonably to be antioipated, among whioh 
dangers, we th1nk, should fa1rly be inoluded the dangers 
inourred from playing games inherently dangerous for the 
age group involved, or likely to beoome dangerous if al-
lowed to be engaged in without supervision. 
In an early oase involving the duty of care owed to the 
sohool ohildren in a sohool distriot, the Supreme Court of Bew 
York stated: "The Board of Eduoation of the oity of Iew York is 
oharged with the duty of providing for adequate supervision of 
aotivities within the sohool yard.u8 
The sohoold1striot was not required to keep the ohildren 
8Graff v. Board of Eduoation of City of New York, 15 N. Y. S. 
(2nd) 941, 358 App. D1v. 813, (1939). 
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during the lunch hour in the oase of Miller ~. Board £! Eduoatio~ 
The primary sohool allowed the pr1mar,y sohool ohildren to eat 
their lunohes in the sohool building, and aftemards allowed them 
to play on the playground for the remainder of the lunohhour. 
While playing on a defeotive fire esoape, a sohool ohild fell down 
and injured himself. 
The Supreme Court interpreted the statute referring to super-
vision and added: 
What the board oould not do under the statute was 
to undertake the oare and oontrol of ohildren during the 
lunoheon period and then, after they had lunohed, turn 
~hem out upon the school property upon whioh there exist-
ed a known dangerous and defeotive condition and provid-
ed no supervision for them although they were in the 
school yard or playground, and it was during sohool hours. 
In a reoent deoision, the Supreme Court of New York stated 
that a school distriot has fulfilled its duty when it provides for 
proper supervision.10 "Appellant's duty was to provide for proper 
supervision of activities within the school, and its duty was ful-
filled when it provided adequate supervision in the person of one 
or more oompetent instruotors." 
In a prominent oase, a California court defined ~he duty owed 
9Miller v. Board of Eduoation, Union Free Sohool District No. 
1 of Albion, 291 N. Y. 25, 50 N. E. (2nd) 529, (194'). 
lOperrill v. Board of Eduoation, Central School Distriot No. 
1, 174 I. Y. S. (2nd) 91, 6 A. D. (2nd) 690, App. Div., 175 N. Y. 
S. (2nd) 304, (1958). 
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to the ohild: "Every teaoher in the public sohools must hold pupii 
to a strict acoount for their oonduot on the way to and from 
sohool, on the playground, or during reoess."ll The oourts in 
that state deolared that in order to provide effeotive oontrol and 
supervision of students, the sohool distriots have the duty to pr~ 
vide, and to enforce, rules and regulations. 
In the oase of Tallor !. Oakland Scavenger 00.,12 a girl was 
struok down by a garbage truok on the sohool grounds as she ran 
from the gym to the athletio field. A prinoipal issue in the oaSe 
'was the failure of the sohool distriot to provide rules and regul& 
tions in view of the danger to whioh the students were exposed s "It 
is the duty of school authorities to supervise at all times, the 
oonduot of the ohildren on the school grounds and to enforce those 
rules and regulations neoessary to their proteotion." 
Ili· the oase of Brown !. Oi ty Sl!. Qakland,13 a young girl 
strayed away from her parents while attending a baseball game at 
the school. The child wandered into a sand pit used for the broad 
jump, and while playing in the sand, out her hand on a broken glas~ 
llBuzzard v. East Lake Sohool Distriot, 93 P. (2nd) 233, 34 
Cal. App. (2nd) 316. (1939). See Seotion 5.543 of the Sohool Code 
of California. 
12Tarlor v. Oakland Soavenger Company, 110 P. (2nd) 1044, 17 
Cal. (2nd) 594, (1941). 
13Brown V. City of Oakland, 124 P. (2nd) 369, 51 Cal. App. 
(2nd) 150, (1942). 
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bottle. The Supreme Oourt asserted the sohoo1 distriot's duty in 
this regard: "It is the duty of sohoo1 authorities to enforoe or 
oause to be enforoed rules and regulations in the supervision of' 
pupils on sohoo1 grounds." 
It has been stated, however, that in providing for proper 
supervision, the school boards are not required to provide detai1~ 
regulations oovering ever" aspeot of a ohild's activity in school • 
. !
"The legi$lature did not hereby intend to cast upon school trus-
tees or, b+ards of eduoation the burden of an attenpt to fashion 
guides for the safe conduct of pupi1s. n14 
Atter the Bohoo1 day terminates, the sohool ohildren are no 
longer in the oustody or oontrol of the sohool, and the sohool 
d1striot owes no duty to proteot ohildren who might linger or play 
near Bohool buildings. Plaintiffs bringing suit against sohool 
distriots for injuries ocourring in these situations have been 
denied relief by the courts. 
In Kantor v. Board of Eduoation,l5 the board of eduoation pe~ 
- ---.............. 
mitted the gates of the sohool yard to remain open after sohool 
hours so that ohi1dren could play their games in t he yard instead 
of on the streets. While watohing a stiok ball game, a nine year 
14Hoose v. Drum et a1., 22 N. E. (2nd) 233. 281 N. Y. 54, (1939). 
15Kantor v. Board of Eduoation of Oity of New York, 296 N. Y. 
s. 516, 251 App. Div. 454, (1937). 
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old boy was struok down by a boy riding a bioycle who was playing 
'tag with other bicycle riders. 
The oourt defined the sohool's duty toward the ohildren: 
We find that under the oircumStanoes herein presented. 
there was no duty upon the board of education to have 
watohers in the yard to prevent any particular form of 
play. The purpose of the board of eduoation in open1ng 
yards to the ohildren is obvious17 to keep them off the 
street and to that extent to 8ssist in avoiding street 
accidents. No supervision is attempted; no organized 
play is established. There is no pretense 'of having 
supervisors there. 
In a similar situation, a neventeen year old boy entered a 
sohool playground after school hours for the purpose of playing 
handball. While he was watohing a game of stickball, the, st1ck 
used 1n the game as a bat s11pped out of the batter's hands and 
struck the youth, oausing severe injuries. In denying liability 
for the sohool distriot. the oourt stated: "The defendant was 
under no duty to provide supervision of the public users of its 
playground."16 
In dete~in1ng whether the sohool distriot has been negligent 
in regard to the oare and supervision of the sohool children, the 
oourts often refer to, and impose, the standard £! ordinary ~, 
or tha't cu:re expeoted of the ordinary prudent person. The failure 
of the sohool boards to use ordinary oare in providing supervision 
16Lutzker v. Board of Education of City of New York, 28 N. Y. 
S. (2nd) 496, 262 App. Div. 881, (1941). 
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for sohool ohildren oonstitutes negligenoe on the part of the 
sohool distriot. Sohool board members in creating polioies and 
supervisory personnel in supervising school ohildren must act in 
the same manner that a person of ordinary prudence would act in 
the same ciroumstanoes. 
The Supreme Court of California, in determining whether a 
sohool district was negligent in providing supervision during a 
reoess period employed a test: "The question is whether the sohool 
offioials used the same oare as persons of ordinar,y prudenoe 
charged with the duty of oarrying on the public system would use 
under the same ciroumstanoes."17 
The oourt then defined ordinary care: "What is ordinary care 
depends upon the- ciroumstanoes of eaoh particular case and is to 
be determined as a fact with reference to the situation and know-
ledge of the parties.nlS 
The Supreme Court of Washington has referred to the same sta~ 
dard in determining negligence. "The extent of the duty thus im-
posed upon the respondent school distriot, in relation to its 
supervision of its pupils within its custod7. is that it 18 
required to exercise such care as an ordinarily prudent person 
17 Buzzard v. East Lake Sohool Dis triot of Lake County, 93 P. (2nd) 233, 34 Cal. App. (2nd) 316, (1939). 
18Ibid • 
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"would exercise under the same or similar oiroumstanoes."19 
Sohool distriots are generally held responsible for the pro-
teotion of sohool ohildren from dangers which are foreseeable to a 
reasonable prudent person. School districts are oharged with fo~ 
seeability, and the failure of sOhool board members to aot in the 
faoe of a foreseeable danger oonstitutes liability on the part of 
the distriot. 
The oourt in the oase of Oakland .!. ·Soavenger .2.2. 20 based it. 
deoision upon this prinoiple. In that oase, the prinoipal and the 
sohool officers had known for some time that students frequently 
ran aoross the area used by truoks, but they imposed no rules of 
oonduot or supervised the students. The oourt in deoiding this 
oase imposed liability: "Their negligenoe is established if a rea-
sonable prudent person could foresee that inj~ries of the same ge& 
eral type would be likely to happen in the absenoe of suoh safe-
guards." 
The oourt then went farther and stated that in holding a 
sohool district liable it was not neoessary that the supervisor or 
the sohool board foresee the speoific injury. In order to prove 
, 
negligenoe, the plaintiffs needed only to show that an injur,y of a 
19Brisooe v. Sohool Distriot No. 123, Grays Harbor County, 
201,P. (2nd) 697, 32 Wash. (2nd) 353, (1949). 
2°Oakland v. Soavenger Co., 83 P. (2nd) 948. 
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general type was foreseeable: "Nor is it necessary that the ver,y 
injury whioh ocourred must have been foreseeable by the sohool 
authorities in order to establish that their failure to provide 
additional safeguards oonstituted negligenoe. n21 
In the osse of Charonnat ~. ~ FranOisoo,22 two students 
were involved in a minor dispute in the sohool yard. One stUdent 
walked away and started playing on the sohool fenoe. The other 
student followed him, grabbed his leg, and twisted it in suoh a 
way that the leg bone fraotured. In holding the sohool liable, 
• 
the oourt relied on the prinoiple deoided in the Oakland oase: "It 
was not neoessar,y that the injury to the pupil whose leg was 
broken by a fellow pupil must have been foreseeable by the sohool 
authorl ties or the yard supervisor." The oourt maintained that 
where arguments and fighting ooour, injuries are likely to result, 
and it was not unreasonable to insist that the supervisor should 
have foreseen that injury oould ooour. 
It is the oommon law duty of school distriots to provide and 
arrange for the supervision of sohool students, and sohool dis-
triots whioh fail to do so are held liable for injuries received 
by students as a result of this negleot. Most states have enacted 
statutes requiring supervision and these are expre.ssed in the 
2lOakland v. Soavenger 00., 83 P. (2nd) 948. 
22Charonnat v. San Un1f'ied Sohool Distriot, 133 P .• 
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the school codes of the states. In the case of Forgone ~. Salva-
dore School District,23 a group of students were left unattended 
---- ----------~--
to eat their lunch in a school room. During the lunch hour some 
of the students started to play and souffle, and during the fray, 
a student twisted and injured a girl' arm. 
The oourt stated that laok of supervision oonsti tuted caus's 
of action against the school district. "In the present oas~ th~ 
negligenoe r::illet:ed to have oonsisted of an omission to supply the 
supervision of stUdents during an intermission of sohool whioh is 
required by law •••• Indeed, we may assume that if the teacher 
had been present, the souffling would not have ooourred and the 
injuries would not have resulted." 
Providing supervision, however, does not guarantee that the 
school district will be absolved from liability when pupils are in~ 
jured. Sohool distriots oan be held liable for failure to provide 
adequate supervision. The question as to what oonstitutes adequata 
supervision depends upon the faots of the particular situation. 
What would be adequate in one situation would not be in another. 
This is a question of fact, and when it is before the court, it is 
left for the jury to deoide. Reoent deoisions have not brought 
an agreement on the question. 
23Porgone v. Salvadore Union Elementary Sohool Distriot, 106 
P. (2nd) 932, 41 Cal. App. 423, (1940). 
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The court in Charonnat v. San Franoisoo24 held that the soho 
- -
did not provide adequate supervision when it assigned one teacher 
to supervise some one hundred and fifty students in the sohool 
yard. It stated tlEt one teacher could not account for the condu 
of that number of pupils. 
Other courts have not been as definite as to what constitutes 
proper supervision. "In determining whether the school district 
was negligent in Rffording supervision of its pupils" there is no 
absolute rule as to the number of pupils one supervisor may ade-
quately oversee, nor is there any fixed standard of supervision .• " 2 
The court in Ohman .!. Board .2! Eduoation,26 in which the art 
teaoher went out of the room, stated: "Proper supervision depends 
largely on the ciroumstanoes attending the event. r 
Sohool distriots whioh use inoompetent or untrained help in 
8upeM"1sing student s have been he 14 liable by the' oourts • Studen 
under suoh supervision are exposed to unreasonable risk of h9rm. 
The oase of Garber v. Central Sohool Distriot27 is a good illus----~-- -
tration. 
240haronnat v. San Franoisco Unified Sohool Distriot, 133 P. 
(2nd) 643, 56 Oal. APP. Div. 840. (1943). 
25Rodriquez v. San Jose Unified Sohool Distriot. 322 P. (2nd) 
70, 157 Oal. App. (2nd) 842. (1958). 
260hman v. Board of Eduoation of Oity of New York, 300 N. Y. 
'06, 90 N. E. (2nd) 474, (1949). 
1 of 
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During the lunoh hour a school janitor was usually left to 
supervise the students in the gym and keep them out of the halls 
until the bell rang. The students were left alone to amuse them-
selves with no rules or regulations oonoerning disoipline. On the 
day of the aooident some of the students started playing "shoot 
the crow It" One boy would lie down on a mat and draw his knees up 
against his chest. Another boy would sit on his upturned feet, 
and would be shot into the air, landing on a nearby mat. The 
janitor joined the game and "shot up" a small student who was not 
experieno.d with the game. The student was thrown five, feet in 
the air, and came down head first on the gym floor seven feet be-
yond the mat, sustaining a fractured arm and other injuries. 
The Supreme Court in holding the school liable stated that 
leaving young boys under the oare of a person without tra1ning, 
skill, or experience amounted to a failure of the school author-
ities to meet the requirements of the oommon rule as well a8 neg-
lect of duty as imposed by statute. "It is indioative not only o~ 
a disregard of the statutory mandate to make ~les and regulations 
to establish order and discipline, but also to oarerully seleot 
suitable supervisol'lI1 to whom the safety of children was to be in-
trusted while under school restratnt.ft28 
It oan be seen from the opinions that there are no binding 
28Garber v. Central Sohool Distriot No. 1 of Town of Sharon, 
Sohoharie Oounty, 295 N. Y. S. 850, 251 App. Div, 214, (1937). 
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rules or f1xed standards 8S to what constitutes adequate or proper 
supervision. However 1t can be certain that the courts w1ll hold 
a sohool distriot liable for negligenoe if the jury should f1nd 
that the sohool failed to provide the proper superv1sion. 
Duty of the School Teacher 
Under the common law a teacher owes the school child the duty 
to protect him from unreasonable risk of harm. Proteotion from 
physioal harm involves the proteotion from the teaoher's own neg-
ligence as well as from the child's acts or those of his olass-
mates. Sohool children require oonstant care and supervision be-
oause of their immaturity. their inab1lity to reoognize danger 
where it exists, and because of their implusive nature.. 
A sohool teaoher is in effect a supervisor whenever the 
teaoher is in oustody of a group of children. This responsib1lity 
is exercised while in the classroom. and in any other 1nstances 
where the teaoher mar be delegated supervisory duty. 
The relationship of a sohool teacher to a sohool distriot is 
that of an employee, and a teacher does not reoeive immunity from 
tort liability the way a school officer would. Teaohers are held 
liabl. in all cases where a stUdent receives an injur.y as a direot 
result of the teaoher's, negligence. In holding a teaoher liable 
the oourts have used the same standards of conduot by whioh to 
measure a teaoher's oonduot as is used for sohool districts or the 
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oommon man. In special situations, a higher standard is used. In 
jurisdiotions where the sohool districts are held liable tor their 
torts, a teacher's liability reverts on the distriot, and the rela~ 
tionship between the teacher and the sohool district is that of 
master and servant. 
A teaoher's legal duty toward the school ohild is largely ful 
filled through proper and effeotive supervision, and teaohers have 
been held liable for breaoh of th1s duty beoause of imp~pper or in 
adequate supervision. 
~ 
In passing judgment in oaaeo involving teaohers, sare courts 
have based their decisions on the legal relationship between the 
ohild and the teaoher whioh is known as ~ parentis. !fhis rela-
tionship imposes upon the teaoher a duty to oare for the ohild in 
the aame manner that a parent would. Under this theory the paren1J 
delegate their respons1bi11ty to the teaoher. 
A noted oas .. which 11lustrates the duty of the teaoher to the 
sohool ch11d through this legal oonoept is the oaS8 of Gainscott 
v. Davies. 29 In that case, the teaoher had asked an eight year 
-
old pup11 to water the plants whioh were looated 1n the "oonserva-
tory,· a room adjacent to the classroom, used to display b101ogioa 
speoimens and plants. The plants in the room were in boxes which 
were suspended from the oei11ng, and were too high for the child 
29Gainsoott v. Davies. 275 N. W. 229. 281 Mich. 515. (1937). 
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to reaoh. With the knowledge of the teaoher, the young girl took 
a ohair, stood on it, and prooeeded to water the plants with a 
milk bottle. In the prooess, the bottle slipped from her hand and 
broke on the oement floor. The girl slipped and fell on the 
broken glass and reoeived severe outs. 
In passing judgment, the oourt stated that the relationship 
of a teacher to a pupil is that of one ~ 1222 2arentis: 
Weare not ooncerned with the law applioable to the 
punishment at a pupil by a teaoher, but rather with the 
law applioable to the duties of a teaoher in the oare and 
oustody of a pupil. In the faithful disoharge of suoh 
duties the teaoher is bound to use reasonable oare, tested 
in the ~ight of the existing relationship. If through 
negligenoe, the teaoher is guilty of a breaoh of suoh 
duty and in oonsequenoe thereof a pupil Buffel's injury, 
liability results. 
Another oourt based its deoision on the same relationsh1p.30 
'In that oase, a manual training teaoher, with approval of the 
board, was oonstruoting a vooational training building. Katerials 
from a razed building were used. and boys were permitted to volun-
teer for this work during their manual training olasses. A tem-
porary stage was ereoted entirely around the building and the boy. 
ould stand on it to fintsh the walls. The plaintiff, Brooks, was 
rking with a oompanion when the stage oollapsed and Brooks re-
oeived severe injuries. 
The court oited the, Gainsoott oase and stated that duty was 
:;OBrooks v. Jacobs 31 A. (2nd 
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based upon the teacheIf.pupil relationship of !!! ~ ;earentis, 
and that beoause the teaoher had the oare and custody of his pupi~ 
with the right to govern and control them, he must so act as not 
negligently injure them, whether the aot is one of misfeasance or 
nonfeasance. 
In instanoes where negligenoe oan be shown, the oourts will 
hold a teaoher liable for nonfeasanoe, the failure to aot 8S re-
1$ 
qui red in ord.er to prevent injury to the ohild, as well as for .!!!. 
feasanoe, the wrong oonduot oausing injury. The following case 
illustrat~s the breaoh of duty ~nder ~ parentis by misfeasanoe. 
It also indioates the limit of the teaoher's authority under this 
legal oonoept. \ cJ.< 
In the oase of Guerrieri ~._Tlson,31 a teaoher notioed that 
a boy who was playing baseball had an inflamed finger. She told 
the boy to report to the offioe after sohool was out. After sohoo: 
she heated a pan of water to the boiling point, and with the help 
of an assistant, held the hand of the student under the water for 
about ten minutes. The boy was then sent home, and later taken to 
the hospital by his parents. The burns required treatment and an 
. ,
1nf~ction complicated the affair. The boy was required to stay in 
the hospital fer twenty-eight days. The scalding aggravated the 
infeotion, and soar tissue permanently disfigured the hand. 
3lGuerrieri v. Tyson, 24 A. (2nd) 468, 147 P. Sup. 239,(1942) 
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The oourt did not judge the teaoher's good intent, if there 
~as one, but her laok of prudenoe in treating the student~ In 
holding the teaoher liable, the oourt stated the limitations of 
the teaoher's authority UDder this relationship: 
Under the oiroumstanoes, we think it olear that these 
defendants are legally liable for the damages resulting 
from their tort. These teaohers stood in 1000 ¥arentis 
to the ohild, but there i8 nothing in tnat-riIa IonsHIp 
which will justify the defendantts aots. Under the dele-
gatsd parental authority implied from the relationship 
of teaoher and pupil, a teaoher may infliot reasonable 
oorporal punisbment on a pupil to enforoe disoipline, but 
there is no implied delegation of authority to eXercise 
her lay judgment as a parent may in the matters of the 
treatment of injury or disease suffered by a pupil. 
The court then added that the teache rs we re not aoting in /;:to 
emergency, and furthermore t neither had any medical training. A 
teacher's authority over a school ohild does not extend beyond 
supervision, and ~atters which require medioal attention should be 
referred to t he medically trained personnel. The above Cllse was 
an extreme one, and teaohers have been held liable in cases of a 
less serious nature. 
Apart from the legal relationship of ~ parentiS, a teaoher 
has the oommon law duty to proteot all students, whioh are under 
the oontrol or oustody of the teacher and a dereliotion of this 
duty will bring about liability. In the oase of Hoose .!. B.!:!!!,32 
a group of ohildren were playing among some goldenrods growing in 
,2Hoose v. Drum et al., 22 B. E. (2nd) 233, 281 N. Y. 54, 
t, Q~Q\ 
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a field adjacent to the school grounds. The ohildren were out on 
reoess, and were under the supervision of their teaoher •. While 
playing with a goldenrod stalk, one pupil struok another pupil in 
the eye, oausing him the loss of the eye. 
The court stated: 
Teachers have watohed over the play of their pupils 
time out of mind. At reoess periods. not less than in 
the olassroom, a teaoher owes to his charges to exeroise 
such care of them as a parent of ordinary prudenoe would 
observe in oomparable oiroumstances •••• The effeotive 
cause of the plaintiffts injuries was a failure to pro-
teot the boys against themselVes. Any dere1iotion in 
this aspeot was the fault of the teaoher. 
other oourts have held teaoher liable for omission or their 
duties. The court in Miller v. Board of Education" ~iled in a 
------- -- ----~~-
simil~ manner. 
After taking lunoh a group of grade children was told by 
their teaoher to go ~lay in the playground. The teaoher remained 
inside of the building, aud watching the ohildren through a win-
dow. While playing, a girl olimbed over a defective fire esoape, 
fell down. and received injuries. The oourt later held that the 
teaoher had falled her duty of supervision because she had not 
adequat~ly supervised the ohi1dren. 
A student obtained permisSion from his teaoher to bring a gun 
"Miller v. Board of Eduoation, Union Free Sohool Distriot NQ 
1 of Albion, 291 N. Y. 25, 50 N. E. (2nd) 529, (194'). 
to the sohool workshop tor repairs in the oase ot Govel .1 • .Board 
.2!. Eduoation.34 The gun oonsisted only of the barrel and. the 
breaoh meohanism. In the days whioh followed, the teaoher failed 
to supervise the work on the gun. One day the student brought 
live ammunition to test the mechanism and the teacher took no 
notioe. While trying out the mechanism, the gun'discharged aooi-
dentally and wounded a student standing nearby. 
The court did not hold the teaoher liable, saying: 
Without ammunition' the portion of the gun whioh was 
brought presented no more of a haB~ than any other metal 
oylinder with attaohmen~s •••• It was obvious to any-
one who looked that Taylor was using live ammunition in 
testing the gun. Duffy (the teacher) was negligent in 
not adequately supervising the work and for not warning t~ 
plaintiff and others who were within range of the danger. 
r In deteirmining liabil1 ty ~f sohool teachers for the'ir negli.-
gence, the oourts have imposed the standard of conduot required of 
an ordinary prudent person. T~acher8 are required to use reason-
able oare. and their failure to do so will bring about liability. 
--
In Govel v. Board of Education,35 the boys physioal education 
- -
classes were requir'ed to somersault over a set of parallel bars by 
bouncing on a springboard plaoed on one side of the bars and land-
ing on the opposity side where some mats were plaoed on the floor. 
34Govel v. Board of Eduoation of City of Albany, 48 N. Y. S. 
(2nd) 299, 267 APP. D~Y. 621, (1944). The sohool board in this 
oase was not held liable beoause it was a delegated duty. 
35Ibid • 
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While attempting this maneuver a pupil oaught his foot on the barst 
fell on the bare floor, and broke a leg. 
In stating negligence, the court said, "A teacher of physioal 
education bas the duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent in-
3uries, to assign pupils to such/exercises as are within their 
abilities, and to properly and adequatlly supervise their activ-
ities, a breach of which duty constitutes actionable negligence on 
the part of the teacher.",_~ 
In the case of Luce v. Board of Ed.ucation,'6 a school student 
- - _ ................................ 
bad received previous fractures of the forearm, and on her return 
to sohool was permitted to forego her gym olasses on doctorts 
orders. Durlng(the seoond sohool term her cast was removed and 
she was allowed to participate in gymnasium activities. While 
1P1aying «jump the stick relay, ,. a game in whioh the participants 
have to jump as a stick is swung under them, the plaintiff was 
!pushed and fell down, breaking her arm in the same plaoe again. 
In stating charges, the plaintiff contended that the girl should 
pot have been 8l10".ed to play that type of game resulting in her 
~all. 
The court cited the Govel case, and stated that a physical 
. 
• ducation teacher has the duty to exeroise reasonable oare to 
'6Luce v. Board of Eduoation of Village of Johnson City, 157 
N. Y. S. (2nd) 12', (1956). 
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preven~ injuries and to assign pupils to suoh aotivities as are 
within their abilities. 
Judgment was passed aga1,nst a physioal eduoation teaoher who 
allowed two unskilled boys to box without any previous instruo-
tions as to the proper method of boxing. As a result. one pupil 
reoeived severe injuries and the oourt allowed reoovery from the 
teaoher.'7 
In passing judgment the oourt stated s 
It is the duty of a teaoher to exeroise reasonable 
oare to prevent 1n~ur1es. In this partioular oase the 
pupils should be warned before being permitted to engage 
in a dangerous and hazardous exeroise; Skilled boxers at 
t~es are injured, and these two vigorous athletiC young 
men should have been taught the prinoiples of defen$e if. 
indeed it was a reasonable thing to permit a 81uggihg 
matoh of the kind wh,1.oh the testimony shows this oontest 
was. 
r--
\ Under ordinary oiroumstanoes, the standard of oonduot require 
of sohool teaohers seldom goes beyond that of reasonable care. "A 
teaoher may be oharged only with reasonable oare suoh as a parent 
of ordinary prudenoe would exeroise under oomparable oiroum-
stanoes."'S 
Under oircumstances in whioh students are exposed to a great.~ 
degree of risk than the ordinary, the oourts m~ impose oare of tb 
37La Valley v. Stanford, 70 N. Y. S. (2nd) 460, 272 App. DiY, 
183, (1947) 0 
{ \'SOhman v. Board~of E4uoa~ton oI City of New York, 90 N. E. 2ndJ 474 .. 300 B. Y. ')06 .. \.194:'/. 
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highest degree upon a teaoher beoause the safety of the students 
depends upon the precautions taken by the teacher. The oase of De 
-
Gooler y. Harkness39 serves as an illustration. An athletic coach 
~oined in with a group of high school boys intent on in1tiating 
the new members of the football squad who had "lettered" that year. 
The in1tiation was oustomarily held towards the end of the school 
year, and oonsisted of giving the oandidates an eleotrio shook. 
The shock was produoed by using wires oonneoted to a transformer 
whioh in turn was oonneoted to a set of batteries. The equipment 
was not available that partioular year, and the current was drawn 
from an eleotrio sooket while a rheostat was improvised from a jar 
c~ntaining salt watlr. After the third oandidate to receive the 
shook complained that it was tou strong, the salt solution was 
diluted in half, and the wires were tested by the ooaoh. ~he 
plaintiff, De Gooyer. reoeived a shook and immediately oollapsed. 
He oould not be revived and died as a result of the shook. The 
ooaoh was implioated by the faot that he was at the time in oontlnl 
of the situation and responsible for the safety of the initiates. 
In the ensuing trial, the court stated that the ooaoh was 
bound to use care of the hi~hestde5ree: 
The defend:mt, Gardner, must be charged with knOW. 
letfe that electricity is dangerous. His duty in 'j)iifici-
pa ng in the act of transmitting the electric current 
to the body of Gerald was to use the highest degree at 
'9De Gooyer v. Harkness, 13 N. W. (2nd) 815, 70 S. D. 26, jt 
(lq44). ' 
care that skill and vigilance oould suggest. The facts 
disolose that the rheostat used was at best a very orude 
and hastily prepared contrivanoe; the shook was adminis-
tered while the boy reclined on a wet damp floor (it is 
generAlly known that an eleotrio shock is enhanced when 
a part of the person who receives the shock oontaots a 
wet surfaoe); the tests that were made inoluded only two 
of the eight or more wires; the evidenoe disolosed that 
the boy preoeeding Gerald had reoeived a severe shock. 
These faots in our opinion are suffioient to support the 
finding of the jury that Mr. Gardner failed Gerald to 
observe the high degree of duty owing to Gerald. \ 
,..I' 
Duty in Sohool Transpo~ation 
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In sohool distriots where the sohool dnildren are transported 
to and from sohool, the oourts have imposed the duty of oare for 
the ohildren's safety. The same rules of negligenoe whioh apply 
to other sohool situations apply ln transportation, and sOhool 
distriots have been held 11able for injuries to pupils arising 
from their negligenoe.40 If all elements of actionable negligenoe 
are not present, 11ability oannot be imposed upon a sohool dls-
trict.41 
In formulating a standard of care the courts are not in ao-
oord, but in all oases the degree of care was dependent upon the 
designation given to the vehiole used in transportation. A common 
oarrier is a vehiole used in publio transportation and under the 
40The liabi11ty of the sohool distriots in Illinois was based 
on a school bus aocident. 
41Baase v. Central Union High Sohool Distriot, 59 P. (2nd) 
193, 15 Oal. App. (2nd) 102, (1936). 
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oommon law it owes the public the highest degree of oare. While 
some courts have identified school buses as being oommon carl'iers, 
others have designated these as private oarriers. The following 
oases are used in illustration. 
In the oase of Shanon!. Central Sohool Distri~,42 a student 
stepped from the sohool bus, ran home, and was struok by an ap-
proaohing oar. The oourt in deoiding liability held that the bus 
driver owed the ohildren ordinary oare: "We are of the opinion 
that a bus which is operated only for the oonvenienoe of a partio-
ular school under the oiroumstances of this case is a mere private 
oarrier as distinguis~d from a oommon carrier, and that ordina£l 
Erudenoe for the safety of the children under s 1milar oircumstancEIII 
is all that is required of the distriot or the driver of the bus~4 ~ 
The ordinary oare of children, however, does not oonstitute 
a minimum of effori on the part of the distriot for the safety ot 
the ohildren. Ordinarily more stringent measures m~st be taken 
when dealing with children than when dealing with adults. In 
failing to warn, or to halt a student who was getting off a sol~ol 
bus, a driver was found guilty of negligence: "It is ordinarily 
42Shanon v. Central Gaithe~ Union Sohool District, 23 P. (2nd 
769, 153 Cal. APP. 124, (1933). 
43This deoision has been cited ~nd upheld in more recent 
casesl Hanson v. Reedley Joint Union High School District, 111 P. 
(2nd) 415, 43 Cal. App. (2nd) 643, (1941), Fos~er v. Einar, 158 p. 
(2nd) 978, 69 Cal. App. (2nd) 341, (1945). 
/ 
\ 
\ 
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"necessary to exercise greater care for the protection and safety 
of young ohildren than for an adult who possesses normal and 
mature faoulties. One would anticipate thoughtlessness and impul-
siveness in the oonduct of a young ohild."44 
Some oourts have stated that the standard of oare used in the 
transportation of children is extraordinary .2.!£!.: 
While a carrier of passengers is not an insurer of 
the safety of his passengers in the sense that a common 
oarrier of goods is said to be an insurer of the safety 
of goods oarried, he is bound to exeroise extraordinarz 
oare and discipline for the safety of his passengers, and 
Iiimatters not the kind of conveyance used or the nature 
. of the motive power employed. Hence, the operator for 
hire of a sohool motorbus who operates along a oertain 
route every sohool day, taking all sohool ohildren alike 
to and from a oertain sohool is a oarrier of pass.ngers 
required to exeroise extraordinary oare and diligenoe 
for the safety of every one at sUCh sohool ohildren 
'riding in his bus.45 
In the oase of Phillips !. Hardgrove46 the oourts in Washing-
ton imposed oare of the highe»t degree. whioh is the oare.imposed 
44Shanon v. Central Gaithsr Union Sohool Distriot, 23 P. 
(2nd) 769, 133 Oal. APt>. 124, (1933). 
45Sheffie1d v. Lovering, 180 S.E. 52', 51, Ga. APP. 353, (1935). The oourts in Georgia have acihared to this standard: 
Roberts v. Baker, 196 S. E. 104,57 Ga. App. 733, (1938) •. Baker v. 
Langely, O.O.A. Okla., 144 Fed. (2nd) 344, 154 A. L. R. 1098,(1944 
. 46Phi1lips v. Hardgrove, 296 P. 559, 161 Wash. 121, (1931). 
The oourt based its deoision on a prior case involving a common 
oarrier: U. S. Lincoln Oity Lines, Ino. v. Schmidt, O.A.leb. 245, 
Fed. (2nd) 600, (1927), and it was upheld in reoent deoisions in 
Washington: Leaoh v. Sohool Distriot No. 322 of Thurstone Oounty, 
85 p. (2nd) 312, 22 Wahs. (2nd) 596, 158 A. L.ft. 810, (1945). 
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on common oarriers. A young girl was struok and killed by a car 
after alighting from a sohool bus. The court in decidingtha case 
stated that the standard of care required of the school district 
in transporting children should be based on publio polioy. The 
standard of oare in referenoe to sohool buildings and equipment 
was based on publio polioy, and the court saw no reason why stan-
dards imposed on sohool transportat~on should not be based on pub-
lic polioy as well. Public policy demanded the highest degree of 
care of publio oarriers, and the same would be demanded of oarrier. 
of sohool ohildren. 
If a school distriot is liable for the failure to 
exeroise ordinary care with reference to the school build-
ing, sohool grounds, and manual training eqUipment, there 
would appear to be no 'reason why it should not, when it 
engages in the oarrying of passengers by a sohool bus, be 
required to exercise the same degree of care that is exer-
oised by passenger carriers generally. If the rule of 
the highest degree of oare arises, as all authorities say, 
from the nature of the employment and on the grounds of 
public policy, there is no reason why it should not be 
applied to a school distriot the same as any other passen-
ger carrier. Certainly school ohildren are entitled to 
the same degree of care as are adults. 
The standard of care was defined in Illinois prior to the 
Kolitar deCision. An appellate oourt in Van Cleave v'. Illinois 
- -
Coaoh Compw 47held that the highest degree of care was required 
in the transportation of sohool ohildren. In the oase it was al-
leged that the driver oarelessly propelled the bus, and oaused a 
47Van Ole ave v. Illinois Ooach Co., 344 Ill. App. 127, 100 I, 
E. (2nd) 398, (1951). 
I 
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student standing in the aisle of the bus to be thrown forward and 
strike the plaintiff. 
In holding the oompany liable, the oourt stated: "We believe 
that this sets up the proper standard of oare and those engaged in 
the transportation of sohool ohildren should be held to exercise 
the highest degree £! ~."48 There was no prior deoision on 
this partioular question in Illin.ois. and the oourt in handing 
down this deoision made reference to ~ !._ Oi ty .2! Seattle, 49 a 
sohool oase from Was,hington. 
In Prioe v. "York,50 an Illinois Appellate Court has approved 
-..;;.;. ... - -
the holding. of the .!!!! Oleaveoase. In this oase a yo'Wlg ohild 
was crOSSing a highway in order to board a sohool bUS, and was 
struok by a passing motorist. The oourt held the sohool district 
not liable beoause there was no breach of duty_ It stated that 
sohool distriots ow.d no duty to escort stUdents. The court how-
ever went on to state that it reoognized the prior holding in the 
Van Cleave oase to the effect that those who conve,y ohildren to 
-
and from sohool must exer01se the highest degree of oare consis-
tent with the praotical operation of a sohool bus. 
48Van Oleave v. IllinOis Ooaoh Co., 344 Ill. App. 127. 100 X. 
E. (2nd) 398, (1951). 
49webb v. Oity of Seattle. 157 P. (2nd) 312, 22 Wash. (2nd) 
596, 158 A. L. R. 810, (1945). 
50 . Prioe v. York, 24 Ill. App. (2nd) 450, (1960). ' 
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Proximate Cause as Deoiding Liability 
After showing that a sohool distriot's of~ioers or a sohool 
teaoher has been negligent in some respeot, a parent must allege 
and prove that the aot of negligenoe was the proximate oause of 
the injury to the ohild. 
In the oase of G3l!en ~. Rhodes51 all indioations show that 
the teaoher was negligent, but the oourt held him not liable be-
oause his aotions were not the proximate oause of the injury. In 
that CAse a student threw a milk bottle and injured another stu-
~ent during the teacher's absenoe from the olassroom. The olass 
was oomposed, of incorrigible youths, and although the teaoher knew 
of previous assaults upon the injured ohi1d, he placed no one in 
charge of the room during his absenoe. The teaoher furnished the 
milk bottles to the olass and 81l01'4ed them to retain them. The 
court in deoiding liability found that ttle teaoher's aotions were 
not the prosimate oause of the injur,y, and absolved the distriot 
and the teaoher, "The violent disposition of the pupil assaulting 
the plaintiff appears to be the first and proximate cause of the 
~laintiffts injur,y and the absenoe of the defendant is a remote 
oause only, if any." 
In oases where the negligent aot of a teaoher 1s the proxlmat4 
5lG~en v. Rhodes, 29 N. E. (2nd) 444, 65 Ohio App. l63,(19~) 
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oause of a child's injury, the sohool teachar can be held liable. 
In the case of Benedetti v. Board of EducF.ition,52 a vocational 
----- - - -------
arts teacher was found liable for negligence because his act was 
a direct and prox~at. cause of a student's injury. In that case 
the teaoher failed to look a maohine and left it unattended for an 
unreasonable length of time. While a student tried to extricate-
a pieoe of metal from the maohine, another student stepped on the 
foot threadle and oaught his hand in the gears. Although the 
teacher was nine feet from the machine at the time of the accident 
the oourt found him negligent because he failed to observe whether 
the maohine was being used or tampered with and his negligenoe W8S 
the proximate cause of the student's injur,yo 
In determining, the proximate cause, the oourt used the "but 
:f 
for" test and estabb.1shed that the aocident would not have ooourmc 
"but for" the teaoher's oonourring negligenoe in failing to ob ... 
serve whether the machine was being used or tampered with: "But fa 
the negligence of the teaoher, no aot of a third person oould have 
operated to OBuse the injury o:f the :tnfant plaintiff." The , 
teaoher was found negligent and the sohool was held liable. 
In an instanoe ."here a teaoher's negligent aot is tbe cause 
of an aocident, an independent intervening oause mRy break the 
ohain of oausation between the teaoher's negligent aot and the 
52Benedetti v. Board of Eduoation of Oity of New York, 67 N. 
Y. S. (2nd) 30. 271 App. Div. 886. (1946). 
injury. This aot beoomes the proximate oause of the abcident, 
while the aot of the teaoher beoomes a more remote oause. 
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In the oase of Tallor ~. xevlin,53 a teaoher of meohanical 
arts direoted a student to olean a printing press. While the stu-
dent was cleaning the press a classmate moved the flyviheel and 
oaught his har.d in the gears. The oourt stated that the student's 
aot was an independent aot whioh intervened and became the proxi-
mate oause of the injury: "We conclude that the aot of the fellow 
pupil in setting the gears in motion was suoh an independent int. 
vening oause as to break the ohain of oausation between the aooi-
dent and any conduct on the part ~ the defendant. It was the 
proximate oause of the injury." 
This case bears some similarity to the Benedetti case, howev 
in that case the instruotor had the duty to look the IIBchine or 
watoh over it so that no one 1iampered V'1it~l it, Etnd he did neither. 
In the T!llo~ case the instruotor had asked a student to perform a 
normal operation. It should be noted that a third party being the 
immediate aoto~ ~n causing an injUl7 does not in all oases absolve 
J 
a teaoher or a school district from liability. This is specially 
true in iDDtnnces whore the school distriot failed to provide ade-
quate supervision.54 
53Taylor v. Kevlin, 1 A. (2nd) 433, 121 N. J. 142,(1938). 
540haronnat v. San 
6 
Unified School District, 133 P. 
1 
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In instanoes where an unforeseen aot is tbe proximate oause 
o~ an injury teaohers are not held l1able. In the oase of Ohman 
v. Board of Eduoation,55 a student in the aot of passing a pen011 
- -- ---------
to another boy threw the penoil and struok another one in the eye 
when the student for whom the penoil was intended duoked out of 
the way. The teaoher at the time was out of the olassroom obta1n-
ing supplies. The oourt held that there was no liability beoause 
the proximate oause of the acoident was the unforeseen aot of the 
pupil, and not the absenoe of the teacher. The absence of the 
teaoher was a remote oause, and in all probability the aocident 
would have happened in the presence of the teacher. 
The court stated: 
) 
Non~theless, it does not follow such absence was the 
proximate produoing oause of the injury, whioh was due, as 
we see 1t, to the tossed pencil. Whether it was done mis-
ohievously, and heedlessly or wantonly and willfully, or 
with the serious purpose of return1ng the penoil to its 
owner, 1t was the aot o~ an 1ntervening third party, whioh 
under the oiroumstanoes oould hardly have been antioipated 
in the reasonable exeroise of the ~eaoh.r's legal duty 
toward the plaintiff. 
In Pollard v. Board of Eduoation,56 a girl had eaten lunoh 
---- - ------
and gone to t.he playground for the remainder of the per10d. In 
returning to her olassroom, she followed other pupils over a fenoe 
550hman v. Board of Eduoation of City of New York, 90 N. E. 
(2nd) 474, 300 N. Y. 306, (1949). 
56Pollard v. Boal~ of Eduoation, Barker Central School Dis-
triot, 117 N. Y. S. (2nd) 184, 280 App. Div. 1033, (1952). 
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whioh separated the playground area. She plaoed one ~oot over the 
wire and was bringing the other over when, a classmate raised the 
wire so that it struck her foot and threw her to the ground. The 
oourt stated that the proximate cause of the injury was the unfore-
seen act of the third party: "We find no evidenoe in the record to 
support a finding that the fenoe involved in the aooident was neg-
ligently oonstruoted or negligently maintained, or that defendant 
breaohed his duty to provide adequate supervision of the play-
ground. In our opinion, the sole proximate oause of the aooident 
was the unforeseen intervention of the plaintiffts olassmate in 
raising the wire." 
Extent of Liability of the Sohool Distriot 
Sohool distriots are not held to striot liability, and they 
are not insurers of the ohildrents safety. Striot liability is 
generally limited to situations where the plaintiffs are exposed 
to extraordinary risk, and the aotor is "an insurer against the 
oonsequenoes of his oonduot.n57 
In holding that the sohool districts are not insurers of 
safety, the courts have stated that liability oannot be imposed 
for injuries reoeived by students whioh ooourred through the fault 
of no one. Parents must allege and prove that the school distriot 
of their employees were guilty of some aot or omission whioh 
57Prossert p. 338. 
amounts to negligenoe. The sohool distriots in ef~eot are not 
liable for the "pure aocidents. n 
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Sohool distriots are ordinarily responsible for the injuries 
of students whioh are oaueed by their olassmates beoause students 
can not always exercise mature judgment for their actions. The 
sohool distriots, however, oannot be held liable for aooidents 
whioh a person of ordinary prudenoe could not foresee. In the 
case of Reithardt v. Board of Education,58 a girl was Sitting on 
-- ....... 
a window ledge waiting for her ph3'sioal education class to start. 
Suddenly and without warning a classmate grabbed her ankles, 
raised her legs, and pulled her off the ledge so that she fell on 
the noor and received injuries. The sohool district in this oase 
was hel; not liable beoau.. the sohool personnel could not have 
~ ~ foreseen the aot in order to avoid the aooident. 
Theoourt in the osse, Underhill ~. Alameda Elementery School 
District,59 held that a school distriot could not be held liable 
~or injuries suffered by a stUdent in the playground unless the 
sohool district failed to provide a safe playground or allowed the 
studente to engage in games of a dangerous nature. The student iD 
this oase was struok by a bat whioh slipped out of the batte~ts 
58Reithardt v. Board of Eduoation of Yuba County, 111 P. (2nd~ 
440, 43 Cal. App. (2nd) 629, (1941). 
59Underhill v. Alameda Elementary Sohool Distriot of Alameda 
County, 24 P. 849, 33 Cal. App. 733, (1933). 
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hand while watohing a supervised game. The parents brought suit 
against the sohool distriot, but failed to prove that the sohool 
distriot had in any way been negligent toward the student. The 
oourt, in passing judgment for the defendant, stated, 
. The injuries whioh may result from the playing of 
ssid games are ordinarily of an inoonsequential nature 
and are inourred without the fault or part of anyone. 
In suoh oases there is no liability and of oourse the 
f\tndamental rules governing liability remain the same, 
~ven though the partioular injury may prove to be of a 
more serious nature. The law does not make sohool dis-
triots insurers of the safety of the pupils at pl~ or 
elsewhere, and no liability is imposed upon a distriot 
under the above mentioned seotion, in the absenoe of 
negligenoe of the distriot, its offioers, or employees. 
In physioal eduoation olasses where students are more likely 
to be exposed to risks, the oourts have ruled in the same manner, 
maintaining that some of the risks are a natural part of the our-
riculum and the students must assume the risks involved. 
In the oase of Oambareri v. Board of Eduoation,60 the studentl 
--------- - -- --------
were partioipating in a relay raoe in the gym. After taking the 
~or tumble, a student resumed his feet, and the mat slipped on 
the floor under his feet. The student reoeived a bruised knee and 
sprained leg as a result, and the sohool distriot was named a de-
fendant in a law suit. 
The oourt stated that the defendant distriot, in meeting the 
600ambareri v. Board of Eduoation of City of Albany, 284 N. 
Y. S. 892, 246 App. Div. 127, (1936). 
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legal requirements towards providing a reasonably safe place, was 
absolved from liability. It maintained that slipping and falling 
were common ooourrenoes in physioal eduoation olasses despite pro-
per oare and supervision. "The defendant was not the insurer of 
the plaintiff's safety. Common experienoe teaohes us that innumel\ 
able hazards surround the individual and injuries are thereby sut-
: 
fered despit, the eXeroise of proper oare and for whi9h no legal 
liability attaches to anyone." 
In the oase of Walter ~. Everett,6l a student was injured 
while performing gymnastios whioh were held in the sohool basement 
under the. direotion of a W. P. W. instruotor. The oourt in absol-
vtng the diatriot'stated: "School ohildren stand under the protect-
ing arms of the sohool distriot while they are at sohool and while 
• 
going to and from home. But a sohool distriot is oertainly not an 
insurer of the safety of ohildren in its oharge." 
In alleging that a sohool distriot has been negligent, the 
burden of proof rests on the parents, and all elements of negli-
gence must be present. Failure to show negligenoe absolves the 
distriot from liability, no matter how grave the consequences. 
The olassioal oase is Friedman v. Board of Eduoation,62 in 
--------- --
61Walter v. Everett Sohool Distriot No. 24, 79 P. (2nd) 689, 
195 Wash. 45, (1938). 
62Friedman v.Board· of Eduoation of City of New York, 262 B. 
Y. 364. 186 N. E •. 865. (1933) •. 
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whioh a New York sohool board was held not liable beoause it had 
not breaohed a duty where none existed. In that oase a helper was 
employed by the "cus1;odian engineer" of the school and his job can 
sisted mainlY of maintaining the sohool fUrnaoe and keeping the 
school warm. While working after school hours, the helper obtaine 
the help of a fifteen year old boy who was not a pupil. While 
riding the ash hoist of the school building, the boy was aooident-
ly orushed to death by the elevator. It was stated in oourt that 
the hoist had no safety devioes to prevent such aooidents, and the 
sohool was therefore negligent. 
Although no one witnessed the acoident and the boy's own neg-
ligenoe oould bave been involved. it was presumed that the aooidan 
.. 
oould have occurred beoause the board failed to use reasonable 
oare in the malntenanoe of the hoist. In deoiding liability, the 
question was whether tha board of eduoation owed any duty to the 
boy. After reviewing the facts the oourt established that the 
board owed no duty to the boy because the board had not in effect 
Invited:the boy into the building: 
The board of eduoation, at the hour of the aooident, 
had exoluded the publio from the building. It had given 
no authority, express, implied, or apparent, to invite or 
even permit others to oome into the premises •••• Not 
only'was no permiSSion or invitation ertended by any per-
son aoting for the board, but the boys had no reason to 
believe that the helper had a right to extend suoh per-
mission or ,invitation. The defendant owed no duty to 
persons introduoed. 
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SUmmary 
(~n jurisdiotions where the sohool districts are liable in 
tort, the courts have clearly defined their duty and have imposed 
a standard of care on those districts. 
School distriots are requ1red to exero1se ordtnar,y care for 
the proteot10n of sohool ohildren. Ordinar,y oare 1s that care 
that a person of ordinary prudenoe would exeroise under similar 
curoumstances and negligenoe 1s determined on this basis by the 
oourts. The quest10n of whether a sohool offioer has exeroised 
ordinar,y ;are 1s a question of fact wh1ch is decided by a jUr,y~ 
I , 
In negligence cases referenoe is commonly made to the super-
\ 
vision of school ch1ldren, and the oourts have insisted that the 
school districts prov1de proper and adequate supervision. The d~· 
triotts failure to do so may bring about liability. The courts 
have not agreed on what oonstitutes adequate supervis10n, but the 
sohool boards are required to aot with prudenoe and foreSight in 
providing supervision. Some oourts have ruled that school d1s-
triots must oreate and enforoe rules and regulations in controll~ 
student oonduot. The problem of providing supervision is delegate( 
to administrative personnel who assign the neoess8r,y supervisors 
from the staff. 
School teachers aDe held responsible for the safety of sohool 
ohildren in their oustody. This applies to the olassroom as well 
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as to other plaoes where the teaoher has been assigned to super-
vise, suoh as hallways, the playground, the gym, or the oafeteria. 
The failure to assign supervisors would be the fault of the dis-
triot, and the failure to supervise as directed ~ould be the fault 
of the teaoher. 
In determining ~egligenoe, the oourts hold the teaohers to 
the same standard of;oonduot applied to sohool board8~ reasonable 
, 
oare. T.aohers are tequired to foresee and prevent aooidents wh1c~ 
are foreseeable at t .. time. A teaoherts failure to foresee and 
~ 
.\ 
prevent an aooident 40es not necessarily absolve the teaoher from 
liability. The question is not whether the teaoher oould foresee 
the aooident, but rather it is whether the teaoher should have 
foreseen the aooident in the same manner that a person of reason-
able prudenoe would have. 
Oooasionally teaohers or other personnel are required to exe~ 
oise the highest degree of oare. ThiS, however, ooours only when 
the students are exposed to extraordinary risk, and \vhen the 
teaoher has complete oontrol of the children's sa.fety. 
Sohool boards and personnel are not ordinarily held respon-
sible for aocidents whioh ave not foreseeable. Sohool distriots 
are not insurers of the childrents safety. In order to hold a 
school board or sohool personnel liable, there must be an aot or 
omission which amounts to negligenoe. The burden of proof rests 
on the parents. and all elements ot aotionable negligenoe must be 
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present. 
The ordinary rules of negligence are ~ound in the Illinois 
Oommon Law, and they will be used by the courts in future oases 
involving sohool distriots and sohool personnel. In order that 
there may be actionable negligenoe in Illinois, there must be a 
legal duty to exeroise due care in fovor of the person injured. 
his duty extends only to those consequenoes which are probable 
oreseeable. There must be a bI'each or failure to perform such 
uty, and the defendantts actioI~ must be the proximate cause of 
Proximate cause in Illinois is stated as the "direct 
auser of an injur,y, and not a mere possibility." 
The duty of ca~e of the school districts and of school person 
i 
e1 for the protectlon of school children is found in the Oommon i <~ 
w. The standard of care of the school districts has not been 
sfined in Illinois, but it can be anticipated that the courts 
ill hold the school districts to the standard of reasonable oare 
or the protection of sohool ohildren. When dealing with ohildren 
person 1s required to take notice of the child's lack of judg-
ent, caution, or discretion, and to reasonably guard against in-
·uring tlim or causing the ohild to injure himself. The failure to 
constitute a breach of duty. In regard to transporta-
Illinois Appellate Oourts have held the school district 
o the highest degree E.! .2!!!:!. 
The dut of oare of sohoot teachers is def 
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parentis by oommon law. The standard of oare has not been defined 
in Illinois, but teaohers may well be held to the standard of !!!-
sonable oare, and be judged by the standard of a reasonable pruden 
-
teaohi'r. A teaoher may be held to the highest degree of care in 
situations where he exposes the pupils to a higher risk of harm 
than is customary and where the safety of the pupils depends upon 
his skill, and the pupils are under his oontrol. 
OHAPTER VI 
LEGAL DEP.BlfSES 
L1abllit7 for damages is not oonolusive in all oases where 
the parents ot the platntitt allege and prove negligen98 against 
defendant teaohers and aohool distriots for injur1e. to pupils. 
Teaohers and sohooldistriots have reoourse to legal defenses and 
the ordina17 rules of negl1genoe app17 to a ohool oaaes. 
Two of the most oommonly used legal deten.es of sohool dis-
triots are oontrlbuto!7 neglisenoe and assUBl;et10n !!.!:i!!. In 
addit10n to these two defense., !!! major, an aot of God, oan be 
used as a bar to aotion. If it oan be shown that an aot of God, 
suoh as an unoontrollable aot of the elements, is the prime faotor 
in oausing inju17 "to a ohUd, there is no negligenoe. It, howeveI; 
reasonable preoaut1ons oould have prevented the aooident, !!! majo;-
oannot absolve negligenoe. 
~he following ohapter w111 be lim1ted to a diaoUBsinn at 
assumption of risk and oontributo~ negligenoe. The disoussion 
40 •• not inolude !!! major beoause of 1ts rare app11oation. Im-
puted negligenoe and oomparative negligenoe are also omitted be-
oause imputed negligenoe doe8 not apply to sohool oase., and oom-
parative negligenoe doe. not apply in Illinois. 
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Sohool oases from other states are used to illustrate the 
applicat10n of the oommon law prinoiples in sohool situations by 
the oourts. These oases may be persuasive in future Illinois 
sohool oases wbere the faots of these oase8 may be 8im11ar. The 
underlying legal prinoiples, however, will be determined in aoooJd. 
anee with the Illinois Oommon Law. For this reason, and in order 
to orient the reader in the proper direotion, eaoh section oonta_ 
a brie~ ~ary of the Illinois deo1sions from OUt-of-80hool oase. 
Assumption of Risk 
Assumpt10n of r1sk, aooordi1'l8 to Blaok'. Law Diotionary, 
ex1st8 where none of the fault for injury rest8 with the ~laintiff 
but where the plaintiff assumes the oonsequenoes of 1njury ooourr-
ing through the fault of the defendant, third person, or fault of 
no one.l 
GenerallY, the defense of assumption of risk re11eves the de. 
fendant of liabi11ty. fhis assumption, however, rests upon the 
oonsent of the plaintiff to relieve the defendant of an Obligation 
of oonduct toward him, Bnd to take his ohances with the risks 1n-
volved. 3uoh oonsent may be founded by an e!press agraement be-
tween the parties, or by implicat10n fram ~e conduct of both par-
ties. Where CODsent is implied, the plaintiff enters voluntar11y 
lHenry Campbell Blaek, Blaok' 8 J!!!. Dietionarz, 4th, (St. Paul. 
1951), p. 158. 
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into a relation involving danger, assuming all risk, and thus re-
liertngthe detendant of responsibility. The soope of this study 
will be limited to implied agreement. 
Immplied assumption of risk requires that the plaintiff bave 
full knowl.dge and appreoiation of the risks, and a voluntar,y 
ohoio. to enoounter the risk. 
The terti assumption .2!. £!!! has been surrounded by muoh oon-
tusion beoause it i8 used in at least tour different meanings ~y 
the oourts, and the distinotions are seldom olear. Implied asauup. 
tion of risk is interpreted in at least three different meanings. 
A meaning whioh is most commonly used by the oourts is that 
"the plaintiff, with knowledge of the risks, has entered voluntar. 
ily into some relation with the defendant whioh neoessarily in-
volves it, and so is regarded taoitly or impliedly agreeing to 
take his own Ohano ..... 2 This meaning is commonly applied in situ-
atioDa where a spectator entering a baseball park may be regarded 
aa oonsenting that the players may prooeed with the game 'Wi-thout 
taking preoautions to proteot him from being hit by the ball. In 
sohool athletio events, both players and speotators assume the 
normal risks of the game. 
Assumption ot risk may also be implied in two other ways. A 
2Willi8m L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law ot Torts,. 2nd ed. 
(s-t. Paul. 1955), p. '0'. - - --
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person may be aware of a partioular risk oreated by the defendant, 
but voluntari17 assume. the risk. !his ·meaning is oommonly applieC 
to situations where workmen who, in finding that a maohine i8 de-
feotive, oontinue to Use it without protest, and by their conduct 
imply that they are wllling to assume lihe risk involved.' 
In a dlfferent situation a plaintiff may assume a partioular 
risk whioh is all out of proportion to the interest whioh he ls 
seeking, suoh as dashing into 8 burning buil.ding to save a hat. 
SUoh conduot in itself 1s unreasonable, and, aooording to'prosser~ 
amounts to contrlbutorJ negligenoe. In these oas.s, both assump-
tion ot risk a$d oontrlbutor" negllgenoe are available as legal 
defenses. 
Implied assumption of risk requires two neoessar,y elements: 
the plaintiff must have full knowledge and appreoiation of the p~ 
ticular risk, and he must have a Yoluntsl"1 ohoioe to enoounter it. 
If either requlrement ls not met, the dootrine oannot bar aotion. 
Where the requi-rementa are me t, the oourts have applied the 
dootr1ne~ln sohool oasea, but have restrloted its use, beoause 
ohl1dren are treated as a special olass. Beoause of their 1mma-
turit7 and. lack of judgment, ohildren are not held to the Baa. 
'This meaning 1s rarely' used sinoe Workmen t s Oompensatiol); 
Acts have made the employer striot17 l1able. 
4prosser. p. '0'_ 
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standards as are adults, and in many oases the dootrine d08S not 
apply to them. A child's oapaoity to reoognize and appreciate a 
partioular risk is deter.mined by a jury aooording to the ohild's 
intelligenoe, maturity, and experienoe. 
The defense of assumption of risk rests upon the fact that 
the defendant is relieved of any duty towards the plaintttt. In 
sohool oases, however, th~teaoher. standing!e!!22 Rarenti~, baa 
proteotive custodJ of thelohild, and is never entirely relieved of 
his dutr toward the OhildJ ~h1s relationship m~ also limit the 
t 
applioation of the defense in another way. The tesoher has di80~ 
linar,y authDrit7 over the ohild's oonduot. An aot by the ohild 
whioh places him into unreasonable risk may be interpreted by a 
oourt as the child's oonforming to, or following, the teacher's 
authority, thereby being denied a free ohoice. 
The following school oases illustrate the applioation of the 
dootrine of assumption of risk by' the courts in school situations. 
In the osse of Hal! ~. Davies,S the plaintiff's son, a boy of 
.txt.en, had been injured previousl1 in football praotioe, and at 
the request of the ooaoh again partioipated in football praotioe 
and reoeived an additional injury to hi5 arm and 5hou14er. Aotion 
was brought against the high sohool athletic assooiation and the 
SHale v. Davi0S e'~ al •• 86 Ga. App. 126, 70 S. E. (2nd) 923, 
(1952). 
1'0 
ooaoh. It was alleged that the assoo1at10n was l1able for the 
ooaoh's neg11gence and resultant 1njury to the student. ~he court 
d1sm1ssed the oase, stat1ng that a master-servant relat10nship d1d 
not ex1st between the assoo1at1on and the ooaoh. It went further 
to absolve the ooaoh by stat1ng that the 001' was oapable ot, and 
had assumed the r1sks of the game & 
He was 16 years of age and, in the absenoe of an 
allegat10n to the o ontrary , W88 a normal bOl' and of 
average intelligenoe tor that age, and no doubt knew 
and realiZed that football 1s a rough and hazardous 
game and that anyone play1ng or praoticing suoh games 
may be injured. A person of th1s age i8 presumed to 
be oapable of realising danger and ot exerc1s1ng oau-
t10n to avo1d 1t. 
As to the boy's ohoioe of assum1ng the r1sk, the oourt stated 
that be1ng a member of and playing on a high sohool football team 
was voluntary, not a mandatory endeavor. If It does not appear that 
he made any objeotlon or entered any protest to engaging 1n the 
praotloe of the team." 
Ordinar1ly where ball players assume normal rlsks of t he game 
ln whioh they are playlng, speotators also are taken to assume the 
rlsks ln watohing the game. 
In the oase of Ingerson y. Shattuok Sohool,6 the plaintiff, 
Mrs. Ingerson, was a spectator at a football game be1ng played at 
the sohool football field. While she was standing near the slde 
6Ingerson v. Shattuok Sohool, 185 Minn. 16, 239 N. W. 667, 
(1931) • 
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lines towards the end of the game, two players went out o~ bounds 
and rolled against her, fraoturing her ]a g. 
SUi t was brought against the sohool alleging that the sohool 
was negligent in not providing a barrier in order to a~ford pro-
teotion for the speotators. 
The 0 ourt stated that a rope plaoed along the Sideline s would 
not have prevented the players from rolling over, and the use of a 
fenoe might have resulted in greater 1njur.y if the players orashed 
into it. The sohool wae therefore not negligent. The oourt added 
that assumption of risk oould not be established as a matter of 
law, but there were inferenoes that Mrs. Ingerson possessed know-
ledge of the risks and had a free ohoioe to assume tnlUI. Mrs. 
Ingerson had attended three previous games, and during those game. 
1t w •• not unoommon for players to oross and go outside the lines 
of the playing field. This had happened several t 1mea during the 
present game. Furthermore, Mrs. Ingerson t s son was a member of 
the football squad, and she eleoted to stand near the benoh where 
he W8S seated. 
The normal risks of a football gamo do not inolude the risks 
oooasioned by a sohoolemployee'a negligenoe.7 A player oannot 
assume the r1sk of reoe1v1ng permanent eye injury when ~8 faoe 
7Kokowioh v. Independent Sohool Distriot, 177 Minn. 446, 225 
N. w. 292, (1929). 
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oomes in contaot with unslaked lime which is used to mark the lina 
on a football field. 
The normal risks of a sohool baseball game run somewhat simi-
lar to those of a football game, the differenoe being that the baI 
itself instead of the players may oause injury to speotators. 
Courts have ruled that generally pe mons who know and apPNoiate 
the danger from thrown or batted balls assume the risk and oannot 
e181m. the management was guilty of negligenoe when a OOoioe is 
given between a seat in the open and one behind a proteotive 
soreen.S 
In the oase of Sayers ~. Ranger,9 a fourteen year old boy was 
jumping over a gymnaSium horse in a physioal eduoation olass, and 
while doing so. he fell and broke his arm. It was alleged that 
the phys10al eduoat1on teaoher was negligent in failing to super-
vise the final jump pm also in direoting him to walk to the supeX' 
visor's office after he wss hurt. 
The oourt held that there was nothing negligent in the oon-
duot' ot the defendant. The instruotor demonstrated the proper way 
to jump, and set out mats to pl"otect the students and supervised 
the jumps. The instructor also warned the students that it was 
SWells v. Minneapolis Baseball and Athletio Assooiation, 122 
Minn. 327, 142 N. w. 706, (191'). ' 
9Sayers et ala v. Rangeret &1., 16 N. J. Sup. 22. 83 A. (2nd) 
775. (1951). 
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dangerous, and that 11' they didn't think theY' oould do it, they 
should not do it. The court oommented, "If negligenoe was assumed 
in the defendant, still no right of recover,y was established. 
Knowledge oitha danger compels assumption of risk in suoh a oase~ 
The warn1rtg from the instruotor that the aot was dangerous and the 
instructions that they were not t.o do it if they didn't think they 
were able, seM'ed to give the boy knowledge of the risk involved 
and a free ahoioe to jump over the wooden horse. 
In an earlier and similar case,a New York oourt ruled in the 
same manner • Although the case does not involve a publio sohool, 
it was deoided that a twelve year old minor assumed the risk when 
u&ing a buo~ horse upon the invitation of an instruotor: "plaint1!j 
assumed the risk of jumping, the danger being open and obvious. "10 
A pupil must not only know of t he facts whioh oreate the dan-
ger, but must understand and appreoiate the danger itself.ll In 
oases where a DUlnor is of suoh fan age that he oannot oomprehend or 
appreoiat4 a danger, a minor is not oapable of asswming, the risk, 
and the dootrine of assumption of risk oannot be used as a bar to 
aotion. Oases involving minors seem to indicate that there is no 
~rbitrarY,age at which a minor is oapable of assuming a paatioular 
risk. Ordinarily a minor is deolared oapable of appreoiating a 
lOxanofsky v. Brooklyn Jewish Oenter, 265 N. Y. 634, 193 N. 
E. 420, (1934). 
Ilprasser, D. ~~9a 
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partioular risk by a jur" acoording to his individual exp~r1enoe 
and intelligenoe. 
A person oapable of assuming risk must have a free and vol~ 
untar,y oholoe. If a person·is denied a ohoioe or alternate oours~ 
the defense will be negated. 
In the oase ot ~.!. Board .2! Eduoation,12 the oourt ruled 
that assumption of risk was not avplioable as a defense beoause 
the plaintiff was foroed to assume the risu. In this partloular 
08se, the plainti:f:f' was injured while taking a ph7810al oltam1nat1Dn 
:tor the board ot eduoat1on. The examination was held inside a 
gymnasium and the pla1Jl1iiff was required to show ber abil1ty in 
playing baseball. She batted a ball and ran to "first base." The 
base slid trom under her on the slippery floor, and she fell and 
broke a leg bone. 
The sohool board oontended that, in taking the examination, 
the plaintitt had assumed anJ risk involved, but the oourt held 
otherwise on the ground that there oould be no assumption ~ risk 
unless it "88 voluntary. She had to '''prooeed or forgo tbe examin-
8tion~" 
Denial of 8 tree ohoioe or al ter.nate cours., as in the pre. 
vious cas., need not be so explioit. ·A oourt has interpreted 8 
teaoherts authority over a pupil as. denying him a tree ohoioe. 
-12·· -
1'5 
In the case of ~ .!. !!,alel.13 the physical educatlon teach-
er ordered a group of pupils to ~erform an overhand olimb on a 
1 frayed rope. The pupil was injured from a tall when the rope 
broke, and action was brought against the teacher for negligenoe. 
It was contended in the defense that the pupil had seen that the 
rope "as frayed, but he had chosen to cl1mb 1t. Be had thus &8-
sumed the risk of injur.y. The oourt held that assumption of risk 
could not be used a8 a defense beoause, "a youth, acting under 
orders of an older teaoher, set in authority 0,/'81' him and maintain 
ed in a position of superiority by means of olass disoipline, 
oould not be oonsidered to bave consoiouslY or unoonsciously con-
sidered the possib11ity of risk of 1njur.r, or to bave exeroised a 
ohoice not to perform an aot his teaoher ordered him to do." 
While most oourts bave not limited the application of assump-
tion of risk, 80me oourts have applied the doctrine onlY to maste~ 
servant 
t10n of 
oase8. Sinoe 1909 the Illinois oourts have limited asSUBP· 
risk to master-servant oa888.14 In dealing with such 
oases, 
vant~6 
the Illinois courts have defined the term master15 and ser-
-
An extension of the doctrine to other than master-servant 
l'nl18 v. Haley, '34 Mich. 146, (19'1). 
14Conrad v. Spr1ng~ield Oons01idated Railroad Co., 240 Ill. 
12, 88 B. E. 180, (1909). . 
15Helson v. RiOhardSOni 108 Ill. App. 212, (190'). Bill v. Strong, 132 Il • App, 174. 
161'0048 v. Berman, 200 Ill. App. 612. (1915), 
Schmid v. Heath, 17' Ill. App. 649, (1912). 
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oases bas reoently been denied by the Illinois Appellate Oourt: 
"The dootrine of assumption of risk is applioable only in oases 
arising between Master and Servant."17 In another reoent oase 
whioh did not invol ... e a _tel'-Hrvant relationship, the Appellate 
Oourt stood by its forme,%.- deoision. In refusing the dootrine a8 
a defense where a IDaster-servant relationship dld not eXist, the 
oourt stated: "The dootrine of assumptlon of risk was oonoeived 
in the law of oontraot, whereas the parentage of oontributory 
negligenoe is in the law of torts.n18 
The Illinois oourts apply the dootrine of oontrlbutor,y neg11-
genoe in the plaoe of assumption of r1sk in 08se. where the mast 
servant relationship dQe. not exist. The law in Illinois imposes 
upon 8 person, ~ juris, the obligation to use ordinary oare for 
his own proteotion. One who unnecessarily assumes a position of 
danger, the hazards ot whioh he understands and appreoiates, oan 
not reoover from an in~ur7 inoident to that risk. A bar to aotio 
is found under the dootrine of oontributory negl1genoe.19 
Cont:ributor,y Negligenoe 
Oon"tributor.r negligenoe i8 an aot or omission amounting to 
17Davis v. Springfield Lodge No. 158, 24 Ill. APP. (2nd) 102, 
(1960). 
18Hammer v. Slive, 27 Ill. App. (2nd) 196, 169 N. E. (2nd) 
(1960). 
19awe Oity of Rookford, 129 N. E. (2nd) 52, 7 Ill. App 
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want of ordinary care on the part of the oomplaining party, whioh 
concurring with the defendant's negligence, is the proximate cause 
of the injury, according to Black's Law Dictlonary.20 
Everyone is required to exeroise care and caution for his own 
safety and oontributory negligenoe is the oonduot on the part of a 
pla1nt1t':t whioh falls below the standard to whioh the plaintiff is 
required to oonform for his own proteotion. Suoh conduct wUl bar 
reoovery if it oontribute. as a legal cause to the damages by ex-
posing the plaintiff to the partioular risks from whioh he suffers 
the harm. The pla1nt1t'f may fail to exeroise reasonable oare at 
the time of his injury, but unless bis injury results from that 
particular risk, his conduct will not bar recovery. 
Oontributory negligenoe is determined in the same manner as 
negligenoe: the plaintiff is required to aot as a reasonable per-
son would under similar oiroumstanoes. The aotor's oonduct must 
oonform to the conduot of a reasonable prudent person under simils 
oiroumstanoes. 
In judging the reasonableness of the aotor's oonduct, the im-
portanoe of the interest the aotor is seeking to advanoe is bal-
anced against the gravity of the risk of harm to 'Whioh he exposes 
himself. It may be oonsidered unreasonable oonduot to dash into 
a burning building to s ave a hat, but it may not be unreasonable 
20Blaok, Law Diotlonar,y, p. 1185. 
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to dash into the path of a train to save a ohild. 2l 
Generally the burden of proof of oontributory negligenoe of 
the plaintiff rests upon the defendant. A minority of jurisdio-
tions, however, require that the plaintiff prove his freedom from 
oontributory negligenoe. These oourts have relaxed the rule, and 
require very little in the way of evidenoe to sustain the plain-
tUft 8 proof. Illinois oourts follow this ruling. 
Oontributory negligenoe differs from negligence in that neg-, 
ligenoe constitutes conduot which creates unreasonable risk to 
o1ihers, while oontributory negligenoe involve. risk: of harm. only 
to the aotor. B'egltgenoe involves an obligation of oonduot to 
others, but oontributory negligenoe involves no duty exoept to the 
aotor himself. 
Oontributor,y negligence and assumption of risk are the two 
most common defense. in negligenoe actions. but they differ in 
that the plaintiff, in assuming the risk, relieves the defendant 
of any duty towards him, while in oontributory negligenoe, the 
22 plaintiff is not entitled to aotion because of his conduot. 
The oourts do not hold young ohildren to the same standard of 
oonduot whioh is required of adults. Allowanoes are made for 
21Prosser, p. 283. 
22 Ibid., p. 283-284. 
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their immaturity and inability -GO "appreoiate -r;he faots." The 
same oonduot which might be oonsidered below standard for an adult 
may be reasonable for a ohild. This in effect makes it diffioult 
to use contributory negligenoe as a bar to aotion in oases where 
ohildren are plaintiffs. 
In dealing with ohildren on the issue of oontributor,r negli-
genoe, two footors whio~ are oonsidered by the oourts are the 
J 
ohild'-s oapaoity, and the standard of conduot imposed on the ohil 
Capaoity is the ohildts ability to realize and appreoiate a given 
danger and act aooordingly. Oapaoity is related to the ohild' s 
age, and the oourts -t.ake this into oareful consideration. It it 
is found that the ohild has the oapaoity, the oourt must then de-
termine the standard of oonduct to whioh the ohild will be held. 
In allowing these oonsiderations for children, there are two 
major views oonoerning the issue of contributory negligence of 
ohildren. The two views are usually olassified as the Illinois 
rule and the !:!assachusetts rule. The Massaohusetts rule holds 
that a ohild, regardless of age, is held to the same standard of 
oare whioh is eXercised under similar oircumstanoes by children 
of the same age, intelligenoe, and experience. 
The Illinois rule, whioh is oalled the "arbitrary age limits 
rule," is a slight modifioation of the MassE1ollu.eetts rule, and 
holds arbitrary age limits for ohildren t S oapaoi ty • Under this 
rule ohildren ~,~,:: seven years of a e oannot be oharged with 
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oontributory negligenoe in sohool situations. 
In the first oase, Juntilla 1:. __ Everett Sohool Distriot. 23 a 
sohool distriot employs a suo088s:ful bar to aotion when it alleges 
and proves oontributory negligenoe on the part of an eighteen year 
old student. The oourt took speoial note of the youth's age and 
his ability to appreoiate a risk. In this case, a parent brought 
aotion for injuries reoeived by his son (William Juntilla) in a 
tall from the sohool bleaohers during a football game. On the 
night of the acoiden" a football game was being played between 
Everett High School and an out of town team. The attendanoe was 
large, and all the seats were taken. Young Junt11la, with several 
girls and boys, prooeeded to the top seats of the ~leaohers, and 
there they took a standing position on the top seats. After star.d~ 
lng there for a short tim!;;, leaning agains"t the railing, Juntilla, 
wilh :five or six others, sat upon the railing behind the top seats 
of the bleaohers. The railing gave way under their weight, and 
Juntilla, with 30me others, fell to the ground behind the bleaoh-
ers, sustaining severe injuries. 
It was stated in the allegation that the defendant sohool 
offioials failed to meet the stwldard of oare required by law be-
cause they should h~ve foreseen that many speotators would o~owd 
upon the back seat of the bleaohers, subJeoting the railing to a 
2'Juntilla v. Everett Sohool District No. 24, 48 P. (2nd) 613 
183 Wash. 357. (19' ... 5)10.1. ________________ ----' 
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pressure it was not oonstruoted to withstand. fhd.s oontention was 
not aooepted beoause the railing did not y18~d to lateral pressure 
against it, but yielded trom a downward pressure from persons sit-
ting on it, a use tor whioh it was not intended. 
fhe oourt stood by a lower oourt ruling and held Juntilla 
guilty of negligenoe, 
What we have said in our disoussion ot the question 
ot the respondent's primary negligenoe to some extent 
disposes of the oontention that young Juntilla was not 
guilty ot oontributory negligenoe. fhis oase is not one 
involving the maintenanoe of an attraotive nuisanoe en-
tioing immature ohildren into harm t s way. Juntilla was 
18 years of age, of mature judgment, and fullY able to 
appreoiate the risk he took in sitting, with numerous 
others, upon the railing. He testified that he kne. it 
was not a seat. In taking his seat upon the railing, 
he assumed the attendant risk. 
!he oourt further asserted that an owner of a premises oould 
be liable in damages to those invited if they were injured beoause 
of an unsafe oondition of the premises. Unreasonable oonduot on 
the part ot those invited, however, oonstitutes a defense to aot~~ 
Where one voluntarily and willingly puts himself or 
his property in danger, there is the presumption that he 
assume. all the risks reasonably to be apprehended from 
suoh oonduot. In oas •• of this kind, this assumption is 
oalled oontributory negligenoe, and is as muoh a defense 
in these oases as any other to whioh it DlEI\Y be applied. 
In the oase ot Hough~. Orleans24 an eleven year old boy was 
tound guilty of negligenoe. In this oase, Vernon Hough, a student 
24Hough v. Orleans Elementary Sohool Distriot of Humboldt 
Oounty, 144 P. (2nd) 383, 62 Oal. App. (2nd) 146, (1943). 
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at the sohool ran against a flagpole while playing a game of toot-
ball in the sohool yard. 
It was alleged by the plaintitf'that the flagpole was support-
ed by two braces on two sides running three teet bigh. The braoes 
~ere attaohed by a bolt about thirty-four inohes above the ground, 
and the end of the bolt extended two and one halt inohes beyond ib.. 
brace, the washer, and nut. There was no o ave ring or guard over 
this bolt in order to mate it reasonably safe for the students. 
It was oontended that inluries were reoeived through the negligen~ 
t 
of the sohool distriot. i 
" 
The oourt stated that the plaintiffs failed to prove negli-
genoe on the part of the school distriot. It was neoessary that 
they prove that there existed a dangerous and defective oondition, 
and that the sohool district had bad prior knowledge of this oon-
dition. In the court's opinion. however, the faot that the studem 
ran into the flagpole and was injured did not show that the 1'18g-
pole was dangerous. 
BaYing found that there was no breach of duty, the court fo'UDd 
it unnecessary to pass upon the question of whether or not there 
twas oont ,'butory negligenoe on the part 01' the minor. However, it 
went on to state that bad there been a breaoh of duty, or had the 
distriot been guilty of negligenoe, there would have been a bar to 
aotion because the student was guilty of contributory negligenoe: 
However his testimony that while he and another boy 
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were throwing a football about, after he had been dismissed 
from sohool for the day, he ran into the flagpole, that he 
knew 1 t was there and he "kind of seen it" when he ran 
for the ball, but did not think he was going to hit 1t, 
so kept gOing, would have justified a find1ng of oontrib-
utor,y negligenoe on his part. He was nearly eleven years 
old and a ohild above average intelligence. 
In the oase of Hovel ~. State,25 a defendant sohool failed to 
bar aotion beoause it failed to prove contributor" negligenoe. In 
the present oase, the parents of a student brought suit against 
the school for in~uries reoeived when she fell down an unlit stai~· 
way. on the day of the aocident, the student had attended a musi-
cal rehearsal held after sohool hours in the auditorium on the 
( 
second floor of ttp.e main building. After t he rehearsal terminated 
the student remained to talk to the teaoher for a few minutes, and 
then lef1; the auditorium. !rhe lights had been turned off, and the 
girl had to descend tbr0U.8h an unlit sta1rway. The girl descended 
the first set of 81;&11"8 by using the bandrail, and turned at the 
first landing. The handrail did no1; continue around the landing, 
but stopped several feet short, leaving about three steps with no 
handra1l. While groping in the darkness for the other handrail, 
the girl slipped and fell down f1fteen steps 1;0 the next landing. 
Pla1nt1f'fs oontended that 11' the girl was perm1tted or invi_ 
into the aud1torium, she was entitled to a safe ex11;. The 
25Bovey v. State, 27 B. Y. S. (2nd) 195, 261 App. Div. 759, (1941). Although this 08se involve. a 8tate Normal Sohool, the 
l"Uling would apP17 under similar oiroumstanoes. 
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oharacteristics ot the handrail did not oonstitute a hazard, but 
the total lack of light oonstituted negligenoe. 
The defendant sobool stated that the student had gone up and 
down the stairway dai13' and was familiar with the physioal oharao-
teristios of the stairway. 
The oourt did not aooept this as proof that she was guilty of 
oontributor.y negligenoe: "The fact that olaimant went up and down 
the stairs daily in daylight is immaterial. There is no proof ths 
she ever had been down them (the stairs) under 1;he oiroumstanoes 
existing at the ttme of tbe aooident. Darkness makes a differenoe 
in even the most familiar plaoes." 
26 In the oase of Andre .!. Allz!h the sohool distriot fa.1l.ed 
to prove oontributor.y negligenoe on the part of a student, and 
henoe failed to bar aotion tor injuries·reoeived by the student. 
The basio question is to determine whether momentary forgetfulness 
or distraotions oonstitute oontribu~or,y negligenoe as a matter of 
law. This oase is signifioant beoause the oourt' s opinions give 
an 1~sight as to the oourt's unwillingness to apply the prinoiple 
as a matter of law. 
Aotion was brought against the sohool distriot for injurie. 
sustained by a sixteen year old student when he stepped and s11ppe( 
26Andre v. Allyn, 190 P. (2nd) 949, 84 Cal. App. (2nd) 347, 
(1948). 
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on a portion of a non-skid oork oarpet whioh had worn off. The 
sohool building oonsisted of two floors, oonneoted by ramps at 
both ends. The student lett his looker and walked down the ramp 
on the way to ohoir praotioe. While walking on the ramp on the 
slippery spot, he hailed a fellow student, lost his balanoe, and 
his right .foot slid trom unde r him. ae went down and broke his 
lett leg above the knee where it had broken six months before. 
Betore passing judgment, the oourt expressed the opinion that 
oontributory negligenoe is not readily applied as a matter of law: 
But in oases in whioh it oan be said that the neg-
ligence of the plaintlff oontributes proximately to the 
aooident as a matter of law are rare. The rule has been 
stated in various ways in a legion of oases, that oou-
tributo~ negllgenoe is not established as a matter ot 
law unless the only reasonable hypothesls is that such 
negligenoe exists: that reasonable or sensible men oould 
have drawn that oonolusion and none other; that where 
there are different inferenoes that may be drawn, one 
for and one against, the one against shall be followed, 
and before it can be held as a matter of law that oon-
tributory negligenoe eXists, the evidenoe must point 
unerringly to that oonolusion. 
On the question of forgettuln ••• t the oourt stated that momen 
ta~ forgetfulness of a known danger not induoed by a sudden dls-
turbing oause would oonstitute oontributory negligenoe. To forge 
however, would not oonstitute negligenoe unless there was a want 
ot ordinary oare on the part of the plaintiff. The oourt then 
added that in the immediate oase, momentary ~orgetfulnes. was In-
deed a sudden distraotion. 
The oourt t..!~1nat.4 b~" expressing a standard of care tor th 
sohool boy:27 
We oannot say as a matter of law that abstraotion 
oonoerning ohoir praotioe, or forgetfulness due to hail-
ing a sohool ohum suddenly, is not an instinotive reao-
tion or aot of sudden impulse, or that it was out of 
oharaoter for the ordinary sohoolboy of plaintiff's age 
and experience. Plaintiff is bound only to that duty 
of oare whioh a nomal ohild of the same age wou.ld be 
expeoted to exeroise in suoh a situation. 
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This deoision illustrates the faot that in the last few years 
the tendenoy of the Supreme Court has been away from the strioter 
view ot preoeeding years, where frequently oontributory negligenoe 
was established as a matter of law, to the present situation in 
whioh suoh cases are rare. 
In the case of Ridse !. Boulder Creek Union Distriot,28 the 
sohool distriot failed to bar aotion when it failed to prove oon-
tributory negligenoe as a matter of law. 
The student, Ridge, 1njured the index f1nger of his right 
hand while operating a power saw without a guard or a fence over 
it. The student was aware that these parts were needed to prevent 
injury, but he had seen others use the power saw without the guard 
The other students did not use the guard beoause the fenoe was 
broken. The fenoe guided the wood into the saw, and if the saw Wall 
27The oourt oited Taylor v. Oakland Soavenger Co., 17 Oal. (2nd) 594, 110 P. (2nd) 1044. 
28R1d~ v. Boulder Oreek Union Junior-Senior High Sohool Dis-
triot of Santa Oruz Oounty, 140 P. (2nd) 990, 60 Oal. App. (2nd) 
45' ____ (1943). 
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operated with the guard and without 'the fenoe, it was extremelY 
41:11ou1t to saw the boards on the markings. Ridge was not in~ 
struoted not to use the power saw without the safety devioe, and 
the instructor and other students used the saw without the safety-
deVices on several ocoasions. 
The appellant sohool distriot alleged that the minor was 
guilty of contributory negligenoe as a matter of law beoause he 
kne~ tha't there was'danger in using the saw in that manner. It 
was stated further that the student's reoord attested to the faot 
that he was a oapable student in shop .. 
The oourt found the student not guilty beoause mere knowledge 
of a danger was not oonolusive that a minor was guilty of oontrib-
utor.J negligenoe as a matter of law. The court stated that know-
ledge that danger existed was not knowledge of ~he amount of dAn~ 
whioh was neoessary to oharge a person with negligenoe in assuming 
the risk caused by suoh danger. The doing of an 80t with appreci& 
tion ot the amount ot danger would be neoessary to oonolude as a 
matter of law that a person was negligent. 
The oourt conoluded by stating, "We cannot 88.7 that the know-
ledge of 'danger whioh Walter Ridge bad, in the faoe of the facts 
that he reoeived no instruotions not to use the saw without the 
guard and that the instruotor used the saw in front of the students 
without the guard attaohed, was a matter of law suffioient to 
charge him with negligenoe contributiruc to his acoident." 
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Thus the sohool failed to bar aotion, and the oourt sustained 
a prior judgment allowing reoovery against the sohool. 
To the writer's knowledge there are no cases involving sohool 
ohildren on the issue of oontributory negligenoe in Illinois. The 
legal prinoiple, however, is well established and aooepted in the 
Illinois Common Law. There are numerous oases involving ohildren 
and the courts have formulated rules :for applying the principle. 
The rules for the most part favor the minor plaint iffs. 
The rule whioh bas an immediate effeot on oontributory negli-
genoe ooncerning ohildren is the Illinois Arb1trar,y Age Limits 
Rule, which makes speoial allowanoes for ohildren. 
This rule olassifies a ohild's oapaoity acoording to three 
age levels, 
(8) A child under seven years of age oannot,be oharged 
with oontributory negligenoe, 
(b) Children between the ages of seven and fourteen may 
be oharged, but this is a question of faot for a 
jury to deoide through oareful oo'nslderation of the 
individual's age, intelligenoe, oapaoity, and expe-
rienoe. 
(0) Children over the age of 'fourteen can be charged with 
oontributory negligence. 
It has been established in Illinois that a ohild under seven 
years o~age does not have the capaoity to realize or appreoiate 
a given danger, and hence oannot be oharged with oontributory neg-
ligenoe. This rule is analogous to the rule regarding a ohild's 
149 
oapaoity to oommit a crime. Thus a ohild under the age of seven 
i.s presumed to be not responsible for his aots. 
This rule has been applied to ohildren below the age of matu-
rity in Illinois. Case. are reoorded where the rule has been ap-
plied to speoifio age levels. The rule has been appl1ed to child-
ren seven years 01d,29 between the ages of f1ve and six,30 and 
f1ve years 01d.31 
Children between the ages of seven and fourteen are also pre-
sumed not to be respons1ble for their aots. However, this preaDp-
, 
t10n is not oonolus1ve and m~ be overoome by proof of "requis1te 
oapaoity and experienoe.",2 A presumption of 1noapab1lity bas 
been found not applioable to oh~ldren over eleven years of age~33 
Whe re 1 t has been found by a jury that a ohild between the ages of 
seven and fourteen is fully able to comprehend danger and use oare 
to av01d injury, the courts have ruled that the ohild may be found 
29Rom1ne v. City of Watseka, 91 N. E. (2nd) 76, 341 Ill. APPo 
'70, (1950). 
'Ofr10lo v. Fr1sella, 121 I. E. (2nd) 49, , Ill. APP. (2nd) 
200, (1954). 
31Duffy v. Cortes1, 119 lie E. (2nd) 241, 2 Ill. APP. (2nd) 
511, (1954). 
32Moser v. East St. Lou1s and Interurban Water Co., 62 N. E. 
(2nd) 558, 326 Ill. App. 542 (1945). 
Levin v. Lauterbaok Coai & Ioe Co., 67 N. E. (2nd) 303, 327 
Ill. App. 180, (1946). . 
3'Saens v. Chioago, W1lm1ngton, and Vermil10n Coal Co., 160 
Ill. A~D. 467, (1911). 
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guilty of oontr1butor,y neg11genoe.34 The Illinois oourts, in 
following this rule, have found an eight year old gir135 and a ten 
year old boy,6 guilty of contributory negligenoe. 
While children over the age of fourteen may be found guilty 
of oontributor,r negligence, the courts do not hold them to the 
same standard of care as an adult, unless tbe age, intelligence, 
oapaoi ty, and experienoe of the partioular ohild are suoh that he 
should be held to that standard of oare .37 
In measuring the oonduct of children who are oapable of being 
found guilty of oontributory negligenoe, there is no exaot stand~ 
exoept "that degree of oare whioh children of like age, oapaci i!y, 
intelligence, and experience would naturally use in the same sit-
uation and under Similar circumstanoes.-'S 
Baoent oases involving ohildren between the ages of seven and 
fourteen have indioated that these ohildren are not required to 
exercise as bigh a degree of oare for their own safety as a person 
'4M1ndeman v. Sanitary Distriot of Chioago, 229 Ill, App. '54 
(192,). 
35eity of Chioago v. Cohen, 139 Ill. App. 244, (1908). 
36XOehler v. Chioago City Railroad Co" 166 Ill. App. 571, 
(1911). 
37Binder v. Chioago City Railroad Co., 175 Ill. 503, (1912). 
,SFannon v. Mot'ton, 228 Ill. App. 415, (1923). 
151 
o~ mature age and experience.39 They are required to exercise o~ 
that degree of oare and oaution for their own safety that a ohild 
of similar age, intelllgenoe, oapaolty, and experience would exer-
oise under the dame or similar c1rcumstances. 40 
Ohlldren over fourteen are generally requlred to exerclse 
that degree of oare and oaution whioh oh11dren of the same age, 
capac1 ty, .1ntelllgenoe, and experlenoe may be reasonably expeoted 
to use under l1ke c1rcumstanoes.41 
In present1ng a oause of act10n in Illino1s, the burden of 
proof of negligenoe rests on the plaintiff. Prosser states that 
freedom from contributory neg11genoe is an essential part of the 
plaintiff's oause of aotion.42 This rule has no applloation to 
ohildren under seven years of age, but it does apply to ohildren 
between the ages of seven and fourteen who are found to have the 
oapacity,45 as well 8S to those over fourteen years of age. Free-
dom from oontributory neg11gence oan be proven by the plaintiff if 
39XSxnowsk1 v. City of LaSalle, 43 N. E. 852, 316 Ill. App. 
115, (1942). 
40wasnelus v. Melton, 128 N. E. (2nd) 355, 6 Ill. App. (2nd) 
434, (1955). . 
41peterson v. Chioago Consolidated Traction 00" 83 N. E. 159 
231 Ill. App. 324, (1907). 
42Prosser, p. 283. 
43Segal v. Ohicago Oity Railway Co., 256 Ill. App. 569, (193q. 
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it oan be shown that the plaintiff exercised ordinar.y oare. 
Summa 17 
Negligenoe aotions are based upon the defendant's failure to 
exercise the required degree of oare, and a subsequent damage, or 
inju17 to the plaintiff. In some oases defendants oan bar aotion 
sinoe plaintiffs are required to oonfozm to a standard of oonduot 
for their own proteotion. Two oommon legal defenses whioh are 
employed by defendants are assumption of risk and oontributory 
negligenoe. A defendant oan bar aotion under these dootrines if 
it oan be shown that the plaintiff with full knowledge and appreoi 
ation willingly assumed a partioular risk from whioh 'tne harm ao-
orued, or if the plaintiff aoted in an unreasonable manner and 
oontributed to the oause of the injury. Suooessful aotions are 
partly based on the merits of the plaintiff's aotions. 
The applioation of these legal degenses is more limited in 
oases where ohildren are named plaintiff,. Children are treated 
as a speoial olass beoause they are not presumed to posses the ma-
turity at an adult, and oonsequently they are not required to oon. 
fom to the same standards of oare for tl;teir own proteotion whioh 
are required of adults. Generally where ohildren are oharged with 
the assumption of risk or oontributory negligenoe, the issue be-
oomes a question of faot, and the ohild's oulpability is judged by 
~ 
a jury aooording to the ohild's age" intelligenoe, and experienoe. 
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The oourts in Illinois rest riot the applioation of assumption 
of risk to parties whioh are under a master-sel'vant relationship. 
This relationship does not exist between the sohool distriot or 
teachers and pupils, and. the dootrine is inapplioable to sohool 
08ses. The sohool districts, however, have recourse to oontribu-
tory negligenoe as a defense. There are instances where the two 
doctrines overlap and situations of 8ssumption of risk are covered 
under contributory negligenoe. 
The Illinois courts follow the Arbitrary Age Limits rule ill. 
applying contributory negligetnce ssa legal defense, and the courts 
severely restriot its use against ohildren who are named plaint1.tra 
in litigations. 
In following this doctrine, the Illinois oourts have ruled 
that young children of ages seven or below cannot be charged with 
contributory negligence beoause they do not have the ability to 
realize and appreCiate a given danger. In following precedent, 
the courts will deny the school districts the use of the dootrine 
as a legal defense in actions arising from injuries to children 
attending kindergarten, first grade, and to some extent those in 
the second g~ade. In effeot there is no legal defense. 
-
Defenses under these oases would be limited to disproving nEg-
ligence. suoh as disproving causation or asserting non-breach of 
duty. A teaoher oould bar action of she oould show tba't her ac-
tions were not the oause of the ohild's injunes. A teacher oould 
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also bar aotion if she showed that she used reasonable oare in the 
disoharge of her duties (acted as a reasonable prudent person wou 
under l1ke circumstanoes). A teacher oould not plead absenoe of 
duty, since under ~ Rsrent1s, a teacher is never relieved of 
duty. 
In oases involving children from ages seven to fourteen, or 
from seoond to ninth grade, school distriots have a reoourse to 
oontributor.y negligence as a legal defense. In applying the doc-
trine against a child of this age level, a jur.y must show that the 
child has the capaCity, and comp_hends the partioular danger. 
Ohildren of ages fourteen and over may be oharged with oont 
butory negligenoe, and while they are not held to the standard of 
care required of adults, they. are judg.d by the standard of care 
required of Children of the same age, oapaoity, intelligence, and 
eipe rience • 
CHAPTER VIr 
COIWLUSIOl~S 
The purpose of this thesis ~as to reveal and interpret the 
legal liability of the Illinois publio schools~ 
It is expeoted that law suits will be brought against sohool 
distriots in the :future. In building a body of cases, the Courts 
in Illinois will invariably refer to oases from other states in 
applying the Common Law to sohool situations. In imposing the 
care of the highest degree on sohool buses. the Illinois oourts 
oi ted a oase from Washington. The IllinOis oourts may rule simi-
larly to the oourts of other states, exoept in the matter of legal 
defenses. The Illinois oourts impose striot limitations on legal 
defenses When they are employed against ohildren plaintiffs. 
The Tort Liability Aot may need to be amended in order to pro 
vide the same proteotion to school employees that it affords the 
sohool distriots. A teaohe r may be sued to any amount. It may 
beoome common praotioe for plaintiffs to sue sohool teaohers for 
unspecified amounts, while at the same time SUing the school d1s-
triot in tue hope of obtaining additional damages. 
The conolusions derived from this paper are listed on the 
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following pages. 
School districts are political subdivisions of the states, 
created for the sole purpose of publio education. 
A school district is a quasi public corporation, having only 
those powers incident to its purpose. 
The doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, whioh renders the school 
districts immune from tort liability, is almost universallY appl1e 
by the . courts. 
In states where the school districts are immune, school offi-
oers share their immunity, but employees do not. 
The courts of several states have expressed dissatisfaotion 
wi th the immun'i ty doctrine, and several states have made exoepti 
to the rule, while four states have abrogated the rule. 
In 1959 the Supreme Oourt of Illinois, with the Molitar deci-
Sion, abrogated the immunity doctrine and made the sohool distriot 
liable for the negligent acts of its employees. 
In 1959 the Illinois. Legislature, with the passage of the 
Tort Liability Act, placed limitations of the liability of school 
distriots. These statutes covered both publio and private elemen-
tar.y and seoondar" sohools and mainly oonsisted of: 
(a) time limitation of one year from the date of injur.y to 
initiate oivil actton, 
(b) a six month limitation in whioh to file a statement 
of injury, 
(0) Ii reoovery limitation of ten thousand dollars tor 
eaoh separate oause ot aotion. 
The individual teaohers do not have the protection of the 
statute limiting the amount of liability, and a teaoher oan be 
sued for any amount. 
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The usual rules of negligenoe apply in Illinois. in order to 
bring action against a sohool. distr10t or a sohool teacher, parent 
must show: 
(a) evidenoe of a duty on the part of the defendant, 
(b) tailure of the defendant to pre:torm that duty, 
(0) plaintiff suffered in3ury as a direot result of that 
duty. 
From the reoords of oases whioh have been brought against 
teachers and sohool d1striots in states where the immunity doot 
has been abrogated, it oan be ooncluded that aotions will be 
brought against sohool teaohers and sohool distriots in Illinois. 
Sohool distriots are held to the standard of reasonable oare. 
Teaohers may be held to a standard of' reasonable oare. Persons 
involved in the transportat1on of sohool ohlldren are held to the 
standard of the hi6hest degree of oare. 
The dootrine of assumption of risk does not apply to sohool 
oases in Illinois beoause it is limited to master-servant 
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relationship, and this relationship does not eX~8t between a pupil 
and his teaoher. 
Legal defenses applied to sohool 08ses are rest rioted to the 
dootrine of oontr1butor,y negligence. Oases no~lly applying to 
assumption of risk may apply this dootrine, but the oourts will 
restriot its use against school ohildren. 
The Illinois oourts do not apply oontributor,y negligenoe 
against ohildren of ages seven and below. The Illinois oourts 
will not permit the use of this dootrine as a defense against 
sohool ohildren in Kindergarten, first gl'Bde, and some of those 
in seoond grade. 
There may be some diffioulty in applying the dootrine to 
ohildren between the ages of seven and fourteen. Defendants must 
show that the aotions of the ohild were below the standard for a 
ohild of the same age. oapaoity, intelligenoe, and experienoe. 
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Recommendations 
Classroom teachers are more closely related to pupil activi-
ties than any other school employees, and for this reason they are 
most often named defendants in pupil injury aotions. Knowledge of 
the principles of negligence and liability disoussed in this paper 
will help the teaoher proteot himself against possible pupil-in-
jury litigation. Teachers have the legal and professional obliga-
tion to protect pupils from the possibility of harm. If the 
teaoher is negligent in this regard, he beoomes liable for inju-
ries to the pupil. 
The areas where accidents are most likely to occur are the 
shop, the laboratory, the gymnasium. and the playground. The 
olassroom, where dangers are ordinarily not inherent. is not ex-
empt from the possibility of pupil injuries. 
Recommendations are listed as an aid to teachers and adminis-
trators in preventing injuries to pupils in the sohools. These 
reoommendations are olassified aocording to the subjeot areas, an 
oonstitute generalizations derived from the writer's research as 
well as recommendations proposed by the Research Division of the 
National Education Association Commission of Safety Eduoation. 
The majority of accidents ooourring in the classroom are the 
result of lack of proper supervision. A t;1.UIDber of oases arise be 
cause of misoonduct or oareless behavior of pupils resulting in 
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harm to fellow pupils. Injuries sometimes are inflioted on one 
pupil by another while the teaoher is present. Sometimes these 
injuries occur while the teacher is out of the classroom. Under 
what circumstances will the teacher's inadequate supervision or 
lack of supervision constitute negligence? Generally it can be 
stated that when the conduct causing the harm could not have been 
foreseen or anticipated by the teacher, the teaoher will not be 
held negligent. Action can be brought against a teacher, however, 
if the pupil's conduot could have been foreseen by the teacher 
with a reasonable exercise of prudenoe, and the teaoher failed to 
regulate the conduct to prevent injury. The same rule holds true 
for injuries which ocour while the teacher is out of the classro~ 
A teacher who leaves an unruly class to its own devices oan antic-
ipate a charge of negligenoe in the event that a pupil is injured. 
It is the best policy never to leave the classroom unless it 
beoomes absolutely neoessar,y to do so. 
When leaving the\olassroom, oall on a fellow teacher or an 
administ rator to take oharge. 
Maintain pupil oonduot under oontrol at all times. A teacher 
is expected to avert accidents which are foreseeable to a pers?n 
of ordina 17 prudence. 
Do not expose pupils to a greater risk of harm than 1s called 
~or in the classroom.· 
161 
Do not assign pupils to do chores where pupils oan oause in-
jury to themselves. 
Do not send pupils on errands. Pupils beoome agents of the 
teaoher and harm caused to the student or by the student becomes 
I ! the teaohtr's respons~bility. 
i 
Becalise of the dange r iOOe rent in the use of sharp hand tools 
power tools, and power-driven machinery, shop teachers must aot 
with great oaution and pru~ence to prevent serious aocidents in 
these cla.srooms. Generally a shop teacher may be held liable fo 
negligence if an aooident occurs, and the teacher has failed in 
duty to properly supervise the activity, instruot the students on 
the proper use of the instrument or device, or if he has failed to 
warn the student of the dangers whioh are inherent in the use of 
the tools or deVices. 
In order to minimize the possibility of accidents in the 
shops, the following reoommendations are proposed to the vocation-
al arts teaohers: 
Report knowledge of hazardous conditions and defects relating 
to the shop, the machinery and eqUipment, and environmental factor 
for safety. 
Regularly inspect maohiner.r, equipment, and environmental 
factors for safety. 
Post oons touGUe notioes or regulations possible hazards, 
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safeguards, and preoautions. 
Make oertain that appropriate safety devices and guards are 
available and used by students. 
Make sure the students know and understand pertinent safe 
praotioe. relating to aotivities in which they are engaged. 
Require students to wear appropriate personal proteotive 
equipment, such as goggles, aprons, helmets, and gloves during 
hazardous activities. 
Thoroughly instruct and demonstrate the use of power tools 
t 
or other hazardous equipment before Url,tlally permitting suoh use 
by a pupil and permit initial use. only under direot supervision. 
Shut off power tools when leaving the shop. 
Exercise continuous supervision to see that shop safety prao-
tices are observed. 
Set the example for pupils to follow by personally obeying 
safety rules and praotioes. 
Never leave the shop while students are engaged in aotivities 
The greatest number of aocidents whioh ocour within the 
sohool building ocour in Ehysioal.eduoation olasse~. These aool-
dents result from a variety of oauses. The following reoommends-
tiona are proposed to sioal eduoatlon teaohersl 
Always maintain adequate supervision of physioal eduoation 
aotivities. 
Make frequent periodio examinations of all equipment in the 
gymnasium and correct defeotive equipment. 
Do not allow pupils to use defective equipment until the de-
teot is oorreoted. ' 
Do not allow pupils to attempt physioal feats whioh are be-
yond their skills. 
Give adequate instruotions and warn pupils of the danger in-
valved in gymnastios. I Allow a large enough area in whioh to conduot gam&s and exer-
oises. Overorowaing enhanoes the risk of one pupil injuring an-
other. 
Do not permit a student who has bad a prior injur,y to yartio-
ipate in an athletio game if it is likelY that his injur,y will be 
aggravated. 
Take great oare in the removal of an injured player from the 
scene of the aooident in order not to aggravate his injuries. 
The science laboratorl is an area in which the aotivities are 
inherently dangerous, and pupils are usuallY more aware of the de 
gers in this area than in others. Nonetheless, teaohe~ in the 
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sCience laboratories must provide adequate instruction and super-
vision of all laborator,y activities. The m.sbandling ofohemioals 
in the ohem1st~y laborator,y, for 1nstanoe, may result in serious 
harm to the students. The following recommendations are proposed 
to science teaohers, 
Make certain that the pupils know and understand the nature 
of the experiment to be performed. 
Make certain that they understand the dangers that may arise 
if proper prooedures are not followed. 
Give careful and adequate instruotions on the use of the 
equipment and materials available for experiments. 
Maintain proper supervision of the classroom tests and expe1"" 
1ments at all, times. 
See that ohemioals and other substances used in the labora-
tor,r are properly packaged, labeled, and stored. 
, 
Keep potentially dangerous chemicals under lock and key. 
Do not hand out chemioals for experimentat10n at hame. 
Oontrol aocess to the supply room so that pupils oannot take 
ohemioals for private use without permission. 
Never leave the classroom when an experiment is in progress. 
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Administrators, like teaohers, are liable for personal aots 
ot negligenoe oausing harm to pupils. Lawsuits are seldom brought 
against administrators, such as superintendents or principals, but 
are usually direoted against the person directly conoerned with 
the aooident, suoh as teaohers. Teaohers have direct oontaot with 
puvi~s, and administrators usually do not. 
Adm1nistrators are not held liable for the negl1gent aots ot 
employees beoause the employer-employee relationship does not ex-
ist between admin1strator8 and teaohers. A teaoher is an employee 
ot the sohool board, not an employee ot tb.e administrator. 
Although sohool boards are the employers of teaohers, they do 
not respond tor 11abili ties incurred by teaohers, exoept in those 
states where the immunity dootrine has been abrogated. In these 
states sui t8 are brought against the sohool distriot, a oorpora-
tion. 
Although school administrators are not legally liable tor in-
juries resulting trom the negligenoe of employees, they are in a 
position to proteot the satety ot pupils. Administrators may be 
held liable for the negligence of an employee if' he employs the 
subordinate, knowing that he was inoompetent. Adm1nist:rators may 
also be held liable tor fa1lure to assign and provide proper super-
vision where it :J.s needed or the failure to adopt and enforce 
rules and regulatiOns for adequate supervision. 
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The following reoommendations are proposed to sohool adminis-
trato1"8 to minimize aooidents in the sohools: 
Adopt prooedures for sohool personnel to report dangerous 
praotioes and unsafe oonditions they beoome aware of. 
Institute a system of regular inspeotion of buildings, faoil-
ities, grounds, and equipment to uncover hazards and dangerous 
oonditions. 
Take steps to promptly eliminate, repair, or oorreot defeots 
and deterioration and to remove obstruotions. 
Seleot oompetent personnel. 
t 
Hold regular meetings with the professional staff and with 
main~enanoe and servioe personnel to review and evaluate sohool 
aooidents and to oonsider ways to avoid their reourrenoe. 
Develop reasonable regulations for student traffio in oor~~i­
dors, on stairways, and elsewhere on the sohool prem1s6s. 
Provide adequate supervision for field t~p. and other educa-
tional aotivities away from the sohool. 
Provide adequ~te supervision in play areas and other areas in 
the school where large numbers of pupils oongregate. 
Adopt rules and regulations for safe sohool bus t ransporta-
tion. 
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Require all sohool aooidents to 'be promptly reported and in-
vestigate all aooidents. 
Initiate a oomplete sy~tem of aooident reporting and analysis 
In regard to sohool transportation, the following reoommenda-
tions are proposed to sohool administrators: 
Use only safe and properly equipped vehioles. Sohool buses 
should measure up to at least min~ standards and speoifioations 
set up by the state department of eduoation. 
Maintain a regular oheok of the meohanioal oondition of' the 
buses by qualified meohanios. 
Employ drivers who are oompetent, experienoed and physically 
Give regular and systematio instruction to bus drivers on 
driving and traffic regulations, partioularly as they relate to 
sohool buses. 
Establish a definite pattern for school bus drivers to use 
approaohing loading, parking, and leaving the sohool grounds. 
Adopt. and enforoe rules and regulations for supe rvising pup 
during loading and unloading. 
Promote sate bus riding habits among pupil passengers. 
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Instruot drivers to park in a safe plaoe before disoharging 
pupils and to oaution pupils to use oare in orossing streets and 
highways after alighting from the sohool bus. 
Establish definite and well-understood prooedures and regula-
tions to safeguard the bus and its passengers from aooident when-
ever the bus is used for field and other non-route trips. 
In regard to the safety of ohildren on the plyground, the 
following reoommendations are proposed to sohool administrators: 
Provide adequate and oompetent supervision. 
Sohedule use of the play area to avoid crowding. 
Separate older ohildren from younger o"a.es. 
Prohibit bioyole riding and other inherently da.ngerous Bot1v 
ties in the play area. 
l'omulate and enforce rules and regulations for the oontrol 
of pupil oonduot on the playground. 
Maintain playground equipment and apparatus in good repair. 
ICeep the playground area free of obst ruotions and rubbish 
piles. 
During the oourse of the sohool day, in spite of all preoau-
tions taken by the sohool staff. aooidents will ooour. These are 
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the aocidents which oocur through the fault of no one, and they 
are termed "pure acoidents." These may range from the minor type 
of accident to those of a serious type requiring emergency treat-
ment • Although a teaoher is not held liable in cases of "pure 
accident," liability oan attaoh, if proper procedures are not fol-
lowed in the handling of these cases. When a pupil is injured, 
the teaoherin charge or one witnessing the acoident should imme-
diately call the sohool nurse. If a school nurse is not available 
the aotion to be taken by the teaoher depends upon the nature of 
the ir;jury. 
If the injury requiI"3d emergenoy treatment, the teaoher 
should render immediate aid. The teaoher by his relationship to 
the pupil is obligated to aid the pupil. In some oases of emer-
gency, prompt aotionmay save a lite. Laok of aotion in an emer-
genoy might lead to a oharge of negligenoe against the teaoher. 
First aid should be rendered until the injured pupil oan reoeive 
a physioian's servioes. Treatment should be restrioted to first 
aid, and not medical treatment, which is the responsibility of the 
physioian. 
Oare must be taken so as not to aggravate the oondition. 
Liability will attaoh if additional bodily harm is inflioted by a 
teaoh~r in rendering first aid, regardless of whether the aots 
were done in a proper or a negligent manner. In essence, a teaoh-
er may be held liable for not rendering first aid in oases where 
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it i8 needed. A teaoher may also be held striotly l1able for any 
additional injury which ocours as a result of first aid treatment. 
It is reoommended that teachers learn first aid prooedures. 
In cases where an emergenoy exists and the sohocl nurse is 
not available, apply emergeno7 first aid. Not1fy the parents of 
the child 1mmediate17. Bot1fy the fam1ly ph1'aioian. If the in-
jured pupil does not require emergency treatment, reference to a 
physic1an or the parents can be made at the disoretion of the 
administrator. 
In all cases where a school nurse is available, and an emer-
gency exists t the following procedure is recommended s send for the 
nurse immediately. Notify the principal. Have the office stat'f 
oall the parents. If the parents cannot be reaohed. notify the 
persons listed on the pupil'. !'emergenoy oard." Have the offioe 
staff oall the fam11y physician indicated on the pupil's "e~ergen­
oy oard." 
In all cases where a school nurse is available, and an emer-
genoy does not exist, simply refer the pupil to the nurse. 
fhe following reoommendations are proposed to sohool adminis-
trators as an aid in hand11ng pupil injuries requiring emergency 
med ical aid: 
Two or more deSignated sohool personnel should be qualified 
in first aid by taking Amerioan Red Cross First Aid Courses. 
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Emergenoy oare prooedures should be well planned so that pro-
per first aid oa1'8 oan be given until a physioian oan be oonsulted 
Everyone on the sohool staff should have a knowledge of the sohool 
first aid prooedures and polioy. 
One or more oompletely equipped first aid kits should be stra 
tesioally looated in eaoh sohool. The greatest need for these 
kits will be in the shop and in the laborator,r. 
A oumulative health reoord or emergenoy information oard 
should be oompiled for eaoh PUPll.~ Eaoh reoord should list the 
family physioian, and person to be notified when a student needs 
emergenoy medioal attention. Plans should be made for engaging 
transportation for ohildren. 
Information oonoerning eaoh illness Or injur,y and what was 
done should be entered on the pupil's oumulative health oard. 
Field trips may be termed an extension of the olassroom. 
Aooidents are not as oommon as they are in the sohool, but there 
is the possibility that they may ooour •. This paper does not in-
olude research on field trips, but reoommendations from Lee O. 
Garber's Yearbook of Sohool Law are inoluded in order to render ----~~ -- ---
a more oom»rehensive ooverage of liability_ 
Administrators should develop a polioy whiah will guarantee 
adequate planning for eaoh field trip,. 
Administrators should have all teaohers follow sohool olioy 
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o'Z the planning of field trips. 
Students should be "aroed of dange l'S 
the field trip. 
to be enoountered on 
Provide adequate supervision of students. It" one teaoher is 
not able to adequately superv1se the group, reasonably prudent 
adults who have been briefed as to their duties and potent1al 
dangers t should be used to supervise. 
Determine "hether the host for the f1eld trip w1ll assume 
liability in the case 0'Z an aocident on hi. premises. 
Parental approval suold be obtained for eaoh student going on 
the trip. While this gives the teacher no proteotion, it may 
prevent severe oritioism of the sohool. 
If there i8 no school policy regarding field trips, the 
teacher should obtain the approval of the administration before 
holding the trip. 
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DICTIONARY OF LEGAL TERMS 
Abrogated - To annul, repeal, or destroy. 
Aotion - An ordinary prooeeding in a oourt by whioh one party pro 
aeoutes another for the enforcement or proteotion of a right, 
tne redress of a wrong, or the punishment of a publio offense 
Aotionable Negligenoe - The breaoh or non-per.fo~noe of a legal 
duty through negleot or oarelessness, resulting in damage or 
inju1'7 to another. 
Appellant - The party who takes an appeal from one oourt to anoth 
er. 
Oode - A oompilation o~ statutes, soient~ioally ar~ed into 
ohapters, subheadings, and seotiona, with a table of oontent 
and index. 
Oammon Law - As used in this paper, legal prinoiples derived from 
usage and oustom, or from oourt deciSions affirming suoh 
usages and oustoms. 
Damages - Peouniar,y oompensation or indemnity whioh may be reoov-
ered in oouri by the person who has suttered 10s8 or injur,y 
to his person, property, or rights through the unlawful sot, 
or omission, or negligenoe of another. 
Defendant - The party against whom relief or reoovery is sought 
in a oourt aotion. 
Defens& - That whioh is offered and alleged by the defendant as a 
reason in law or faot why the pla1nt~f should not reoover. 
Duty - Human Aotion whioh is exaotly conformable to the laws which 
require us to obey them. 
Equity - A branoh of remedial justioe, administered by oertain 
tribunals, distinot from the common law oourts and empow-
ered to deoree -equity" (impartial justioe) between two 
persons whose rights or olaims are in oonfliot. 
Governmental Immunity - Immunity from tort aotions enjoyed by 
governmental un! ts in common-law 8tate8 .• 
178 
179 
In Looo Parentis - In plaoe of the pa rent; oharged w1 th some of 
the parentts rights, duties, and responsibilities. 
Judgment - Deoision of the oourt, usually that part involving the 
payment of damages. 
Law - System of prinoiples or rules of human oonduot, whioh in-
cludes deoisions of oourts as well as aots of legislatures. 
Liebili ty - Legal responsibilitY'. 
Litigation ... contest in a oourt of justice for the purpose of en-
:toroip.g a right. 
Malfeasanoe ... Commiss~on of an unlawful act, applied to publio 
offioers, and employees. 
Misfeasanoe - Improper performanoe of a lawful actJ negligenoe. 
leglisenoe - The omission to do something whioh a reasonable man, 
guided bY' those ordina17 considerations which ordinarily 
reg'.l.late hum~ at'fairs, would do. 
Non!easan~e ~ Omission to perton. a required duty. 
Nolens Volens - With or Without Consent. 
Nuisanoe - A oontinuous oondition or use of property in suoh a man~ 
ner as to obstruot the proper use of it bY' others lawfully 
having a right to use it, or the publio. 
Plaintiff - Person who brings an aotion. 
Power - The authority to do something express17 or impliedly 
granted. 
Precedent - A deoision oonsidered as furniShing an example or 
authority for an identioal or sim1lar oase afterw&.rd aris .. 
ing on a similar question of la •• 
Prudence - Carefulness, precaution, attent1veness, and good judg-
ment, applied to action or oonduot. That degree of oare re-
quired by the exigenoies or circumstanoes under whioh it is 
to be exeroised.. 
Quasi - As ift almost as if it were. 
Regulations - Rules :for management or government. 
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Respondeat Superior - The master is liable in oe~a1n cases for tb 
wrongful aots of his servant. Let the master answer. 
Stare Deoisis - Prinoiple that when a oourt has made a deolaration 
of a prinoiple it is the law until ohanged by a competent 
authoritYJ upholding of preoedents within the jurisdiotion. 
statute - Aot of the legislature. 
Tort - Legal wrong oommitted upon the person. reputation, or pro-
perty of another, independent of oontraot. 
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